Munafo v. Metropolitan Transp. Authority
Decision Date | 24 August 2004 |
Docket Number | Docket No. 03-7831-CV. |
Citation | 381 F.3d 99 |
Parties | Charles MUNAFO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, New York City Transit Authority, Staten Island Rapid Transit Operating Authority, Alfonse W. Sorrentino, Peter Argenziano, individually and in his official capacity, Samuel Holmes, individually in his official capacity, John J. McCabe, individually and in his official capacity, Owen P. Swords, Esq., individually and in his official capacity, David C. Filimon, individually and in his official capacity, Martin F. Scheinman and John and Jane Doe, 1-4, Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Edward R. Korman, Chief Judge.
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Scott A. Korenbaum, New York, New York, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Dorothea W. Regal, Luisa K. Hagemeier, Hoguet Newman & Regal, LLP, New York, New York, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before: McLAUGHLIN, CABRANES, and WALLACE, Circuit Judges.*
Charles Munafo appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Edward R. Korman, Chief Judge, denying his motion to alter or amend judgment and denying a new trial. Munafo contends that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to amend its civil judgment and provide a new trial on the issue of damages, or grant a new trial on all issues. He argues that the jury misinterpreted questions on the special verdict form and rendered an inconsistent verdict. The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343, and we have jurisdiction over Munafo's timely filed appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.
In 1999, the Staten Island Rapid Transit Operation Authority (Authority) terminated Munafo's employment in its Maintenance of Way Department (Track Department) following a series of disciplinary actions for alleged insubordinate conduct. At the time, defendants Peter Argenziano, David Filimon, John McCabe, and Alphonse Sorrentino were managerial employees at the Authority. Sorrentino, Munafo's immediate supervisor in the Track Department, initiated the disciplinary proceedings against Munafo and served as principle complainant. Argenziano, Filimon, and McCabe presided over various phases of the proceedings as hearing officers.
After exhausting the Authority's contractual grievance procedures, Munafo filed a civil action in federal court against Sorrentino, Argenziano, Filimon, McCabe, and other individual and corporate defendants primarily pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His complaint alleged that the defendants denied him due process and violated his First Amendment free speech rights by terminating his employment in retaliation for his safety complaints and union activities. The district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds. On appeal, we concluded that we lacked jurisdiction to consider the First Amendment claims, and we declined to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over the corporate defendants' appeal. See Munafo v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 285 F.3d 201, 210 (2d Cir.2002) (Munafo I). Nonetheless, we reversed the district court's denial of the individual defendants' motions for summary judgment on the due process claims. See id.
After remand and at the conclusion of a five-day trial, the district judge instructed the jury that some of Munafo's speech might be constitutionally protected and outlined the jury's role in ascertaining the defendants' motives for terminating Munafo. He explained that the jury must decide whether Munafo's protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the defendants' decision to take action against him, but that it must also consider whether the defendants would have terminated Munafo even if he had not engaged in protected speech. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977). Along the way, the district judge stressed that the jury's responsibility was limited to answering the four factual questions on the special verdict form with respect to each defendant; the court would then apply the law to the jury's verdict and render judgment. No party objected to these oral instructions or the questions on the special verdict form.
After deliberating approximately one day, the jury announced its verdict. The completed special verdict form reads as follows:
Special Verdict Form on the Question of Liability
X Yes No
If you answered "No" to Question 1, do not proceed to Questions 2, 3 or 4.
Alfonso Sorrentino X Yes ___ No Peter Argenziano X Yes ___ No John McCabe X Yes ___ No David Filimon ___ Yes X No
3. If you answered "Yes" to Question 2 as to any individual defendant, do you find that that defendant would have taken the same action even if plaintiff had not engaged in any of the constitutionally protected speech?
Alfonso Sorrentino X Yes ___ No Peter Argenziano X Yes ___ No John McCabe X Yes ___ No David Filimon ___ Yes X No
4. Do you find that plaintiff unreasonably chose not to participate in the disciplinary process provided for by the collective bargaining agreement and that his participation could have led the Standing Board of Arbitration or any other hearing officer in the process to decide not to terminate Mr. Munafo?
___ Yes X No
Upon receiving the jury's special verdict, the district judge announced judgment in favor of all four remaining defendants. He then polled the jurors individually, and each confirmed that the answers provided in open court accurately reflected their views of the case. The jury was subsequently excused from the courtroom.
Moments later, some jurors informed the district judge's law clerk that they had been surprised and disappointed to learn that their special verdict resulted in a judgment for the defendants. The district judge invited the jury back into the courtroom and inquired once again whether the jury's answers on the special verdict form were correct. The following colloquy ensued:
The court then proceeded to explain why, as a matter of law, the jury's factual findings for Questions 1 and 3 exonerated all four defendants.
After the jury withdrew from the court-room for the second time, Munafo contended that the jury must have misread Question 3 and therefore mismarked the answer boxes in the special verdict form. Reluctantly, the trial judge consented to poll the jury a third time. The interview proceeded as follows:
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