Jeanty v. County of Orange

• Decision Date: 27 July 2005
• Docket Number: No. 03 CIV. 8043(WCC).,03 CIV. 8043(WCC).
• Parties: Kervin JEANTY, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF ORANGE, H. Frank Bigger, former Orange County Sheriff, sued in his individual capacity, Sgt. Lee Rywalt, Sgt. Daniel A. Figueroa, C.O. Jason Nowicki, C.O. Michael Pfleger, John Does I-X, sued in their individual capacities, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

379 F.Supp.2d 533

Kervin JEANTY, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF ORANGE, H. Frank Bigger, former Orange County Sheriff, sued in his individual capacity, Sgt. Lee Rywalt, Sgt. Daniel A. Figueroa, C.O. Jason Nowicki, C.O. Michael Pfleger, John Does I-X, sued in their individual capacities, Defendants.

No. 03 CIV. 8043(WCC).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

July 27, 2005.

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Thornton, Bergstein & Ullrich, LLP (Christopher D. Watkins, Esq., Of Counsel), Chester, NY, for Plaintiff.

Burke, Miele & Golden, LLP (Michael K. Burke, Esq., Of Counsel), Goshen, NY, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

WILLIAM C. CONNER, Senior District Judge.

Plaintiff Kervin Jeanty commenced the present action against defendants the County of Orange (the "County"), H. Frank Bigger, former Orange County Sheriff,¹ Sergeant Lee Rywalt, Sergeant Daniel A. Figueroa and corrections officers Jason Nowicki and Michael Pfleger² (collectively, "defendants").³ Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the defendants maliciously and sadistically subjected him to excessive force and physical abuse in violation of his rights under the Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. In addition, plaintiff maintains that the County violated his rights under the Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by failing to train and supervise its corrections personnel in the appropriate use of physical force and by its policy and practice of covering-up excessive force incidents. Plaintiff also alleges state law claims against defendants including assault, battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress, as well as a claim under N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 137(5) which precludes County correctional facilities from subjecting inmates to degrading and humiliating treatment. In the present motion, defendants move to dismiss the action in its entirety pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 56. Additionally, defendants move for severance of plaintiff's claims against the individual defendants from the claims against the County or, in the alternative, separate trials pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b). For the reasons stated hereinafter, defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part. Defendants' motion for severance or, in the alternative, separate trials is denied.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was arrested on January 28, 2002 and charged with Arson in the Second Degree, a Class B violent felony. (Defs. Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 1.) From January 2002 through approximately December 31, 2002, plaintiff was held at the Orange County Jail (the "Jail"). (Id. ¶ 3.) On May 20, 2002, plaintiff was convicted by a plea of guilty to the charge of Arson in the Second Degree. (Burke Affm., Ex. C.)

Plaintiff alleges that beginning in approximately late 2002. the Jail's Special Emergency Response Team (the "SERT Team") participated in cell shakedowns during which officers, including SERT Team members, "took inmates to the shower area to perform strip searches, while other officers searched through inmates' cells." (Complt. ¶ 12.) On December 19, 2002, defendants Rywalt, Figueroa, Nowicki and Pfleger, members of the SERT Team, were assigned to and did conduct cell searches at the Jail. (Defs. Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 5, 6.) Plaintiff maintains that on the evening of December 19, 2002, while he was housed in his cell in Housing Unit D-2, fifteen to twenty SERT Team members entered the D-2 Unit and ordered the inmates in their cells to turn on their cell lights and strip to their underwear. (Complt. ¶ 14.) Plaintiff alleges that he removed his long john underwear and sweatshirt and was then told by Rywalt and Figueroa to remove his t-shirt. (Pl. Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 14.) Plaintiff responded that he would take off his t-shirt in the shower area, which plaintiff maintains had been the procedure during other cell searches. (Id. ¶ 16.) In addition, plaintiff maintains that he believed from past experience that he might be written up if he left his cell without wearing a shirt. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that either Figueroa or Rywalt then said, "Take your shirt off before I take it off for you" to which plaintiff again responded that he would remove his shirt at the shower area where the strip searches occurred. (Id. ¶ 17; Complt. ¶ 16.)

