Steketee v. Lintz, Williams & Rothberg

• Citation: 38 Cal.3d 46,210 Cal.Rptr. 781,694 P.2d 1153
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Decision Date: 21 February 1985
• Parties: , 694 P.2d 1153 George STEKETEE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. LINTZ, WILLIAMS & ROTHBERG et al., Defendants and Respondents. L.A. 31910.

Page 781

210 Cal.Rptr. 781

38 Cal.3d 46, 694 P.2d 1153

George STEKETEE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. LINTZ, WILLIAMS & ROTHBERG et al., Defendants and Respondents.

L.A. 31910.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

Feb. 21, 1985.

Lewis, D'Amato, Brisbois & Bisgaard, Roy M. Brisbois and Mark E. Goodfriend, Los Angeles, for defendants and respondents.

BIRD, Chief Justice.

Does section 340.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure permit a minor subjected to professional negligence at the hands of a health care provider a period of at least three years from the date of the wrongful act in which to file his action, regardless of when he reached the age of majority?

I.

This is an action for legal malpractice. Plaintiff, George Steketee, alleges that defendant law firm and two of its members negligently failed to file an action for legal malpractice on his behalf within the period established by Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5. ¹

The parties stipulated to the following facts. Plaintiff was born on October 30, 1959. On September 25, 1976, when he was approximately 16 years, 11 months of age, he sustained certain personal injuries. Plaintiff alleges that various medical practitioners from whom he sought treatment negligently failed to diagnose a fracture in the lower right extremity. The alleged medical malpractice occurred in September and/or October of 1976.

In August or September of 1977, when plaintiff was 17 years old, he discovered facts which led him to suspect that medical malpractice had occurred. In January of 1978, plaintiff retained the defendants to represent him in connection with his medical malpractice claim. Plaintiff was 18 years, 3 months old at the time. In January of 1979, after plaintiff's 19th birthday, he was informed by the defendants that they would no longer represent him. No complaint was ever filed on behalf of plaintiff.

New counsel was subsequently retained. Believing that the statute of limitations had run on plaintiff's claim while he was being represented by defendants, plaintiff's new attorneys filed this action for legal malpractice. However, the trial court concluded that the statute of limitations had not run so summary judgment was entered for the defendants. This appeal followed.

Plaintiff contends that he became subject to the adult statute of limitations set forth in the first two sentences of section 340.5 when he turned 18. That provision requires commencement of an action within three years after the injury or within one year after actual or constructive discovery of the injury, whichever comes first. The three-year limitation may be tolled under certain circumstances not applicable here. ²

Plaintiff argues that the adult "discovery" period began to run on his 18th birthday and expired 1 year later while he was still being represented by defendants. Therefore, the defendants negligently failed to file an action on his behalf before the statute expired.

However, the trial court held that plaintiff remained subject to the separate statute of limitations for minors set forth in the third sentence of section 340.5. Unlike the adult statute, which requires commencement of an action within three years after the date of the injury, the minor statute requires the plaintiff to bring suit within three years from the date of the alleged wrongful act. Further, the minor statute makes no provision for a shorter limitations period based upon the plaintiff's discovery of the malpractice.

If defendants are correct, plaintiff had three years from the date of the wrongful act to file his action. Under this view, the statute began to run in September or October of 1976, the time of the alleged misdiagnosis. It did not expire until September or October of 1979, several months after the attorney-client relationship had been terminated. Defendants argue that they had no duty to file an action on plaintiff's behalf since they no longer represented him at the time the statute of limitations ran.

II.

First, this court must interpret section 340.5. In this task, the court is guided by certain principles of statutory construction. First among these principles is " 'the fundamental rule that a court "should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law." [Citation.] In determining such intent "[t]he court turns first to the words themselves for the answer." [Citation.]' " (Palos Verdes Faculty Assn. v. Palos Verdes Peninsula Unified Sch. Dist. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 650, 658, 147 Cal.Rptr. 359, 580 P.2d 1155.) The court is required to give effect to statutes " ' "according to the usual, ordinary import of the language employed in framing them." [Citations.] "If possible, significance should be given to every word, phrase, sentence and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose[ ]" [citation]; "a construction making some words surplusage is to be avoided." [Citation.] "When used in a statute [words] must be construed in context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious purpose of the statute where they appear." [Citations.]' " (Id., at pp. 658-659, 147 Cal.Rptr. 359, 580 P.2d 1155.)

