Wiese v. Heathlake Cmty. Ass'n, Inc.

• Decision Date: 27 March 2012
• Docket Number: No. 14–11–00268–CV.,14–11–00268–CV.
• Citation: 384 S.W.3d 395
• Parties: Aaron WIESE, Appellant, v. HEATHLAKE COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

384 S.W.3d 395

Aaron WIESE, Appellant,

v.HEATHLAKE COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellee.

No. 14–11–00268–CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas,

Houston (14th Dist.).

March 27, 2012.

Hugh L. McKenney, Houston, for appellant.

James R. Young, Luke Patrick Tollett, Houston, for appellee.

Panel consists of Justices BOYCE, JAMISON, and McCALLY.

OPINION

WILLIAM J. BOYCE, Justice.

A property owners' association sued a homeowner to enforce a restrictive covenant. The trial court granted injunctive relief and statutory attorney's fees. In 16 issues, the homeowner challenges the trial court's interpretation of the restrictive covenant, the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's findings of fact, and the trial court's award of attorney's fees. We reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND

This case focuses on Aaron Wiese's boat, a large model Wellcraft. When resting on its trailer, the boat is nearly 12 feet tall.

Wiese resides in West Harris County in a subdivision governed by a properly recorded Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. The Declaration establishes Heathlake Community Association, Inc. as the property owners' association charged with maintaining the subdivision and enforcing its restrictive covenants.

The Declaration dictates certain standards for property ownership within the community. The standard applicable in this case is one written specifically on the subject of boats, and it states as follows:

Section 10. Storage of Automobiles, Boats Trailers and Other Vehicles. No boat trailers, boats, travel trailers, inoperative automobiles, campers, or vehicles of any kind shall be semipermanently or permanently stored in the public street right-of-way or on driveways. Storage of such items and vehicles must be screened from public view, either within the garage or behind a fence which encloses the rear of the Lot.

After Wiese moved into the neighborhood, observers noted that he frequently parked his boat in public view in the driveway or on the street. Believing this storage to be in violation of the Declaration, Heathlake communicated with Wiese directly to address the complaints. When repeated attempts to resolve the issue failed, Heathlake filed this suit seeking a permanent injunction and other statutory penalties.

Heathlake proffered evidence at trial showing that Wiese's storage of the boat had become a recurring issue within the community. In an eight-year span, Wiese received at least nine notices advising him that he was storing his boat in a proscribed manner. The notices normally afforded Wiese an opportunity to cure the defect, generally within ten or fifteen days from the date of receipt. Wiese testified that he removed the boat within the time allotted by each notice. However, once the violation had been cured, the evidence showed that the boat inevitably returned to Wiese's property and remained parked in public view for extended periods of time.

Email correspondence from one neighbor documented the duration of this storage. The neighbor indicated that on one occasion, Wiese had been storing his boat in his driveway “for six weeks plus.” The neighbor later complained that the boat was parked along the street for an entire week in June 2009, except Saturday and Sunday. The neighbor also reported that it was on the street for “over a week” in July 2009.

A member of Heathlake's Architectural Control Committee also testified about his encounters with the boat. The committee member did not live on Wiese's street, but he inspected the property himself in the summer of 2006 following complaints from other residents. The committee member found that the boat was stored continuously in Wiese's driveway for four consecutive days in August and for five consecutive days in September. The pattern demonstrated that “the boat was stored every day during the week to be used occasionally on weekends.”

Wiese testified that he did not store the boat at his house. He admitted that “on occasion” he had kept the boat at his home for several days at a time, but he indicated that this storage was only temporary. When it did happen, Wiese said he was preparing to take the boat into the shop for maintenance or was waiting for a part to be delivered. When not in use, Wiese testified that the boat was actually stored at a warehouse facility he operated near downtown Houston.

The trial court found that Wiese had violated the Declaration and that Heathlake was entitled to a permanent injunction. Among its findings of fact, the trial court determined that Wiese violated the restrictive covenant by “repeatedly storing a boat on the Property without screening such boat from public view” and by “repeatedly semi-permanently storing a boat in the public street right of way and on the driveway of the Property.” The court also found that Wiese's manner of keeping the boat constituted a nuisance within the community and that Wiese was likely to violate the Declaration again. The court then entered a permanent injunction, ordering Wiese to desist and refrain from keeping his boat unscreened from public view on his property for any period in excess of 24 consecutive hours.