Plaintiff alleges that Figueroa and Rywalt then ordered him to sit on his bed and put his hands behind his back, which he complied with. (Pl. Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 18.) Plaintiff maintains that after he complied, "approximately six SERT Team members, including defendants Figueroa, Rywalt, Nowicki and Pflager [sic], stormed into his cell and, without provocation, began to punch, hit and kick [him] about his ribs, head and face." (Id.) According to plaintiff,

Nowicki pinned [his] head into his pillow for several minutes. [Plaintiff], who is asthmatic, had difficulty breathing and began to choke. He informed Nowicki that he had asthma and could not breathe. In response, Nowicki momentarily released [plaintiff's] head from the pillow and said, "I'll let you have air every five seconds." Then, with the assistance of another officer, Nowicki continued to press [plaintiff's] head into his pillow. Other officers continued to punch and beat [plaintiff] while his head was pressed into his pillow.

(Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that Pfleger grabbed his left arm behind his back, pulled on it and continued to do so even though plaintiff yelled out in pain and begged the officer to stop. (Id. ¶ 18.) Plaintiff maintains that even after he heard his arm "loudly pop," the officer continued to hit him. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that the officers then placed him in shackles, handcuffed him behind his back and dragged him from his cell to the day room. (Id. ¶ 19.)

After the above-mentioned incident, plaintiff was transported to Arden Hill Hospital and was diagnosed as having "a spiral fracture to the humerus bone in his left arm, the bone connecting his elbow to his shoulder" and "left arm nerve damage." (Id. ¶ 21; Defs. Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 7.)

After investigation of the incident, a "Use of Force Review Form" was completed in the Jail on December 19, 2002, and a "New York State Commission of Corrections Reportable Incident" was completed and filed on December 20, 2002. (Defs. Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 8 (citing Burke Affm., Exs. H, I).) Defendants subsequently filed criminal charges against plaintiff, accusing plaintiff of assaulting Pfleger. (Complt. ¶ 21.) Plaintiff pled guilty to a reduced charge of assault in the third degree, a misdemeanor. (Pl. Mem. Opp. Summ. J. at 1.) Plaintiff contends that he pled guilty to a reduced charge "[t]o avoid a longer jail sentence." (Complt. ¶ 21.) However, plaintiff notes that there is no plea allocution and no record of factual support for his misdemeanor assault plea. (Pl. Mem. Opp. Summ. J. at 1.) In addition, plaintiff contends that "[d]uring the relevant time, defendants maintained a policy or practice of filing criminal charges against inmates who were themselves subjected to excessive force by Jail personnel, usually, ..., when the assaulted inmates required immediate hospital care." (Complt. ¶ 21.)

Additionally, plaintiff maintains that the County "failed to properly train and supervise defendants in the appropriate use of physical force to restrain an inmate in their charge" and that "[t]his failure to train and supervise contributed to the beating sustained by plaintiff." (Id. ¶ 24.) Furthermore, plaintiff alleges that "[d]uring the relevant time, the County ... had a policy and practice by which excessive force incidents by corrections staff against inmates in the Jail were covered-up and the involved officers are [sic] not disciplined." (Id. ¶ 25.) According to plaintiff, this policy and practice involved:

under-reporting use of force incidents to oversight authorities, both within the Jail and without (including the New York Commission on Corrections); injuries sustained by inmates were left untreated for significant periods of time (to allow the wounds to heal as much as possible) and minimally documented; inmates were not allowed to grieve excessive force incidents; and, the inmates themselves were routinely and unjustly charged with criminally assaulting the beating officers to shield those officers from any civil or criminal liability for the beating.

(Id.) Plaintiff contends that this policy and practice contributed to the beating he sustained and the resulting injuries. (Id.) Plaintiff filed a grievance with the Jail related to this incident on March 17, 2003. (Defs. Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 10; Burke Affm., Ex. J.)

DISCUSSION

I. Motion for Summary Judgment

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Under FED. R. CIV. P. 56, summary judgment may be granted where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 247-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A fact is material only if, based on that fact, a reasonable jury could find in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The burden rests on the movant to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In deciding whether summary judgment is appropriate, the court resolves all ambiguities and draws all permissible factual inferences against the movant. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. However, to defeat summary judgment, the nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings and "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The court's role at this stage of the litigation is not to decide issues of material fact, but to discern whether any exist. See Gallo v....