Munafo v. Metropolitan Transp. Authority

Decision Date24 August 2004
Docket NumberDocket No. 03-7831-CV.
Citation381 F.3d 99
PartiesCharles MUNAFO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, New York City Transit Authority, Staten Island Rapid Transit Operating Authority, Alfonse W. Sorrentino, Peter Argenziano, individually and in his official capacity, Samuel Holmes, individually in his official capacity, John J. McCabe, individually and in his official capacity, Owen P. Swords, Esq., individually and in his official capacity, David C. Filimon, individually and in his official capacity, Martin F. Scheinman and John and Jane Doe, 1-4, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Edward R. Korman, Chief Judge.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Scott A. Korenbaum, New York, New York, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Dorothea W. Regal, Luisa K. Hagemeier, Hoguet Newman & Regal, LLP, New York, New York, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before: McLAUGHLIN, CABRANES, and WALLACE, Circuit Judges.*

WALLACE, Senior Circuit Judge.

Charles Munafo appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Edward R. Korman, Chief Judge, denying his motion to alter or amend judgment and denying a new trial. Munafo contends that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to amend its civil judgment and provide a new trial on the issue of damages, or grant a new trial on all issues. He argues that the jury misinterpreted questions on the special verdict form and rendered an inconsistent verdict. The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343, and we have jurisdiction over Munafo's timely filed appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.

I.

In 1999, the Staten Island Rapid Transit Operation Authority (Authority) terminated Munafo's employment in its Maintenance of Way Department (Track Department) following a series of disciplinary actions for alleged insubordinate conduct. At the time, defendants Peter Argenziano, David Filimon, John McCabe, and Alphonse Sorrentino were managerial employees at the Authority. Sorrentino, Munafo's immediate supervisor in the Track Department, initiated the disciplinary proceedings against Munafo and served as principle complainant. Argenziano, Filimon, and McCabe presided over various phases of the proceedings as hearing officers.

After exhausting the Authority's contractual grievance procedures, Munafo filed a civil action in federal court against Sorrentino, Argenziano, Filimon, McCabe, and other individual and corporate defendants primarily pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His complaint alleged that the defendants denied him due process and violated his First Amendment free speech rights by terminating his employment in retaliation for his safety complaints and union activities. The district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds. On appeal, we concluded that we lacked jurisdiction to consider the First Amendment claims, and we declined to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over the corporate defendants' appeal. See Munafo v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 285 F.3d 201, 210 (2d Cir.2002) (Munafo I). Nonetheless, we reversed the district court's denial of the individual defendants' motions for summary judgment on the due process claims. See id.

After remand and at the conclusion of a five-day trial, the district judge instructed the jury that some of Munafo's speech might be constitutionally protected and outlined the jury's role in ascertaining the defendants' motives for terminating Munafo. He explained that the jury must decide whether Munafo's protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the defendants' decision to take action against him, but that it must also consider whether the defendants would have terminated Munafo even if he had not engaged in protected speech. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977). Along the way, the district judge stressed that the jury's responsibility was limited to answering the four factual questions on the special verdict form with respect to each defendant; the court would then apply the law to the jury's verdict and render judgment. No party objected to these oral instructions or the questions on the special verdict form.

After deliberating approximately one day, the jury announced its verdict. The completed special verdict form reads as follows:

Special Verdict Form on the Question of Liability

1. Do you find that plaintiff engaged in the constitutionally protected speech that the Court described to you?
                X Yes           No
                

If you answered "No" to Question 1, do not proceed to Questions 2, 3 or 4.

2. If you answered "Yes" to Question 1, do you find that plaintiff's constitutionally protected speech was at least a "substantial" or "motivating" factor in his dismissal with respect to the defendant indicated?
                Alfonso Sorrentino X Yes ___ No
                Peter Argenziano X Yes ___ No
                John McCabe X Yes ___ No
                David Filimon ___ Yes X No
                

3. If you answered "Yes" to Question 2 as to any individual defendant, do you find that that defendant would have taken the same action even if plaintiff had not engaged in any of the constitutionally protected speech?

                   Alfonso Sorrentino       X    Yes    ___    No
                   Peter Argenziano         X    Yes    ___    No
                   John McCabe              X    Yes    ___    No
                   David Filimon                ___         Yes      X    No
                

4. Do you find that plaintiff unreasonably chose not to participate in the disciplinary process provided for by the collective bargaining agreement and that his participation could have led the Standing Board of Arbitration or any other hearing officer in the process to decide not to terminate Mr. Munafo?

                ___ Yes X No
                

Upon receiving the jury's special verdict, the district judge announced judgment in favor of all four remaining defendants. He then polled the jurors individually, and each confirmed that the answers provided in open court accurately reflected their views of the case. The jury was subsequently excused from the courtroom.

