People v. Broden, Docket No. 78608

• Decision Date: 21 March 1986
• Docket Number: Docket No. 78608
• Citation: 382 N.W.2d 799,147 Mich.App. 470
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lora BRODEN, Defendant-Appellant. 147 Mich.App. 470, 382 N.W.2d 799
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 799

382 N.W.2d 799

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lora BRODEN, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 78608.

147 Mich.App. 470, 382 N.W.2d 799

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Jan. 23, 1985.

Decided Dec. 3, 1985.

Released for Publication March 21, 1986.

[147 MICHAPP 471] Thomas E. Betz, Champaign, Ill., for defendant-appellant on appeal.

Before HOOD, P.J., and WAHLS and KALLMAN ^*, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

We are invited in this case to conclude that a trial court, which indicates nothing more than that it is applying a guideline [147 MICHAPP 472] sentence, has complied with the Supreme Court's mandate that an explanation for the sentence imposed be given. People v. Coles, 417 Mich. 523, 549-550, 339 N.W.2d 440 (1983). We decline the invitation.

Defendant in this case pled guilty to second-degree murder, M.C.L. Sec. 750.317; M.S.A. Sec. 28.549, was sentenced to from 16 to 30 years imprisonment, and appeals as of right.

Defendant first argues that her conviction should be reversed because the trial judge failed to advise her of the maximum possible sentence for the offense to which she was pleading, as required by GCR 1963, 785.7(1)(b). The trial judge informed defendant that second-degree murder "is punishable by life imprisonment and is not a probationable offense". M.C.L. Sec. 750.317; M.S.A. Sec. 28.549 sets the punishment for second-degree murder as "imprisonment in the state prison for life, or any term of years". The language "any terms of years" refers to the maximum sentence. People v. Blythe, 417 Mich. 430, 437, 339 N.W.2d 399 (1983); People v. Earl Jones, 94 Mich.App. 232, 235, 288 N.W.2d 385 (1979). However, misstatement of the maximum possible sentence is not reversible error where no prejudice is shown. People v. Shannon, 134 Mich.App. 35, 349 N.W.2d 813 (1984). Since the rule requiring the judge to inform defendant of the maximum possible sentence for the offense to which he is pleading was intended to inform defendant of the most serious consequence he faces if he pleads guilty, Shannon, supra, p. 38, 349 N.W.2d 813, we find that the trial judge's statement, that the maximum sentence was "life", did not prejudice defendant.

We also find no merit in defendant's argument that the trial judge should have informed her of the recommended minimum sentence range before accepting her plea. The guidelines do not come [147 MICHAPP 473] within the language of GCR 1963, 785.7(1)(d) (which was revoked effective April 25, 1984), and we see no reason to add the guideline range as mandated advice at a guilty plea hearing.

Finally, we deal with the invitation alluded to in the opening paragraph of this opinion. We conclude that we should once again remand this matter to the trial court for an explanation of the reasons for the sentence imposed. We interpret People v. Coles, supra, as requiring more than a simple reference to the guidelines as a reason for a sentence imposed.

We previously remanded this matter by an order on August 23, 1984, so that the trial judge could explain the reasons for the sentence imposed. At the remand hearing he stated, "I followed the guidelines exactly. I told her at the time of sentencing I was following the guidelines. I think that was sufficient reason to explain her sentence to her and the attorney had an opportunity to review that before I passed sentence." We do not feel that simply saying "I followed the guidelines" is an adequate statement of reasons for a sentence.

In Coles, the Supreme Court mandated that trial courts articulate, on the record, their reasons for imposing a given sentence. The purpose of this requirement is to aid appellate review. Simply relying on the guidelines without any explanation defeats the avowed purpose of the articulation requirement for several reasons. First, this Court is prevented from determining which, if any, of the Coles criteria for imposing a proper sentence were followed. Second, the guidelines give a range only for the recommended minimum sentence, with no guidance at all as to the maximum. In this case, for instance, the guideline range was 16 years to life. To say that the trial judge could pick [147 MICHAPP 474] any number from 16 to life seems to us to defy the policy of Coles.

Finally, the Sentencing Guidelines, Administrative Order No. 1984-1, 418 Mich. lxxx, have as one of their primary goals the evaluation of the guidelines themselves. Evaluation is certainly not aided, and in fact would be subverted, by a procedure in which these "temporary" guidelines are allowed are a substitute for an explication by the trial judge of the reasons why he or she is dealing with a particular defendant in a particular manner.

Defendant's conviction is affirmed and this cause is remanded so that the trial court can explain the reasons for the sentence in terms other than a mere reference to the guidelines.

KALLMAN, Judge (concurring in part; dissenting in part).

I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority...