Canty v. City of Richmond, Va., Police Dept., Civ. A. No. 74-0106-R.

Decision Date30 October 1974
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 74-0106-R.
Citation383 F. Supp. 1396
PartiesLeslie CANTY, Jr. v. CITY OF RICHMOND, VIRGINIA, POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Leslie Canty, Jr., pro se.

Wm. L. Wimbish, W. Barrett Disney, Jr., Asst. City Attys., Thomas D. Stokes, III, Michael W. Smith, Richmond, Va., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM

MERHIGE, District Judge.

Plaintiff, pro se, brings this civil rights action alleging that the city defendants, City of Richmond Police Department; and Officers C. E. Brown, E. W. Patterson, and Cole; and the Greyhound defendants, Greyhound Bus Lines and driver L. L. Macon, have denied him due process of law by subjecting him to false arrest, false imprisonment, and the arbitrary imposition of excessive force, and have also infringed his right to travel interstate. Jurisdiction is conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3). This matter comes before the Court on motions to dismiss made by the City of Richmond Police Department and Officers Brown, Patterson and Cole, and a motion for dismissal or, alternatively, for summary judgment made by defendants Greyhound and Macon.

I. Statement of Facts

The facts alleged in the complaint, which for the purpose of this motion must be accepted as true, follow: In early December 1972, plaintiff Canty was travelling by Greyhound Bus from New York City to Tuscaloosa, Alabama. On a stopover in Richmond, plaintiff left the bus momentarily and upon return was refused, without reason, permission to reboard the bus by defendant Macon. Plaintiff nonetheless reboarded the bus, whereupon the manager of the terminal, at the prompting of defendant Macon, called the police to have him removed. According to the plaintiff, when the police arrived they found him sitting peaceably in the bus and, without any justification, ordered him to leave. The plaintiff then asked the police to furnish him with the reason why he should leave, and when they refused so to provide one he again refused to leave. The police then forcibly removed the plaintiff from the bus, choking his neck and "macing" him in the face in the process. As a result of the incident, plaintiff was arrested without probable cause, taken to the hospital to have his eyes treated, and by a Richmond jury but not before to the police station to be booked on charges of disorderly conduct and resisting arrest. After spending an indeterminate time in the city jail, plaintiff was released pending trial. The plaintiff was subsequently found not guilty being held in contempt by the circuit court when he was prevented by a snow storm from attending his trial. Plaintiff now seeks expungement of his arrest records and monetary relief.

II. Jurisdiction

A complaint brought under the civil rights statutes, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), in order to survive a motion to dismiss, must allege (1) an infringement of a right secured by the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) done under color of state law. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L. Ed.2d 492 (1961). Plaintiff's inartfully drafted complaint, however, does not with any precision or coherence track the two-pronged requirement of Monroe v. Pape. Nevertheless, the Court believes that a liberal construction of these pro se pleadings will enable the plaintiff to survive the motion to dismiss as to all except the Police Department. The Court, therefore, feels compelled to articulate the reasons why it concludes a liberal construction of the pleadings is mandated in this action.

In a motion by defendants to dismiss, all the material allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421, 89 S.Ct. 1843, 23 L.Ed.2d 404 (1969). A complaint may not be dismissed "unless it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of his claim." Johnson v. Mueller, 415 F.2d 354, 355 (4th Cir. 1969) (Craven, J.), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L. Ed.2d 80 (1957).1 Moreover, civil rights complaints are to be construed broadly in order to effectuate the high congressional priority placed upon the vindication of civil rights' deprivations. Green v. Dumke, 480 F.2d 624, 628 (9th Cir. 1973) (Hufstedler, J.).

Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit takes the position that its district courts must be especially solicitous of civil rights plaintiffs. Johnson v. Mueller, supra, 415 F.2d at 355. It appears that district courts in our circuit are governed by the obverse of the rule of Conley v. Gibson, supra. A civil rights complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any legal theory which might plausibly be suggested by the facts alleged. See Burris v. State Department of Public Welfare of South Carolina, 491 F.2d 762 (4th Cir. 1974) (per curiam).

