Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Errico Scott v. Immigration and Naturalization Service

• Decision Date: 12 December 1966
• Docket Number: Nos. 54 and 91,s. 54 and 91
• Citation: 385 U.S. 214,17 L.Ed.2d 318,87 S.Ct. 473
• Parties: IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Petitioner, v. Giuseppe ERRICO. Muriel May SCOTT, nee Plummer, Petitioner, v. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

385 U.S. 214

87 S.Ct. 473

17 L.Ed.2d 318

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Petitioner,

v Giuseppe ERRICO.

Muriel May SCOTT, nee Plummer, Petitioner,

v. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE.

Nos. 54 and 91.

Argued Oct. 20, 1966.

Decided Dec. 12, 1966.

Sol. Gen., Thurgood Marshall, for Immigration and Naturalization service.

Frank M. Ierulli, Portland, Or., for Giuseppe Errico.

Julius C. Biervliet, Mount Vernon, N.Y., for Muriel May Scott.

Mr. Cheif Justice WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari in these cases to resolve a conflict between the Second and Ninth Circuits on their interpretations of § 241(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.¹ The issue is identical in both cases and, therefore, lends itself to a single opinion.

Section 241(f) reads as follows:

'The provisions of this section relating to the deportation of aliens within the United States on the ground that they were excludable at the time of entry as aliens who have sought to procure, or have procured visas or other documentation, or entry into the United States by fraud or misrepresentation shall not apply to an alien otherwise admissible at the time of entry who is the spouse, parent, or a child of a United States citizens or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.'

The issue is whether the statute saves from deportation an alien who misrepresents his status for the purpose of evading quota restrictions, if he has the necessary familial relationship to a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident.

Respondent Errico in No. 54, a native of Italy, falsely represented to the immigration authorities that he was a skilled mechanic with specialized experience in repairing foreign automobiles. On the basis of that misrepresentation he was granted first preference quota status under the statutory preference scheme then in effect, and entered the United States in 1959 with his wife. A child was born to the couple in 1960 and acquired United States citizenship at birth. In 1963 deportation proceedings were commenced against Errico on the ground that he was excludable at the time of entry as not 'of the proper status under the quota specified in the immigrant visa.'² Throughout the proceedings Errico insisted that he was saved from deportation by § 241(f). The special inquiry officer of the Immigration and Naturalization Service ruled that relief under § 241(f) was not available because Errico had not complied with quota requirements and, hence, was not 'otherwise admissible at the time of entry.' The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the deportation order but the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the construction of the statute adopted by the Board would strip it of practically all meaning, since a material misrepresentation would presumably be given to conceal some factor that would bear on admissibility. 349 F.2d 541. We granted certiorari. 383 U.S. 941, 86 S.Ct. 1196, 16 L.Ed.2d 205.

Petitioner Scott in No. 91, a native of Jamaica, contracted a marriage with a United States citizen by proxy solely for the purpose of obtaining nonquota status for entry into the country. She has never lived with her husband and never intended to do so. After entering the United States in 1958, she gave birth to an illegitimate child, who became an American citizen at birth. When the fraud was discovered, deportation proceedings were begun, and a special inquiry officer of the Immigration and Naturalization Service found her deportable on the ground that she was not a nonquota immigrant as specified in her visa.³ The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the Board. 350 F.2d 279. The court agreed with the Board of Immigration Appeals that a sham marriage contracted solely to circumvent the immigration laws would not confer nonquota status on an alien as the spouse of an American citizen. It also affirmed the ruling that Mrs. Scott was not entitled to relief under § 241(f) because she was not otherwise admissible at the time of entry, since her country's quota was oversubscribed. We granted certiorari. 383 U.S. 941, 86 S.Ct. 1211, 16 L.Ed.2d 206.

