People v. King

• Citation: 38 Cal.4th 617,42 Cal.Rptr.3d 743,133 P.3d 636
• Decision Date: 15 May 2006
• Docket Number: No. S129052.,S129052.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Sean KING, Defendant and Appellant.

42 Cal.Rptr.3d 743

38 Cal.4th 617

133 P.3d 636

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Sean KING, Defendant and Appellant.

No. S129052.

Supreme Court of California.

May 15, 2006.

Hilda Scheib, San Francisco, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Assistant Attorney General, Catherine A. Rivlin and Gregg E. Zywicke, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

KENNARD, J.

Subdivision (a)(1) of Penal Code section 12020 (section 12020(a)(1)),¹ prohibits the possession of a variety of weapons. Does it require a culpable mental state, or is it a "public welfare offense," for which proof of a culpable mental state is not required? We conclude that section 12020(a)(1) is not a public welfare offense, and that the prosecution must prove the possessor's knowledge of the weapon's illegal characteristics.

We also conclude that when, as here, the prohibited weapon is a "short-barreled rifle" — in this case a rifle that had been altered to reduce its overall length to less than 26 inches — the prosecution need only establish the defendant's knowledge of the shortness of the rifle, not its precise dimensions. The Court of Appeal held that the trial court's failure to instruct on knowledge required reversal of defendant's conviction for illegally possessing the rifle, concluding that the evidence was in conflict as to whether he knew that the rifle was shorter than the legally allowed 26 inches in overall length specified in the statute. Because the uncontested evidence established defendant's knowledge of the rifle's size, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

I

On December 4, 2001, San Francisco police officers executed a search warrant at a house occupied by defendant, his mother, and his brother. From a workbench in the garage they retrieved a loaded rifle, the stock of which had been sawed off, so that its overall length was 24 1/8 inches. In defendant's bedroom, they found methamphetamine and narcotics paraphernalia.

Defendant was charged with possession of a short-barreled rifle (§ 12020(a)(1)), selling or furnishing methamphetamine (Health & Saf.Code, § 11379), possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf.Code, § 11377), possession of narcotics paraphernalia (Health & Saf.Code, § 11364), and other crimes not relevant here.²

At trial, defendant admitted he knew the rifle was in the workbench drawer, and that he "probably picked it up to look at it" while cleaning the workbench, but he denied ownership of the rifle, claiming it must have belonged to his brother or one of his brother's friends. He said he did not know the length of the rifle.

With respect to the violation of section 12020(a)(1), the trial court gave this standard instruction: "Every person who possesses a rifle with an overall length of less than 26 inches is guilty of [violating section 12020(a)(1)]. [¶] There are two kinds of possession: actual possession and constructive possession. [¶] `Actual possession' requires that a person knowingly exercise direct physical control over a thing. [¶] `Constructive possession' does not require actual possession, but does require that a person knowingly exercise control over or the right to control a thing, either directly or through another person or persons. [¶] One person may have possession alone, or two or more persons together may share actual or constructive possession. [¶] In order to prove this crime ... each of the following elements must be proved: [¶] ... [a] person possessed any rifle with an overall length of less than 26 inches."

The jury convicted defendant of the crimes previously mentioned, and the trial court sentenced him to a term of five years and four months in prison, eight months of which were attributable to the violation of section 12020(a)(1).

The Court of Appeal reversed defendant's conviction for violating section 12020(a)(1). It held that the trial court committed prejudicial error in not instructing the jury that to convict defendant, the prosecution was required to prove that he knew or reasonably should have known the illegal characteristic of the short-barreled rifle he was charged with possessing. We granted the Attorney General's petition for review.

II

Section 12020 prohibits the possession of various "unusual, sophisticated weapons, some with mysterious and evil-sounding names...." (People v. Taylor (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 933, 938, 114 Cal. Rptr.2d 23.) It includes such exotic items as a fléchette dart, a shuriken, and a shobizue, as well as more commonplace weapons such as blackjacks, billy clubs, and metal knuckles.³ Among the prohibited items is a "short-barreled rifle." The phrase "short-barreled rifle" is a term of art that includes not only rifles with a barrel less than 16 inches long, but also rifles whose overall length is less than 26 inches, regardless of the length of the barrel. (§ 12020, subd. (c)(2).)⁴ Here, the rifle seized from the garage was 24 1/8 inches long.

