People v. Boyd
| Decision Date | 06 June 1985 |
| Court | California Supreme Court |
| Parties | , 700 P.2d 782 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Juan Anthony BOYD, Defendant and Appellant. Crim. 21704. |
Joseph Levine, William Blum, Deputy State Public Defenders, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendant and appellant.
William R. Weisman, Deputy Atty. Gen., Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiff and respondent.
This case arises under the 1978 death penalty initiative, now codified as Penal Code sections 190-190.5. Defendant was convicted under this statute of first degree murder and attempted robbery, with the special circumstance of murder during the commission of attempted robbery (Pen.Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). 1 The jury also found that defendant personally used a firearm in committing the charged offenses. A second jury, selected for the penalty phase, fixed the punishment at death.
David Edsill, the victim, was a student at Azusa Pacific College. On November 10, 1979, he and other members of the Azusa Pacific football team were invited to a party at the residence of Ronald Cochran in Pomona.
The same evening, defendant, Timothy Casey, Barbara Johnson and Pamela Plummer met at Johnson's residence. The account of the killing is based primarily on the testimony of Johnson and Plummer.
They testified that after drinking rum and beer defendant suggested getting some "Sherms"--cigarettes laced with PCP. As the four walked down the street, David Edsill approached them to ask directions to a nearby residence (presumably Cochran's house). They replied that they did not know the residence, and all but defendant continued walking past Edsill. Defendant, however, stopped and asked Edsill, "How much money do you have." Edsill said, "I don't have any." Defendant took hold of Edsill's shirt and asked again, "Do you have some money?" Edsill again said he did not. Defendant then drew a gun, pointed it at Edsill's head, and said, "I'm going to ask you again, do you have any money?" Edsill pushed the gun away from his head. Defendant stepped back, lowered the gun, and shot Edsill in the chest. As Edsill bent over and ran across the street, defendant fired five more shots, all of which missed. Defendant and his companions then fled from the area.
One of the other party guests discovered Edsill lying on the sidewalk and summoned help, but Edsill died within a few minutes. The county medical examiner testified that death resulted from a single bullet wound to the heart.
Defendant and his companions met later at Tim Casey's house. Defendant took the shells from the gun and gave them to the two girls. He also gave the gun to Johnson, but later changed his mind and asked for it back. Defendant then went to the residence of Leslie Henderson, where defendant was staying, and told Henderson, "I shot some white dude in the Islands [an area in Pomona]." Defendant added that he told the victim, "This is a 211, don't make it a 187." 2 Henderson observed that defendant had been drinking and appeared high on PCP.
Defendant himself did not testify, but counsel called several witnesses in an attempt to establish a diminished capacity defense. Defendant's mother and two family friends testified that defendant was a regular user of PCP and that when under the influence of this drug his personality would change, and he would become irrational and violent. A police officer and a defense investigator both testified that when they interviewed Johnson and Plummer, the two girls agreed that defendant used PCP; Johnson told the investigator she thought defendant took PCP the day of the crime.
Although the court appointed a psychologist and a psychiatrist to examine defendant, neither was called to testify. Instead, counsel called Dr. Bernd Schulze, a pharmacologist who was studying persons admitted to the Los Angeles County General Hospital for problems related to PCP. Schulze confirmed that persons who use PCP may engage in bizarre and violent behavior, sometimes long after they have taken the drug.
On the basis of the defense testimony, counsel argued that the killing was an unpremeditated, impulsive act, induced by PCP, and not an attempt to perpetrate a robbery. The jury, however, instructed on both felony murder and premeditated murder returned a verdict finding defendant guilty of first degree murder and of attempted robbery. The verdict further found as a special circumstance that the murder was committed while defendant was engaged in the attempted commission of the crime of robbery.
At the penalty trial several months later, the prosecution called many witnesses to depict defendant's history from junior high school to the date of trial. These witnesses described numerous unarmed assaults by defendant upon his secondary school classmates, school personnel, and counselors at juvenile detention facilities. Each of the actual assaults constituted criminal activity involving the use of force or violence; the admission of such testimony is not an issue on appeal. (See § 190.3, subd. (b).) We describe in detail, however, other prosecution testimony which has been challenged on appeal on the ground that it does not relate to any of the specific aggravating and mitigating factors enumerated in the 1978 initiative.
On March 17, 1974, Counselor Arthur Castillo was assigned to transport defendant by truck to the Riverside County Juvenile Hall. Defendant threatened to kill Castillo when they arrived at the hall. After he was handcuffed, defendant again threatened to "fuck up" Castillo as soon as the cuffs were removed. He added he would kick the gear shift and step on the gas pedal while the truck was going down the steep mountain road from the ranch. To prevent defendant from carrying out these threats, he was restrained with a seat belt, and another counselor accompanied Castillo on the trip.
The following day defendant asked a counselor at the Riverside County Juvenile Hall for a peanut butter and jelly sandwich. When the counselor refused to get him the sandwich, defendant threatened to kill the counselors. He began yelling and banging on the windows in his room. Other juveniles at the hall joined in, threatening to kill the counselors, to take the counselors' keys, and to harm their families. The disturbance lasted two to three hours but ended without anyone injured.
