Shillitani v. United States Pappadio v. United States, s. 412 and 442

Decision Date06 June 1966
Docket NumberNos. 412 and 442,s. 412 and 442
PartiesSalvatore SHILLITANI, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES of America. Andimo PAPPADIO, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES of America
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Albert J. Krieger, New York City, and Jacob Kossman, Philadelphia, Pa., for petitioners.

Ralph S. Spritzer, Washington, D.C., for respondent.

Mr. Justice CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court.

These consolidated cases again present the difficult question whether a charge of contempt against a witness for refusal to answer questions before a grand jury requires an indictment and jury trial. In both cases, contempt proceedings were instituted after petitioners had refused to testify under immunity granted by the respective District Courts. Neither petitioner was indicted or given a jury trial. Both were found guilty and sentenced to two years' imprisonment, with the proviso that if either answered the questions before his sentence ended, he would be released. The opinion of the District Court in Pappadio is reported at 235 F.Supp. 887 (D.C.S.D.N.Y.1964). In Shillitani, the District Court simply entered an order, which is not reported. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed each conviction in separate opinions. United States v. Pappadio, 346 F.2d 5 (2 Cir., 1965); United States v. Shillitani, 345 F.2d 290 (2 Cir., 1965). We granted certiorari to review the validity of the sentences imposed in both cases. 382 U.S. 913, 916, 86 S.Ct. 287, 15 L.Ed.2d 231 (1965). We hold that the conditional nature of these sentences renders each of the actions a civil contempt proceeding, for which indictment and jury trial are not constitutionally required. However, since the term of the grand jury before which petitioners were contumacious has expired, the judgments below must be vacated and the cases remanded for dismissal.

I.

No. 412, Shillitani v. United States.

Shillitani appeared under subpoena before a grand jury investigating possible violations of the federal narcotics laws. On three occasions he refused to answer questions, invoking his privilege against self-incrimination. At the Government's request, the District Judge then granted him immunity under the Narcotic Control Act of 1956, 18 U.S.C. § 1406 (1964 ed.), and ordered him to answer certain questions. When called before the grand jury again, Shillitani persisted in his refusal. Thereafter, in a proceeding under Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,1 the District Court found him guilty of criminal contempt. No jury trial was requested. Shillitani was sentenced to prison for two years 'or until the further order of this Court. Should * * * Mr. Shillitani answer those questions before the expiration of said sentence, or the discharge of the said grand jury, whichever may first occur, the further order of this Court may be made terminating the sentence of imprisonment.' The Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting Shillitani's constitutional objection to the imposition of a two-year sentence without indictment or trial by jury on the basis that 'the contempt proceedings preceded any compliance' and the 'sentence contained a purge clause.' It further construed the sentence as giving Shillitani an unqualified right to be released if and when he obeyed the order to testify. 345 F.2d, at 294.

Pappadio appeared under subpoena before the same grand jury. He also refused three times to answer numerous questions on the ground that the answers would incriminate him. He was then granted immunity under 18 U.S.C. § 1406 and directed to testify. He continued to refuse to answer any questions except those of identification. In opposition to the grand jury's subsequent request that the District Court require Pappadio to cooperate, his attorney claimed that he should not be called as a witness so long as a 1958 indictment charging him with conspiracy to violate the narcotics laws was pending. The District Court held that Pappadio had complete immunity, including any criminal proceeding then pending, and ordered him to answer all questions previously asked. Upon return to the grand jury, Pappadio did respond to numerous questions, but still refused to answer five questions pertaining to his alleged association with a group headed by Thomas Lucchese which engaged in narcotics traffic and other illicit activities.2 An order to show cause was issued, Pappadio's demand for a jury was denied, and the District Court found him in contempt for willful disobedi- ence of its order to testify. He received a sentence almost identical to that given Shillitani, and the Court of Appeals affirmed on the same grounds.3

II.