Finally, " 'the various parts of a statutory enactment must be harmonized by considering the particular clause or section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole. [Citations.]' " (Id., at p. 659, 147 Cal.Rptr. 359, 580 P.2d 1155.) "[I]t is a well-established rule of construction that when a word or phrase has been given a particular scope or meaning in one part or portion of a law it shall be given the same scope and meaning in other parts or portions of the law. [Citations.]" (Stillwell v. State Bar (1946) 29 Cal.2d 119, 123, 173 P.2d 313; accord People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 468, 194 Cal.Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697 (plur. opn.); People v. Mirmirani (1981) 30 Cal.3d 375, 382, fn. 6, 178 Cal.Rptr. 792, 636 P.2d 1130 (plur. opn.).)

The pivotal sentence of section 340.5 provides that "[a]ctions by a minor shall be commenced within three years from the date of the alleged wrongful act except that actions by a minor under the full age of six years shall be commenced within three years or prior to his eighth birthday whichever provides a longer period." Plaintiff contends that the plain meaning of the phrase "actions by a minor" refers to the plaintiff's age at the time the action is filed rather than at the time of the alleged wrongful act. He argues that the minor statute of limitations applies only if a plaintiff is under the age of majority when the action is filed. If the plaintiff is over the age of majority when the action is filed, then reference must be made to the adult statute of limitations, with its one-year "discovery" limitation.

Applying the rules of statutory construction enumerated above, it is apparent that plaintiff's reading of section 340.5 is fatally flawed. This court would be required to attribute widely divergent meanings to the same phrase as it appears in two parts of the same statute--indeed, in two parts of the same sentence!

Specifically, the phrase "actions by a minor" appears twice in the third sentence of section 340.5. The second part of the sentence refers to "actions by a minor under the full age of six years." If, as plaintiff contends, the phrase "actions by a minor" referred to the plaintiff's age on the date the action is filed, no one who was the victim of medical malpractice while under the age of six would be permitted to commence an action at the age of seven. By definition, a seven-year-old may not file an action or do anything else while he or she is "under the full age of six years." Yet, it is clear that the Legislature intended to permit a victim of medical malpractice under the age of six to file an action at any time prior to his or her eighth birthday and in some cases even later. It is, therefore, apparent that the phrase "actions by a minor" as used in the second part of the sentence refers to the plaintiff's age at the time of the alleged wrongful act.

In accordance with the rule that a word or phrase will be given the same meaning each time it appears in a statute (Stillwell v. State Bar, supra, 29 Cal.2d at p. 123, 173 P.2d 313), the phrase "actions by a minor" in the first part of the sentence must also refer to the plaintiff's age at the time of the wrongful act. The phrase "under the full age of six years" in the second part of the sentence merely modifies the word "minor" and does not compel a different result.

The construction advocated by plaintiff has other defects. First, plaintiff contends that he was subject to the requirement applicable to adults that an action be filed within one year after the discovery of the injury. He asserts that this one-year period began to run on his eighteenth birthday. However, the statute does not say that the action must be commenced within one year after the plaintiff becomes an adult. It states that "the time for the commencement of action shall be ... one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury...." ( § 340.5, emphasis added.)

Thus, if the "discovery" component of the adult statute of limitations were applicable at all, the one-year period would not run from plaintiff's eighteenth birthday. Rather, it would run from the date of discovery in August or September of 1977, when plaintiff was 17 years old. In other words, the adult statute of limitations would begin to apply to plaintiff while he was still a minor, in clear violation of the Legislature's intention that minors should be treated differently than adults. ³

Plaintiff's construction would also require a wrenching shift in the initial frame of reference whenever a minor malpractice victim over the age of 15 did not bring an action until he was 18. As noted above, the adult statute of limitations requires commencement of an action within three years after the date of the injury, while the three-year period...