Melugin v. Hames

• Decision Date: 25 October 1994
• Docket Number: No. 93-36109,93-36109
• Citation: 38 F.3d 1478
• Parties: William B. MELUGIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Lloyd F. HAMES, Commissioner, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 1478

38 F.3d 1478

William B. MELUGIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Lloyd F. HAMES, Commissioner, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 93-36109.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Aug. 5, 1994.

Decided Oct. 25, 1994.

Nancy J. Shaw, Asst. Federal Public Defender, Anchorage, AK, for plaintiff-appellant.

Nancy R. Simel, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of Sp. Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage, AK, for defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Alaska.

Before: PREGERSON, CANBY, and BOOCHEVER, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge PREGERSON; Dissent by Judge CANBY.

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge:

OVERVIEW

William B. Melugin, an Alaska state prisoner, appeals the District Court's denial of his habeas petition. Melugin challenges his conviction for interference with official proceedings on the grounds that the Alaska statute under which he was convicted is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad in violation of the First Amendment. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2253. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

In the mid-1980's, William B. Melugin, a resident of Cordova, Alaska, became involved in a dispute with the Cordova Telephone Cooperative (the "Co-op") over loss of telephone services provided by the Co-op to Melugin's small trucking business. Melugin claims that, as a result, he lost his business. Efforts to settle the dispute failed. ¹

In April of 1987, Melugin filed a civil complaint in Alaska superior court against the Co-op. Shortly after the Co-op filed its answer, Melugin came to the courthouse in Cordova and spoke with state Magistrate Susan Weltz and demanded that his case be set for trial immediately. Magistrate Weltz told Melugin that setting a trial date was not a simple matter and explained that trial Several months later, on September 17, 1987, the Co-op filed a motion for summary judgment against Melugin. The Co-op's counsel mailed Melugin a copy of the motion. Two days later, Melugin addressed the following letter to Anchorage Superior Court Judge Brian C. Shortell, who had been assigned to Melugin's case:

dates were set by the superior court in Anchorage. Melugin became increasingly angry and began yelling at Magistrate Weltz, who in turn became so frightened by Melugin's behavior that she locked the door to her chambers when Melugin left.

To Whom It May Concern

I am still waiting for my trial date in the above case. When defendants suspended phone service to my business it was for the express purpose of forcing hardships upon my family. I've had enough. I told them when I lost my home if I had not received a fair trial by jury I was going to kill the things. Last week I signed a quit claim to my home and property. I can stay until I get an honest trial or someone else buys the property. As far as I am concerned the things are living on borrowed time. And this is the last time I am asking for my rights as a human.

The court forwarded a copy of Melugin's letter to the Co-op's attorney, who construed it as a threat and notified the Cordova Police. One month later, in mid-October, Melugin was interviewed by a Cordova police officer concerning the letter. Melugin confirmed that the letter's apparent threat to kill "the things" was directed at the Co-op's manager, members of its board, and Magistrate Weltz. Melugin said that he wrote the letter in hopes of being arrested so that he could receive a trial on his civil claims against the Co-op.

The state took no immediate action on Melugin's letter. On December 7, 1987, Judge Shortell granted the Co-op's motion for summary judgment against Melugin. Melugin was in California at the time, but a friend notified him of the court's ruling.

On December 15, Melugin returned to Cordova but was forced to travel almost immediately to Anchorage for removal of a large cyst that had become severely infected. On December 19, the cyst was surgically removed under general anesthetic. Melugin was released from the hospital the following day. Melugin's physician directed him to take five milligrams of Percodan and ten milligrams of Valium three times daily to relieve pain. Melugin returned to Cordova. Several days later, Melugin had his wound redressed by a Cordova physician, who advised Melugin to take only half of the originally prescribed doses of medication.

On December 28, 1987, Melugin took the originally prescribed doses of Percodan and Valium, armed himself, and drove to the state courthouse in Cordova. There, in an apparently agitated state, Melugin confronted Magistrate Weltz. He demanded to know if the superior court's order granting summary judgment meant that his case had been dismissed. When Magistrate Weltz confirmed that the case had been dismissed, Melugin pulled out the loaded gun and pointed it at Weltz. Magistrate Weltz pressed the security alarm, but Melugin threatened to shoot her if the police arrived. Weltz then called the security police and told them not to come.