On September 26, 1980, Deputy Sheriff Silliman went to the main lockup tank at the Pomona courtroom, where defendant was being held in connection with the trial in the present case. She saw the metal grating had been removed from the air vent, noticed two T-shirts on the floor with dirt on them that might have come from the grating, and observed that defendant and one other prisoner in the lockup area were not wearing T-shirts.
In addition to the testimony recounting individual incidents, the prosecutor called James Carlson, defendant's probation officer during 1973-1974, and Lee McCollum, his parole agent during 1975-1980. Both explained how defendant was placed in various disciplinary and rehabilitative facilities, summarized the therapeutic and vocational programs made available to him, and reviewed defendant's failure to utilize or benefit from these programs. 3
Carlson testified that he arranged for defendant to attend the Good Samaritan Day Treatment Center, a private academic and therapeutic center. Defendant began school there on October 19, 1973, but was removed in a few days for some unspecified violation of law. Defendant returned to the Good Samaritan Center in November of 1973 and in February of 1974, but on each occasion was again removed after a few days. Carlson then arranged defendant's placement in the Los Pinos Forestry Camp, an Orange County juvenile facility with a work program and behavioral therapy; defendant lasted only five days in that program.
McCollum, defendant's parole agent from 1975 to 1980, testified that in 1975 defendant was paroled from the Nelles School in Whittier, a California Youth Authority (CYA) facility. About eight or nine months later, defendant violated parole, and was placed in the Preston School, a similar CYA facility. When defendant was released on parole, he left the jurisdiction without permission for about 14 months. When defendant returned, the CYA continued him on parole on condition that he participate in a drug rehabilitation program, continue his education, and seek employment. Defendant, however, did not attend the drug program regularly, did not do well in the Pomona adult education program, and quit his job after two weeks. McCollum arranged for defendant to receive therapy from the Pomona Family Counseling Service, but defendant refused to attend.
The prosecutor asked both Carlson and McCollum for their opinion on defendant's community reputation for violence. Carlson replied that defendant McCollum said that "defendant has exhibited quite a bit of violent action in the community without the known use of any weapons."
Finally, the prosecutor recalled Pamela Plummer, who repeated her guilt-phase testimony describing the killing. This time the prosecutor carefully asked her about each of the symptoms of PCP use described by the defense expert, Dr. Schulze. Plummer testified that defendant did not show such signs of use on the night of the murder, and that she did not think he was under the influence of PCP.
Nonplused by Plummer's testimony, the defense counsel abandoned his plan to present evidence of diminished capacity at the penalty phase, and called no witnesses. As a result, the new jury impanelled for the penalty trial did not hear testimony that defendant was a user of PCP and that this drug can cause irrational violent behavior. Defense counsel...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Denard
...observe that incriminating evidence was " ‘uncontradicted’ " by defendant] disapproved on other grounds in People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 772–773, 215 Cal.Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782 ; Vargas, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 476, 108 Cal.Rptr. 15, 509 P.2d 959 [Griffin error to observe that defendant......
-
People v. Brown
...in jail of the stolen wirecutters constitutes criminal conduct, and that reversal is required under People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 774-775, 215 Cal.Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782. The People assert all three incidents involved criminal conduct and at least the threat of violence. In Boyd, supr......
-
People v. Howard
...implied threat to use force or violence." Defendant urges, in supplemental briefing, that our holding in People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 772-776, 215 Cal.Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782, controls and requires reversal here. In Boyd, we considered the permissible scope of evidence which may be in......
-
People v. Lucky
...constitute an "actual crime." (See People v. Phillips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29, 72, 222 Cal.Rptr. 127, 711 P.2d 423; Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 778, 215 Cal.Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782.) He urges that juvenile misconduct leading to a juvenile adjudication cannot be considered a "crime" for any Defen......
-
Table of Cases null
...§2.2.2(2)(b); §2.2.3(2); §6.1 People v. Boyd, 222 Cal. App. 3d 541, 271 Cal. Rptr. 738 (4th Dist. 1990)—Ch. 2, §7.1.1 People v. Boyd, 38 Cal. 3d 762, 215 Cal. Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782 (1985)—Ch. 1, §2.1.1(2); Ch. 4-A, §4.1.4(1)(b)[3] People v. Boyd, 95 Cal. App. 3d 577, 157 Cal. Rptr. 293 (2d ......
-
Chapter 4 - §4. Character evidence of other acts offered for nonpropensity purposes
...in certain situations. E.g., Pen. C. §190.3 (discussing sentencing procedure if D is subject to death penalty); see People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 772 (if death penalty is possible, prosecution can present evidence on aggravation during sentencing phase, including evidence of D's othe......
-
Chapter 1 - §2. When is evidence relevant
...victim-impact evidence unless evidence is so unduly prejudicial that it renders trial fundamentally unfair); People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 773-74 (any evidence of D's background, character, or conduct that is not probative of any factor listed under §190.3 is irrelevant and thus inad......