At the outset it should be noted that even the Government agrees that § 241(f) cannot be applied with strict literalness. Literally, § 241(f) applies only when the alien is charged with entering in violation of § 212(a)(19) of the statute, which excludes from entry '(a)ny alien who * * * has procured a visa or other documentation * * * by fraud, or by willfully misrepresenting a material fact.'⁴ Under this interpretation, an alien who entered by fraud could be deported for having entered with a defective visa or for other documentary irregularities even if he would have been admissible if he had not committed the fraud. The Government concedes that such an interpretation would be inconsistent with the manifest purpose of the section, and the administrative authorities have consistently held that § 241(f) waives any deportation charge that results directly from the misrepresentation regardless of the section of the statute under which the charge was brought, provided that the alien was 'otherwise admissible at the time of entry.'⁵ The Government's argument in both cases is that to be otherwise admissible at the time of entry the alien must show that he would have been admitted even if he had not lied, and that the aliens in these cases would not have been admitted because of the quota restrictions. It is the argument of the aliens that our adoption of the government thesis would negate the intention of Congress to apply fair humanitarian standards in granting relief from the consequences of their fraud to aliens who are close relatives of United States citizens, and that the statute would have practically no effect if construed as the Government argues, since it requires a considerable stretch of the imagination to conceive of an alien making a material misrepresentation that did not conceal some factor that would make him inadmissible.

The sharp divergence of opinion among the circuit judges in these cases indicates that the meaning of the words 'otherwise admissible' is not obvious. An interpretation of these words requires close attention to the language of § 241(f), to the language of its predecessor, § 7 of the 1957 Act,⁶ and to the legislative history of these provisions.

The legislative history begins with the enactment of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 1009. This Act provided for the admission to the United States of thousands of war refugess, many from countries that had fallen behind the Iron Curtain. Some of these refugees misrepresented their nationality or homeland while in Europe to avoid being repatriated to a Communist country. In so doing, however, they fell afoul of § 10 of the Act, which provided that persons making willful misrepresentations for the purpose of gaining admission 'shall thereafter not be admissible into the United States.' The plight of these refugees, who were excluded from the United States for misrepresentations that were generally felt to be justifiable, inspired recurring proposals for statutory reform. When the Act was revised and codified in 1952, the House Committee recommended adding a provision to save such refugees from deportation when they had misrepresented their nationality or homeland only to avoid repatriation and persecution.⁷ The Conference Committee deleted the provision, but announced its sympathy with the refugees in the following terms:

'It is also the opinion of the conferees that the sections of the bill which provide for the exclusion of aliens who obtained travel documents by fraud or by willfully misrepresenting a material fact, should not serve to exclude or to deport certain bona fide refugees who in fear of being forcibly repatriated to their former homelands misrepresented their place of birth when applying for a visa and such misrepresentation did not have as its basis the desire to evade the quota provisions of the law or an investigation in the place of their former residence. The conferees wish to emphasize that in applying fair humanitarian standards in the administrative adjudication of such cases, every effort is to be made to prevent the evasion of law by fraud and to protect the interest of the United States.' H.R.Rep.No.2096, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 128 (1952), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1952, p. 1754.

The Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Attorney General did not construe the statute as the Conference Committee had recommended, believing that the explicit statutory language did not allow for an exemption for justifiable misrepresentations. Refugees who misrepresented their place of origin were always found to have concealed a material fact, since the misrepresentation hindered an investigation of their background.⁸

The misrepresentation section was not the only provision of the 1952 legislation that was widely thought to be unnecessarily harsh and restrictive, and in 1957 Congress passed legislation alleviating in many respects the stricter provisions of the earlier legislation. The purpose of the 1957 Act is perfectly clear from its terms, as well as from the relevant House and Senate Com- mittee Reports.⁹ The most important provisions of the Act provide for special nonquota status for the adopted children or illegitimate children of immigrant parents, and for orphans who have been or are to be adopted by United States citizens. Other important provisions allow the Attorney General to waive certain grounds for exclusion or deportation, including affliction with tuberculosis or conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, on behalf of aliens who are near relatives of United States citizens or of aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence. The intent of the Act is plainly to grant exceptions to the rigorous provisions of the 1952 Act for the purpose...