Littlejohn v. Moody
| Decision Date | 10 August 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:04CV330.,2:04CV330. |
| Citation | 381 F.Supp.2d 507 |
| Parties | McKinley LITTLEJOHN, Plaintiff, v. Larry MOODY, Safety Manager, Mike Gibbs, Electric Foreman, and Chuck Lloyd, Counselor, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
McKinley Littlejohn, Petersburg, VA, Pro se.
Anita K. Henry, Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, VA, for Defendants.
OPINION AND FINAL ORDER
Plaintiff, a Federal inmate, brings this pro se action pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), to redress alleged violations of his constitutional rights. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that he was shocked by an electrical surge because a buffing machine that he was required to use did not have a ground-prong in its plug. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and monetary damages as follows: $75,000 in punitive damages from each defendant; $25,000 in compensatory damages from each defendant; and $25,000 in mental and emotional damages from each defendant. This action is before the Court on the Motion of Mr. Larry Moody, Mr. Mike Gibbs, and Mr. Chuck Lloyd [hereinafter "the Defendants"] to Dismiss the Complaint. For the reasons set forth below, the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
Plaintiff filled out a Complaint Form, which was received by the Court on May 21, 2004, and conditionally filed on May 27, 2004. (Doc. 1.) In an effort to determine whether Plaintiff stated a Bivens claim adequately, the Court mailed Plaintiff a questionnaire on June 23, 2004, and ordered him to complete it within thirty (30) days. (Doc. 2.) Plaintiff filled out and returned the questionnaire, which the Court treated as an amendment to Plaintiff's Complaint. (Doc. 3.) Plaintiff qualified to proceed in forma pauperis, so the Court ordered his Complaint filed on September 16, 2004. (Doc. 6.) Plaintiff was ordered to submit documentation of administrative exhaustion, which he did on September 29, 2004. (Doc. 7.) By order of the Court, the Attorney General of the United States, the United States Attorney, and the Defendants were served with summons and copies of the Complaint. See Docs. 8-11.
On December 14, 2004, the Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss and a memorandum in support thereof. (Doc. 12.) The next day, in accordance with Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir.1975), Plaintiff was notified of his opportunity to respond to Defendants' Motion with any material that he wished to offer in rebuttal. (Doc. 13.) Plaintiff was also instructed that failure to submit any materials could result in an adverse judgment based on Defendants' Motion. Id. Plaintiff timely responded to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, submitting a reply brief, which he actually styled a "rebuttal brief", five unsworn statements from fellow inmates, and copies of the documents previously offered as evidence of administrative exhaustion. (Doc. 14.) Plaintiff certifies that he mailed a copy of his reply to counsel for the Defendants on January 3, 2005.
"Unless otherwise directed by the Court ... the moving party may file a rebuttal brief within three (3) days after the service of the opposing party's reply brief." E.D VA. LOCAL R. CIV. P. 7(F). When service is made by mail, FED. R. CIV. P. 6(e) adds three days, so a rebuttal brief must be filed within six (6) days after service. In computing a period of time allowed by the local rules of a district court, "the day of the act, event, or default from which the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included." FED. R. CIV. P. 6(a). Unless the last day is a weekend or legal holiday, it shall be counted. Id.
In this case, Plaintiff's reply brief was mailed January 3, 2005. Since the sixth day was a Sunday, Defendant's rebuttal brief was due on January 10, 2005. Defendant's rebuttal brief was received January 26, 2005. A court may, for good cause shown, enlarge the period of time in which an action is to occur. Id. at (b). Requests for extensions or enlargements of time must be in writing and, if made after the period of time in which an act was to occur, must be accompanied by a brief. Local Rule 7(E) and (H). Such requests are looked upon with disfavor and may only be granted if the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect. Rule 6(b); Local Rule 7(H). In this case, the Defendants made no request for extension or enlargement and offered no reason for their untimely submission. Therefore, the Defendants' rebuttal brief will not be filed or considered by the Court.