Moments later, some jurors informed the district judge's law clerk that they had been surprised and disappointed to learn that their special verdict resulted in a judgment for the defendants. The district judge invited the jury back into the courtroom and inquired once again whether the jury's answers on the special verdict form were correct. The following colloquy ensued:

THE COURT: My law clerk tells me that you were somewhat surprised when I said that the net effect of your answers to the question was a verdict for the defendants. My question to you is whether the answers that you gave me are your answers to those questions....

THE FOREPERSON: We thought it would be a different outcome.

* * * * * *

THE COURT: ... The third question ... said if you answered yes to question 2 as to any defendant, do you find that any defendant would have taken the same action, even if plaintiff had not engaged in any of the constitutionally protected speech. And you answered [ ] yes with respect to Sorrentino, Argenziano and McCabe.... Now, are those answers your responses to the question? ...

THE FOREPERSON: Those are the answers that —

THE COURT: Okay....

The court then proceeded to explain why, as a matter of law, the jury's factual findings for Questions 1 and 3 exonerated all four defendants.

After the jury withdrew from the court-room for the second time, Munafo contended that the jury must have misread Question 3 and therefore mismarked the answer boxes in the special verdict form. Reluctantly, the trial judge consented to poll the jury a third time. The interview proceeded as follows:

THE COURT: I just want to ask you ... was yes your answer to question 2?

JUROR NUMBER 2: 2?

THE COURT: Or 3 rather. Was yes the answer?

JUROR NUMBER 2: That was the answer that we indicated but—

JUROR NUMBER 1: But we didn't understand it.

THE COURT: You didn't understand it?

JUROR NUMBER 1: No[,] because it would have been no the way you explained it to us. We found—you told us the law after we picked it. Now, knowing the law, no, we would have went the other way. We feel very strongly about it, your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, y[]ou may feel very strongly that the plaintiff should prevail—

JUROR NUMBER 1: Yes.

THE COURT:—but if your answer was correct to the question, he can't and you can't change your answer just because you would like him to win.... So, the issue is not whether you misunderstood—

JUROR NUMBER 1: Even if we again misunderstood, we are for the plaintiff on this. That's why we would say no to—that's my point. We are for the plaintiff to begin with.... I mean, we were told the law after.

* * * * * *

THE COURT: ... You can't decide first that you want to rule for the plaintiff and then answer the questions to make that result happen. It works just in reverse.

* * * * * *

JUROR NUMBER 7: But, your Honor, we only answered that because we misinterpreted it. And now I don't feel our intent—our verdict has come forth in this court.... We were totally confused at [the time you polled us], your Honor. We were in a state of shock here. And we went back and we couldn't believe what we had just heard....

* * * * * *

THE COURT: That's because you may have wanted to reach a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. But your answer to the question, there was no ambiguity in this question....

* * * * * *

JUROR NUMBER 1: In all honestly [sic], you know what we agreed to, that was for the plaintiff. So, we made a mistake the wrong way[,] but in our hearts, we were for the plaintiff. I know we agreed to the question not realizing—

THE COURT: Yes, not realizing that it would—but that's my point. You answered the question—

JUROR NUMBER 1: Not realizing what it meant to the stuff.... I didn't understand it. This went by the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
200 cases
  • Ferreira v. City of Binghamton
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit
    • September 23, 2020
    ... ... other than by a municipal employee, we find conflicting authority in the rulings of the Court of Appeals. Because we cannot discern from ... Munafo v. Metro. Transp. Auth. , 381 F.3d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal ... ...
  • Morris v. Flaig
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York
    • March 31, 2007
    ... ... Air Transp. Local 504, 992 F.2d 12, 14 (2d Cir.1993)) (additional citation omitted) ... erroneous result or that the verdict is a miscarriage of justice." Munafo v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 381 F.3d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Atkins ... , Inc., 71 F.Supp.2d 139, 166 (E.D.N.Y.1999) (stating that the authority to deny certification, even where the three statutory criteria are met, is ... ...
  • Claudio v. Mattituck-Cutchogue Union Free Sch. Dist.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York
    • July 24, 2013
    ... ... See Carlton v. Mystic Transp., Inc., 202 F.3d 129, 135 (2d Cir.2000) (“[A]n employer who ... result or that the verdict is a miscarriage of justice.” Munafo v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 381 F.3d 99, 105 (2d Cir.2004) (quoting Atkins ... to be terminated for unlawful reasons, and who was using his authority in a secretive manner to accomplish that objective. Similarly, as ... ...
  • Schwartz v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York
    • May 31, 2007
    ... ... No California authority cited by the Excess Carriers squarely places the reasonableness inquiry on ... Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2810.1 (1995); see also Munafo v. Metropolitan Transp. Authority, 381 F.3d 99, 105 (2d Cir.2004). A ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • Trials
    • United States
    • Georgetown Law Journal No. 110-Annual Review, August 2022
    • August 1, 2022
    ...is rendered, and to employ nonjuror evidence even after the verdict is rendered.” Id. at 51; see, e.g. , Munafo v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 381 F.3d 99, 106-07 (2d Cir. 2004) (juror testimony regarding whether verdict delivered was verdict agreed upon admissible under Rule 606(b) because Rule ......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT