Ability Center, Toledo v. City of Sandusky

Decision Date01 October 2004
Docket NumberNo. 03-3277.,No. 03-3339.,03-3277.,03-3339.
Citation385 F.3d 901
PartiesABILITY CENTER OF GREATER TOLEDO, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants, v. CITY OF SANDUSKY and Gerald A. Lechner, in his official capacity, Defendants-Appellants/Cross-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, 133 F.Supp.2d 589, Carr, J.

William P. Lang (argued and briefed), Avon Lake, OH, for Appellants.

Thomas J. Zraik (argued and briefed), Zraik Law Offices, Sylvania, OH, for Appellees.

Before: KEITH, CLAY, and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges.

GIBBONS, Circuit Judge.

Ability Center of Greater Toledo, Statewide Independent Living Council, and five individuals with disabilities1 — collectively, the plaintiffs-appellees/cross-appellants — filed this class action lawsuit against defendants-appellants/cross-appellees the City of Sandusky, Ohio, and Gerald A. Lechner (in his official capacity as Sandusky's city manager). Plaintiffs alleged that defendants violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165, and related regulations by failing to install proper accommodations for disabled individuals in the course of renovating Sandusky sidewalks and street curbs, and by failing to develop a transition plan for implementing ADA requirements. The district court granted summary judgment to plaintiffs on the former claim and summary judgment to defendants on the latter. Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration of the district court's grant of partial summary judgment to plaintiffs, which was denied. Defendants now appeal this grant of partial summary judgment to plaintiffs and the denial of their motion for reconsideration, while plaintiffs cross-appeal the district court's grant of partial summary judgment to defendants. For the following reasons, we affirm.2

I.

In a class action complaint filed on September 8, 1999, plaintiffs asserted two basic claims against defendants. First, plaintiffs alleged that, in the process of replacing and repairing certain Sandusky sidewalks and street curbs, defendants failed to install proper curb cuts and ramps in accordance with 28 C.F.R. § 35.151. Second, plaintiffs alleged that defendants failed to adopt a transition plan pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(d). Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as monetary damages. Each side filed a motion for summary judgment on these claims.

On February 16, 2001, the district court entered an interlocutory order granting in part and denying in part the parties' respective motions. Specifically, the court granted summary judgment to plaintiffs on their first claim, finding that defendants did not comply with § 35.151 when altering various Sandusky streets, sidewalks, and curbs. With respect to their second claim, the court held that Title II does not provide a private right of action for the enforcement of § 35.150(d) and accordingly granted summary judgment to defendants. The court also concluded that plaintiffs were not entitled to compensatory or punitive damages because such damages are not available under Title II absent proof of intentional discrimination, which plaintiffs could not show.

Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration with the district court on April 25, 2001, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). They argued that the then newly decided case of Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 121 S.Ct. 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001), demonstrates that Title II does not provide private parties a cause of action for pursuing violations of § 35.151. Plaintiffs opposed the motion, as did the Department of Justice, which filed an amicus curiae brief in support of plaintiffs' position. The district court ultimately disagreed with defendants and denied their motion.

On January 17, 2003, the district court entered a final order certifying the class, granting plaintiffs declaratory and injunctive relief on their § 35.151 claim, awarding plaintiffs attorneys' fees, and establishing a scheme for monitoring defendants' compliance with the order. Defendants filed a timely appeal and now challenge the district court's grant of partial summary judgment to plaintiffs and its denial of their motion for reconsideration, arguing that the court erred in finding that plaintiffs have a private cause of action under Title II to challenge violations of § 35.151. Plaintiffs cross-appeal the district court's grant of partial summary judgment to defendants, arguing that Title II provides them a private cause of action for challenging defendants' failure to adopt a transition plan in accordance with § 35.150(d).

II.

We review a district court's grant of partial summary judgment de novo, Campbell v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan, Inc., 238 F.3d 792, 797 (6th Cir.2001), as we do a district court's denial of a motion seeking reconsideration of a grant of summary judgment. Northland Ins. Co. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 327 F.3d 448, 454-55 (6th Cir.2003).

A.

Title II of the ADA states that "no qualified individual with a disability shall by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." § 202, 42 U.S.C. § 12132. "Public entity" includes "any state or local government" and "any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government." § 201, 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(A) & (B). The Act grants the Attorney General authority to promulgate regulations to implement its provisions. § 204, 42 U.S.C. § 12134. Pursuant to § 204, the Attorney General adopted 28 C.F.R. § 35.151, which provides that alterations of facilities3 commenced after January 26, 1992, "by, on behalf of, or for the use of a public entity in a manner that affects or could affect the usability of the facility or part of the facility shall, to the maximum extent feasible, be altered in such manner that the altered portion of the facility is readily accessible and usable by individuals with disabilities." Id. § 35.151(b). The regulation further specifies that alterations should meet certain accessibility standards, id. § 35.151(c), and that altered streets and pedestrian walkways must contain curb ramps. Id. § 35.151(e). Section 35.151 is part of a broader regulatory scheme that aims to effectuate § 202 of the ADA. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.101. The scheme makes explicit that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, because a public entity's facilities are inaccessible to or unusable by individuals with disabilities, be excluded from participation in, or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any public entity." Id. § 35.149 (emphasis added).

Defendants do not dispute the district court's finding that they failed to comply with § 35.151,4 nor do they assault the reasonableness or validity of the regulation or of Title II more generally. Rather, they argue only that — in light of Sandoval — the ADA provides a private cause of action under Title II solely for claims based on intentional discrimination.5 Since the district court found that they did not intentionally discriminate against plaintiffs, the defendants contend, plaintiffs have no valid cause of action against them under Title II to enforce § 35.151 and obtain injunctive or declaratory relief.6 Limiting our inquiry to the issue presented to us, we now turn to defendants' argument.

Title II stipulates that "[t]he remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in [§ 505 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794a,] shall be the remedies, procedures, and rights this subchapter provides to any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of section 12132 of this title." § 203, 42 U.S.C. § 12133. Section 505 of the Rehabilitation Act, in turn, adopts "[t]he remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2).7 In short, the remedies, procedures, and rights available under Title II of the ADA parallel those available under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

In Sandoval, the Supreme Court addressed the scope of private causes of action available under § 601 of Title VI, which provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. The case involved a regulation promulgated under Title VI by the United States Department of Justice pursuant to § 602, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1, that prohibited recipients of federal funding from "utiliz[ing] criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, or national origin." 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2) (2000). The plaintiffs claimed that the Alabama Department of Public Safety — a recipient of federal funds — violated the regulation by administering state driver's license exams only in English, which it did in accordance with an amendment to the Alabama constitution that declared English as the state's official language.

The Court considered whether the plaintiffs could, as private parties, proceed on their disparate impact claim and secure injunctive relief.8 The Court began by noting that "private rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by Congress." Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286, 121 S.Ct. 1511. Whether a statute provides for a private cause of action, it continued, depends upon whether the statute in question demonstrates that it was Congress's intent to create such a cause of action. Id. The Court recognized that it had already determined that Congress intended...

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