ISSUES PRESENTED

Wiese raises 16 issues on appeal. He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's findings of fact, the trial court's various conclusions of law, Heathlake's entitlement to attorney's fees, Heathlake's interpretation of the Declaration, and the trial court's decision to enter the permanent injunction. We begin by examining the permanent injunction and the conclusions of law on which it is based.

ANALYSIS

We review a trial court's decision to grant or deny a permanent injunction for an abuse of discretion. Meehl v. Wise, 285 S.W.3d 561, 565 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, or without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241–42 (Tex.1985). Because the trial court has no discretion in determining the applicable law, the trial court also abuses its discretion when it fails to analyze the law correctly and apply it to the facts of the case. In re Kuntz, 124 S.W.3d 179, 181 (Tex.2003).

To obtain injunctive relief, a party must ordinarily show (1) the existence of a wrongful act; (2) the existence of imminent harm; (3) the existence of irreparable injury; and (4) the absence of an adequate remedy at law. Jim Rutherford Invs., Inc. v. Terramar Beach Cmty. Ass'n, 25 S.W.3d 845, 849 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). When the basis for suit is the enforcement of a deed restriction, instead of showing proof of irreparable injury, the party seeking relief need only demonstrate that the defendant intends to do an act that would breach the restrictive covenant. Id.

Injunctions are not intended to grant relief for past actionable wrongs or to prevent the commission of wrongs not imminently threatened. Tex. Emp't Comm'n v. Martinez, 545 S.W.2d 876, 877 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1976, no writ). Generally, the purpose of injunctive relief is to halt wrongful acts that are either threatened or in the course of accomplishment. Id. A party seeking an injunction must be specific in pleading the type of relief sought because courts are without authority to grant relief beyond what is requested. Computek Computer & Office Supplies, Inc. v. Walton, 156 S.W.3d 217, 221 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.).

Once granted, an injunction must be specific in its terms to be enforceable, describing in clear and precise detail the acts sought to be restrained. SeeTex.R. Civ. P. 683. It should be broad enough to prevent subsequent violations of those already committed, but not so broad as to enjoin a defendant from activities that are a lawful and proper exercise of his rights. Webb v. Glenbrook Owners Ass'n, Inc., 298 S.W.3d 374, 384 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2009, no pet.).

Heathlake pleaded for injunctive relief and requested an order enjoining Wiese from storing his boat on a permanent or semi-permanent basis. The trial court concluded as a matter of law that a boat stored in excess of 24 hours is being stored “semipermanently” in violation of the Declaration. The trial court's injunction forbids Wiese “from having a boat that is not screened from public view ... in excess of twenty four consecutive hours.”

Wiese argues that the trial court abused its discretion because the injunction's language exceeds the scope of the pleading, the evidence, and the terms of the Declaration. He makes two primary arguments. He first contends that the Declaration is ambiguous because it simultaneously prohibits and allows the storage of boats. He next contends that the trial court's 24–hour rule is unsupported by the record because Heathlake proffered no evidence concerning the meaning of “semipermanently.” We examine each argument in turn.

Restrictive covenants are subject to the general rules of contract construction. Pilarcik v. Emmons, 966 S.W.2d 474, 478 (Tex.1998). When construing a restrictive covenant, our primary goal is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of its drafters, using the language of the instrument as our guide. Uptegraph v. Sandalwood Civic Club, 312 S.W.3d 918, 925 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.). We examine the covenant as a whole in light of the circumstances present when it was written, affording words and phrases their commonly accepted meanings. Pilarcik, 966 S.W.2d at 478;Wilmoth v. Wilcox, 734 S.W.2d 656, 657–58 (Tex.1987). We review the trial court's interpretation of a restrictive covenant de novo. Rakowski v. Comm. to Protect Clear Creek Village Homeowners' Rights, 252 S.W.3d 673, 676 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) (plurality opinion); City of Pasadena v. Gennedy, 125 S.W.3d 687, 692 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).

Whether a restrictive covenant is ambiguous is a question of law for the court to...