For example, in Burris, the plaintiff who was represented by counsel alleged that he was denied due process of law when the State Department of Public Welfare denied his application for "Aid to the Totally and Permanently Disabled" without a hearing. The plaintiff did not allege a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), so the district court apparently treated the complaint as alleging federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) and dismissed because the complaint did not state a substantial federal question or allege the requisite jurisdictional amount of $10,000. The Court of Appeals vacated the district court's dismissal order and remanded the case to the district court to accept jurisdiction and consider the merits because it was of the opinion that the district judge should have apprised plaintiff's counsel of the availability of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343. Accord, Johnson v. Mueller, supra, 415 F.2d at 355.

This solicitude for a civil rights plaintiff with counsel must be heightened when a civil rights plaintiff appears pro se. In the great run of pro se cases, the issues are faintly articulated and often only dimly perceived. There is, therefore, a greater burden and a correlative greater responsibility upon the district court to insure that constitutional deprivations are redressed and that justice is done. So, although the Court of Appeals cannot mean that it expects the district courts to assume the role of advocate for the pro se plaintiff, radiations from Burris strongly suggest that the district court must examine the pro se complaint to see whether the facts alleged, or the set of facts which the plaintiff might be able to prove, could very well provide a basis for recovery under any of the civil rights acts or heads of jurisdiction in the federal arsenal for redress of constitutional deprivations. Accordingly, the Court in considering the defendants' motion to dismiss will not permit technical pleading requirements to defeat the vindication of any constitutional rights which the plaintiff alleges, however inartfully, to have been infringed. See Aiken v. United States, 282 F.2d 215, 216 (4th Cir. 1960). Cf. Conley v. Gibson, supra, 355 U.S. at 48, 78 S.Ct. 99.

A. Constitutional Deprivations

The Court construes the plaintiff's complaint as alleging that the city defendants acting in concert with the Greyhound defendants deprived him of due process of law and infringed his right to travel. As to the due process claim, the first prong of the Monroe v. Pape test is satisfied because the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment shields the individual from false arrest, Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967); false imprisonment, Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1969); and the arbitrary imposition of excessive force, Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1970). See also, Johnson v. Mueller, supra, 415 F.2d at 355.

Plaintiff's claim that the defendants have infringed his constitutionally protected right to travel interstate also satisfies the first element of the Monroe v. Pape test. The constitutionally protected right to travel ". . . occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union. It is a right that has been firmly established and repeatedly recognized." United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757, 86 S. Ct. 1170, 1178, 16 L.Ed.2d 239 (1966) (Stewart, J.). This right to travel like other constitutional rights is shielded by the Fourteenth Amendment and may be appropriately protected by congressionally enacted civil rights legislation. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 106, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971).

B. State Action

Plaintiff, for purposes of this motion to dismiss, has satisfied the first element of the Monroe test as against all defendants. The only question remaining is whether the Court has jurisdiction over the several defendants that the plaintiff has brought before the Court.

1. The Police Department

A city or municipality is not a "person" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) for purposes of either monetary, Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 191-192, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), or injunctive relief, City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 93 S.Ct. 2222, 37 L.Ed.2d 109 (1973). Furthermore, it is the rule in this circuit that a suit against a municipal agency is in effect a suit against a municipality itself so that a police department would likewise not be a "person" under § 1983 for purposes of monetary and injunctive relief. Cf. Singleton v. Vance Co. Board of Education, 501 F.2d 429 (4th Cir. 1974). Accordingly, the complaint against the Police Department must stand dismissed.2

2. The Police Officers

The police officers — Brown, Cole and Patterson — stand on a different footing. Although City of Kenosha v. Bruno, supra, precludes municipal liability for money damages in § 1983 actions, municipal officers and employees may be held liable for money damages in § 1983 suits....

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