What follows are those facts that, given the deference owed to Plaintiff as a pro se litigant, his Complaint/Brief in Support of Complaint ["Compl."], Questionnaire ["Q."], and Reply Brief can be read to allege. Since the Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint, his factual allegations must be accepted as true. Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 405 (4th Cir.2001) (citing Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421-22, 89 S.Ct. 1843, 23 L.Ed.2d 404 (1969)).
On or about 9:00 a.m. on February 25, 2004, Plaintiff was using the E-South Buffer. Compl. at p. 5.
Plaintiff did not take notice that the E-South Buffer did not have a "ground-prong" in the cord. Id.
Plaintiff was using the E-South Buffer around Cell # 24. Id.
The door to Cell # 24 was open. Id.
When Plaintiff reached out to close the door, his hand became locked to the door because of an electrical surge. Id.
Plaintiff could not release either the door or the machine. Id.
Electric current flowed through his body for approximately several minutes. Id.
An inmate noticed Plaintiff's situation and pulled the cord from the wall. Id.
Plaintiff was in severe pain and received several injuries. Id.
Plaintiff was sent to the medical department and was diagnosed with the following injuries: pain in the right wrist; pain in the left upper chest area; tingling in the mouth; numbness in both lips; and blurred vision. Id.
Plaintiff continues to have difficulty sleeping due to night sweats and nightmares about being electrocuted. Id.
Chuck Lloyd is a job counselor who is responsible for all of the equipment in the unit. (Q. at p. 2.) He assigns inmates jobs, and those jobs may involve using certain equipment. Id. The E-South Buffer had a history of shocking people; so, prior to the incident, Mr. Lloyd sent the buffer to the shop to be repaired. (Reply Br. at Pilkington Statement.)
Larry Moody is the safety manager who oversees all equipment prior to release and checks for malfunctions. (Q. at p. 2.) He knew the buffer was faulty, but still let it be returned to the unit without the "Safety Features". Id.
Mike Gibbs is the foreman for the electrical shop. (Q. at p. 2.) He knew that the buffer had no ground-plug or safety grips when it was returned to the unit. Id.
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) allows a party to move for dismissal of an action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Ordinarily, a complaint should not be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) unless it appears beyond all doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Labram v. Havel, 43 F.3d 918, 920 (4th Cir.1995). A court must construe a complaint in the light most favorable to the pleader and take his allegations as true. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974); Martin Marietta Corp. v. International Telecommuns. Satellite Org., 991 F.2d 94, 97 (4th Cir.1992); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1292 (4th Cir.1978), cert. denied sub nom. Moffitt v. Loe, 446 U.S. 928, 100 S.Ct. 1865, 64 L.Ed.2d 281 (1980). Thus, a pro se complaint, no matter how inartfully pleaded, must survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (per curiam).
In Estelle v. Gamble, the Supreme Court held that prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment when they are deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of inmates. 429 U.S. 97, 104-105, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). Failure of prison officials to protect inmates from other sources of harm is subject to the same scrutiny. Young v. City of Mt. Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 575 (4th Cir.2001) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991)). Thus, prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment when they are deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm. Id. In his Complaint, Plaintiff claims that his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated because he suffered a severe electric shock when he was required to use the E-South Buffer, which was known to be faulty. Compl. at pp. 2, 6. Plaintiff refers to his Fourteenth Amendment rights sporadically. Regardless, where prison officials are accused of deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm, the standard that applies to a Fourteenth Amendment claim "is the same as that which applies in cases arising under the Eighth Amendment." Parrish v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 302 n. 11 (4th Cir.2004) (citing Young, 238 F.3d at 575).
The Defendants attack Plaintiff's Complaint on two fronts: first, they argue that it fails to state a viable constitutional claim and, second, they contend they are entitled to qualified immunity even if the complaint does state a claim. Mem. in Supp. Mot. Dismiss at pp. 3, 9. To evaluate an assertion of qualified immunity, the Court must make a two-step inquiry "in proper...
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