We believe that the character and purpose of these actions clearly render them civil rather than criminal contempt proceedings. See Penfield Co. v. Securities & Exchange Comm., 330 U.S. 585, 590, 67 S.Ct. 918, 921, 91 L.Ed. 1117 (1947). As the distinction was phrased in Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 449, 31 S.Ct. 492, 501, 55 L.Ed. 797 (1911), the act of disobedience consisted solely 'in refusing to do what had been ordered,' i.e., to answer the questions, not 'in doing what had been prohibited.' And the judgments imposed conditional imprisonment for the obvious purpose of compelling the witnesses to obey the orders to testify. When the petitioners carry 'the keys of their prison in their own pockets,' In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461 (C.A.8th Cir. 1902), the action 'is essentially a civil remedy designed for the benefit of other parties and has quite properly been exercised for centuries to secure compliance with judicial decrees.' Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 197, 78 S.Ct. 632, 650, 2 L.Ed.2d 672 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting). In short, if the petitioners had chosen to obey the order they would not have faced jail. This is evident from the statement of the District Judge at the time he sentenced Shillitani:

'I want to make it clear that the sentence of the Court is not intended so much by way of punishment as it is intended solely to secure for the grand jury answers to the questions that have been asked of you.' (Emphasis supplied.)

The Court of Appeals also interpreted the sentence as conditional: 'We construe the judgment in this case * * * to mean that defendant has an unqualified right to be released from prison once he obeys Judge Wyatt's order. As thus construed, the sentence was entirely proper.' 345 F.2d, at 294. While all of the parties before this Court briefed the issues with reference to criminal contempt, counsel for petitioners and the Government conceded at argument that the contempt orders were remedial, and therefore might well be deemed civil in nature rather than criminal.4

The fact that both the District Court and the Court of Appeals called petitioners' conduct 'criminal contempt' does not disturb our conclusion. Courts often speak in terms of criminal contempt and punishment for remedial purposes. See, e.g., United States v. Onan, 190 F.2d 1 (C.A.8th Cir. 1951). 'It is not the fact of punishment, but rather its character and purpose, that often serve to distinguish' civil from criminal contempt. Gompers v. Buck Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441, 31 S.Ct. 492, 498 (1911). Despite the fact that Shillitani and Pappadio were ordered imprisoned for a definite period, their sentences were clearly intended to operate in a prospective manner to coerce, rather than punish. As such, they relate to civil contempt. While any imprisonment, of course, has punitive and deterrent effects, it must be viewed as remedial if the court conditions release upon the contemnor's willingness to testify. See Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 42—43, 61 S.Ct. 810, 812 813, 85 L.Ed. 1172 (1941). The test may be stated as: what does the court primarily seek to accomplish by imposing sentence? Here the purpose was to obtain answers to the questions for the grand jury. 5

III.

There can be no question that courts have inherent power to enforce compliance with their lawful orders through civil contempt. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 330 332, 67 S.Ct. 677, 713—714, 91 L.Ed. 884 (1947) (Black and Douglas, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part); United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 753—754, 84 S.Ct. 984, 1019—1020, 12 L.Ed.2d 23 (1964) (Goldberg, J., dissenting). And it is essential that courts be able to compel the appearance and testimony of witnesses. United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331, 70 S.Ct. 724, 730, 94 L.Ed. 884 (1950). A grand jury subpoena must command the same respect. Cf. Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 617, 80 S.Ct. 1038, 1043, 4 L.Ed.2d 989 (1960). Where contempt consists of a refusal to obey a court order to testify at any stage in judicial proceedings, the witness may be confined until compliance. McCrone v. United States, 307 U.S. 61, 59 S.Ct. 685, 83 L.Ed. 1108 (1939); Giancana v. United States, 352 F.2d 921 (C.A.7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 959, 86 S.Ct. 437, 15 L.Ed.2d 362 (1965).6 The condi- tional nature of the imprisonment—based entirely upon the contemnor's continued defiance—justifies holding civil contempt proceedings absent the safeguards of indictment and jury, Uphaus v. Wyman, 364 U.S. 388, 403—404, 81 S.Ct. 153, 155, 5 L.Ed.2d 148 (1960) (Douglas, J., dissenting), provided that the usual due process requirements are met.7

However, the justification for coercive imprisonment as applied to civil contempt depends upon the ability of the contemnor to comply with the court's order. Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 76, 68...

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