381 U.S. 618 (1965), 95, Linkletter v. Walker

Docket Nº:No. 95
Citation:381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601
Party Name:Linkletter v. Walker
Case Date:June 07, 1965
Court:United States Supreme Court
 
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Page 618

381 U.S. 618 (1965)

85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601

Linkletter

v.

Walker

No. 95

United States Supreme Court

June 7, 1965

Argued March 11, 1965

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

Syllabus

Petitioner was convicted of burglary by a Louisiana court and his conviction was affirmed by the highest state court. Thereafter, in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, this Court held that evidence illegally seized is inadmissible in a state criminal trial, and petitioner applied for a writ of habeas corpus. The writ was denied by the federal District Court and by the Court of Appeals, which found the searches of petitioner's person and property illegal but held that the Mapp exclusionary rule was not retrospective.

Held: The exclusionary rule announced in Mapp does not apply to state court convictions which had become final before its rendition. Pp. 622-640.

(a) The effect of a subsequent ruling of invalidity on prior final judgments when collaterally attacked is not automatic retroactive invalidity, but depends upon a consideration of particular relations and conduct, or rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality, and of public policy in the light of the nature of the statute and its previous application. Chicot Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371. P. 627.

(b) No distinction is drawn between civil and criminal litigation. P. 627.

(c) The Constitution neither prohibits nor requires retroactive effect, and in each case, the Court determines whether retroactive or prospective application is appropriate. This approach is particularly correct with reference to the unreasonable search and seizure prescription of the Fourth Amendment. P. 629.

(d) The primary purpose of Mapp v. Ohio was the enforcement of the Fourth Amendment through the inclusion of the exclusionary rule within its rights, and this purpose would not be advanced by making the rule retroactive. Pp. 636-637.

(e) Other areas in which rules have been applied retrospectively concerned the fairness of the trial, which is not under attack here. P. 639.

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(f) The date of the seizure in Mapp (which preceded that here) is of no legal significance; the crucial date is the date of the Mapp judgment which changed the rule. P. 639.

323 F.2d 11, affirmed.

CLARK, J., lead opinion

MR. JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court.

In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), we held that the exclusion of evidence seized in violation of the search and seizure provisions of the Fourth Amendment was required of the States by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In so doing, we overruled Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), to the extent that it failed to apply the exclusionary rule to the States.1 This case presents the question of whether this requirement operates retrospectively upon cases finally decided in the

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period prior to Mapp. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that it did not, 323 F.2d 11, and we granted certiorari in order to settle what has become a most troublesome question in the administration of justice.2 377 U.S. 930. We agree with the Court of Appeals.

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[85 S.Ct. 1733] The petitioner was convicted in a Louisiana District Court on May 28, 1959, of "simple burglary." At the time of his arrest he had been under surveillance for two days as a suspect in connection with another burglary. He was taken to the police station, searched, and keys were taken from his person. After he was booked and placed in jail, other officers took his keys, entered and searched his home, and seized certain property and papers. Later, his place of business was entered and searched, and seizures were effected. These intrusions were made without a warrant. The State District Court held that the arresting officers had reasonable cause for the arrest under Louisiana law, and finding probable cause to search as an incident to arrest it held the seizures valid. The Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed in February, 1960.

On June 19, 1961, Mapp was announced. Immediately thereafter, petitioner filed an application for habeas corpus in the state court on the basis of Mapp. The writ being denied in the Louisiana courts, he then filed a like application in the United States District Court. After denial there. he appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. It found the searches too remote from the arrest, and therefore illegal, but held that the constitutional requirement of exclusion of the evidence under Mapp was not retrospective. Petitioner has two points: (1) that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Mapp was not retrospective; and (2) that even though Mapp be held not to operate retrospectively, the search in his case was subsequent to that in Mapp, and while his final conviction was long prior to our disposition of it, his case should nevertheless be governed by Mapp.

Initially we must consider the term "retrospective" for the purposes of our opinion. A ruling which is purely prospective does not apply even to the parties before the

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court.3 See, e.g., England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964). See also Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932). However, we are not here concerned with pure prospectivity, [85 S.Ct. 1734] since we applied the rule announced in Mapp to reverse Miss Mapp's conviction. That decision has also been applied to cases still pending on direct review at the time it was rendered.4 Therefore, in this case, we are concerned only with whether the exclusionary principle enunciated in Mapp applies to state court convictions which had become final5 before rendition of our opinion.

I

While to some it may seem "academic," it might be helpful to others for us to briefly outline the history and theory of the problem presented.

At common law, there was no authority for the proposition that judicial decisions made law only for the future.6 Blackstone stated the rule that the duty of the court was not to "pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound

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the old one." 1 Blackstone, Commentaries 69 (15th ed. 1809).7 This Court followed that rule in Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425 (1886),8 holding that unconstitutional action

confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.

At 442. The judge, rather than being the creator of the law, was but its discoverer. Gray, Nature and Sources of the Law 222 (1st ed. 1909). In the case of the overruled decision, Wolf v. Colorado, supra, here, it was thought to be only a failure at true discovery, and was consequently never the law;,while the overruling one, Mapp, was not "new law ,but an application of what is, and theretofore had been, the true law." Shulman, Retroactive Legislation, 13 Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences 355, 356 (1934).

On the other hand, Austin maintained that judges do, in fact, do something more than discover law; they make

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it interstitially by filling in with judicial interpretation the vague, indefinite, or generic statutory or common law terms that alone are but the empty crevices of the law. Implicit in such an approach is the admission when a case is overruled that the earlier decision was wrongly decided. However, rather than being erased by [85 S.Ct. 1735] the later overruling decision, it is considered as an existing juridical fact until overruled, and intermediate cases finally decided under it are not to be disturbed.

The Blackstonian view ruled English jurisprudence and cast its shadow over our own as evidenced by Norton v. Shelby County, supra. However, some legal philosophers continued to insist that such a rule was out of tune with actuality largely because judicial repeal oft-time did "work hardship to those who [had] trusted to its existence." Cardozo, Address to the N.Y. Bar Assn., 55 Rep.N.Y. State Bar Assn. 263, 296-297 (1932). The Austinian view gained some acceptance over a hundred years ago when it was decided that, although legislative divorces were illegal and void, those previously granted were immunized by a prospective application of the rule of the case. Bingham v. Miller, 17 Ohio 445 (1848). And as early as 1863, this Court drew on the same concept in Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175 (1863). The Supreme Court of Iowa had repeatedly held that the Iowa Legislature had the power to authorize municipalities to issue bonds to aid in the construction of railroads. After the City of Dubuque had issued such bonds, the Iowa Supreme Court reversed itself and held that the legislature lacked such power. In Gelpcke, which arose after the overruling decision, this Court held that the bonds issued under the apparent authority granted by the legislature were collectible. "However we may regard the late [overruling] case in Iowa as affecting the future, it can have no effect upon the past." At 206. The theory was, as Mr. Justice Holmes stated in Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S.

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349, 371, "that a change of judicial decision after a contract has been made on the faith of an earlier one the other way is a change of the law." And in 1932, Mr. Justice Cardozo in Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, applied the Austinian approach in denying a federal constitutional due process attack on the prospective application of a decision of the Montana Supreme Court. He said that a State "may make a choice for itself between the principle of forward operation and that of relation backward." At 364. Mr. Justice Cardozo based the rule on the avoidance of...

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