Holding Weltz at gunpoint, Melugin demanded an immediate jury trial for his case. Weltz telephoned the presiding superior court judge in Anchorage, who negotiated through Weltz with Melugin, and eventually agreed to fly a judge to Cordova from Anchorage that afternoon so that a jury trial could begin. During these negotiations, Melugin took another dose of his prescribed medications. Within a short time, Melugin began to look weak and ill, showing the effects of the medicines. Approximately one-half hour later, Melugin holstered the gun and told Magistrate Weltz that she was free to leave. After she left, Melugin was taken into custody. The entire siege lasted approximately one and one-half hours.

The State of Alaska indicted Melugin on several counts. The first count, which related to the threatening letter of September 17, 1987 that Melugin had sent, charged him with the offense of interference with official proceedings in violation of AS Before trial, Melugin moved to dismiss the first count of interference with official proceedings on the ground that the statute under which he was charged was impermissibly vague and overbroad. Melugin's motion was denied. Melugin was tried before a jury and convicted on all counts except one of the two alternative counts of kidnapping.

11.56.510(a)(1)(D). The indictment also charged Melugin with two counts of kidnapping, ² one count of third-degree assault, and one count of third-degree weapons misconduct.

Melugin then filed a direct appeal to the Alaska Court of Appeals, challenging his conviction. Melugin argued that because the Alaska statute under which he was convicted concerning interference with a judicial proceeding is vague and overbroad, it should not be applied to his conduct. The Alaska Court of Appeals rejected Melugin's argument, and ruled that the statute applied to Melugin's conduct which was intended to prevent the court from dismissing his civil lawsuit, that Melugin's conduct fell within the "hard core" of activity prohibited by the statute, and that the statute was not facially overbroad because "threats" are not protected speech.

Melugin then sought discretionary review with the Alaska Supreme Court. That court denied Melugin's petition.

In September 1992, Melugin filed in the United States District Court a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in which he sought to vacate all of his convictions on a number of grounds. Appointed counsel later filed an amended petition challenging only the conviction for interference with official proceedings. The sole ground for relief was: "Alaska Statute AS 11.56.610 (Interference with Official Proceedings) is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad."

Following briefing by both parties, Magistrate Judge John D. Roberts issued a written report and recommendation, concluding that the statute does not infringe on constitutionally protected speech and that the provision is not impermissibly vague as applied to Melugin's conduct. Accordingly, Magistrate Judge Roberts recommended that the habeas petition be denied. After considering Melugin's objections and the state of Alaska's response, Magistrate Judge Roberts declined to modify his recommendation.

United States District Judge James K. Singleton accepted Magistrate Judge Roberts' recommendation, and concluded that the Alaska statute is not overbroad because the United States Constitution does not protect "true threats" to harm persons. Further, Judge Singleton found that the statute was not vague and that Melugin's conduct clearly fell within the "hard core" of cases intended to be covered by the statute.

DISCUSSION

The decision whether to grant or deny a petition for habeas corpus is reviewed de novo. Adams v. Peterson, 968 F.2d 835, 843 (9th Cir.1992) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1818, 123 L.Ed.2d 448 (1993). We accord state court factual conclusions a presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(d) (1988). See Callazo v. Estelle, 940 F.2d 411, 415-16 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, S.Ct. 870, 116 L.Ed.2d 776 (1992). Further, we accept a state court ruling on questions of state law. Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 885 (9th Cir.1990).

1. First Amendment Considerations: Overbreadth

Melugin challenges the constitutionality of AS 11.56.510(a)(1), the statute under which he was convicted, on grounds that the statute violates his First Amendment right to free speech because it is impermissibly vague and overbroad.

The statute reads in pertinent part:

(a) A person commits the crime of interference with official proceedings if the person

(1) uses force on anyone, damages the property of anyone, or threatens anyone with intent to

(A) improperly influence a witness or otherwise influence the testimony of a witness;

(B) influence a juror's vote, opinion, decision, or other action as a juror;

(C) retaliate against a witness or juror because of participation by the witness or juror in an official proceeding; or

(D) otherwise...