At issue is whether the Legislature intended section 12020(a)(1) to be a public welfare offense, or whether the Legislature intended the prosecution to prove that the defendant had a culpable mental state, or mens rea, in which case we must decide the precise nature of that mental state.

The basic rules of statutory construction are well established. "When construing a statute, a court seeks to determine and give effect to the intent of the enacting legislative body." (People v. Braxton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 798, 810, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 46, 101 P.3d 994.) "`We first examine the words themselves because the statutory language is generally the most reliable indicator of legislative intent. [Citation.] The words of the statute should be given their ordinary and usual meaning and should be construed in their statutory context.' [Citation.] If the plain, commonsense meaning of a statute's words is unambiguous, the plain meaning controls." (Fitch v. Select Products Co. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 812, 818, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 591, 115 P.3d 1233.) But if the statutory language may reasonably be given more than one interpretation, "`"courts may consider various extrinsic aids, including the purpose of the statute, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, and the statutory scheme encompassing the statute."'" (People v. Yartz (2005) 37 Cal.4th 529, 538, 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 328, 123 P.3d 604; People v. Garcia (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1166, 1172, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 464, 52 P.3d 648.)

Although the language of section 12020(a)(1) does not specifically mention a culpable mental state, this does not mean that the Legislature did not intend to require one. As a general rule, no crime is committed unless there is a union of act and either wrongful intent or criminal negligence. (In re Jorge M. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 866, 872, 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 466, 4 P.3d 297; see § 20.) This rule, which is "firmly embedded" in "`the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence'" (Staples v. United States (1994) 511 U.S. 600, 605, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608) is so basic that wrongful intent or criminal negligence "is an invariable element of every crime unless excluded expressly or by necessary implication" (People v. Vogel (1956) 46 Cal.2d 798, 801, 299 P.2d 850, fn. omitted; People v. Coria (1999) 21 Cal.4th 868, 876, 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 650, 985 P.2d 970), and "penal statutes will often be construed to contain such an element despite their failure expressly to state it" (In re Jorge M., supra, at p. 872, 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 466, 4 P.3d 297; see also Staples v. United States, supra, at pp. 605-606, 114 S.Ct. 1793).

Proof of a culpable mental state is, however, not required for "public welfare offenses." These crimes generally involve the violation of statutes that are purely regulatory in nature and seek to protect the health and safety of the public. (Staples v. United States, supra, 511 U.S. at pp. 606-607, 114 S.Ct. 1793; In re Jorge M., supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 872, 98 Cal. Rptr.2d 466, 4 P.3d 297.) Examples of such statutes are furnishing alcohol to a minor (In re Jennings (2004) 34 Cal.4th 254, 266, 17 Cal.Rpt.3d 645, 95 P.3d 906), sale of adulterated food (In re Casperson (1945) 69 Cal.App.2d 441, 443, 159 P.2d 88) and driving with a prohibited blood-alcohol concentration (Ostrow v. Municipal Court (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 668, 197 Cal.Rptr. 40). (See also 1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal.Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Elements, § 17, pp. 220-222.) In the words of this court: "`[Public welfare] offenses usually involve light penalties and no moral obloquy or damage to reputation. Although criminal sanctions are relied upon, the primary purpose of the statutes is regulation rather than punishment or correction. The offenses are not crimes in the orthodox sense, and wrongful intent is not required in the interest of enforcement.'" (People v. Coria, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 877, 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 650, 985 P.2d 970.)

The Attorney General here contends that section 12020(a)(1) is a public welfare offense. Although he acknowledges that a violation of section 12020(a)(1) requires "proof of the defendant's knowledge of the existence of the weapon" the defendant is accused of possessing, he argues that the crime does not require proof of the defendant's "knowledge of the contraband character which renders the weapon illegal." As explained below, we disagree.

Section 12020 was enacted in 1953 as part of the Dangerous Weapons' Control Law (§§ 12000-12520). As originally enacted, the statute stated: "Any person in this State who manufactures or causes to be manufactured, imports into the State, keeps for sale, or offers or exposes for sale, or who gives, lends, or possesses any instrument or weapon of the kind commonly known as a blackjack, slung shot, billy, sandclub, sandbag, or metal knuckles, or who carries concealed upon his person any explosive substance, other than fixed ammunition, or who...