Attorney General v. Bailey

Decision Date02 June 1982
Citation436 N.E.2d 139,386 Mass. 367
Parties, 4 Ed. Law Rep. 834 ATTORNEY GENERAL et al. 1 v. Robert W. BAILEY 2 et al. 3
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Charles E. Craze, Cleveland, Ohio (John C. Sandelli, Dracut, with him), for defendants.

Maria I. Lopez, Asst. Atty. Gen., for plaintiffs.

Before HENNESSEY, C. J., and WILKINS, LIACOS, ABRAMS and O'CONNOR, JJ.

ABRAMS, Justice.

We granted the plaintiffs' application for direct appellate review to resolve two narrow questions: whether G.L. c. 72, § 2, requires nonapproved private schools, run under religious auspices, to report the names, ages, and residences of the children in attendance; and, if so, whether this requirement violates the right to religious freedom, freedom of association, and privacy, guaranteed by the First and Fourth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 4 We hold that the reporting requirement of G.L. c. 72, § 2, applies to all private schools, approved and nonapproved, religious and secular. In addition, the application of this requirement to schools run by religious organizations is constitutional.

We summarize the facts. Since September, 1980, the Grace Bible Church has operated the Grace Bible Church Christian School in Dracut, to provide a Christian education for students in grades one through six. Reverend Robert W. Bailey is the pastor of the church. Reverend Steven M. Willett is the associate pastor of the church and administrator of the school. They are also the officers, directors, and incorporators of the church.

On October 7, 1980, the school committee of Dracut requested the names and addresses of all the Dracut resident children who attend the Grace Bible Church Christian School. In a letter, dated October 16, 1980, the defendants' attorney notified the school committee that the Grace Bible Church Christian School would be unable to comply with their request. The office of the Attorney General, by letter dated November 13, 1980, asked Reverend Bailey to comply with the school committee's request. On November 18, 1980, the defendants' attorney replied that since the Grace Bible Church Christian School is a church school, it is not subject to the reporting provisions of G.L. c. 72, § 2. In addition, the defendants' attorney argued that 603 Code Mass.Regs. §§ 19.01-19.05 (1979), violated the privacy of United States citizens and the sanctity of the church. 5

After receiving this reply, the Attorney General and the Commissioner of Education brought this action in the Superior Court to obtain compliance with the private school reporting provisions of G.L. c. 72, § 2. They sought a declaration that Reverend Bailey and Reverend Willett, as supervisory officers of the Grace Bible Church Christian School, are required to report to the superintendent of schools of the town the name, age, and residence of every child who attends that school. Before trial, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, claiming that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. After a hearing at which the Reverends Bailey and Willett submitted affidavits in opposition to the plaintiffs' motion, the judge ruled that there were no genuine issues of material fact. Consequently, the judge granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, declared that "the Commonwealth's interest (in compulsory education) is of sufficient magnitude to override whatever constitutional interest the defendants may have in refusing to disclose the information requested," and ordered the defendants to comply with G.L. c. 72, § 2. The defendants appealed. We affirm.

1. Summary Judgment.

Rule 56(c) of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, 365 Mass. 824 (1974), provides that a judge shall grant a motion for summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court does not "pass upon the credibility of witnesses or the weight of the evidence (or) make (its) own decision of facts." Hub Assocs. v. Goode, 357 Mass. 449, 451, 258 N.E.2d 733 (1970), quoting Gordon v. American Tankers Corp., 286 Mass. 349, 353, 191 N.E. 51 (1934). A court should not grant a party's motion for summary judgment "merely because the facts he offers appear more plausible than those tendered in opposition, or because it appears that the adversary is unlikely to prevail at trial." Hayden v. First Nat'l Bank, 595 F.2d 994, 997 (5th Cir. 1979), quoting 10 C. A. Wright & A. R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2725, at 514 (1973). Instead, the court should only "determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exist(s)." H & M Cake Box, Inc. v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers, Int'l Union, Local 45, 454 F.2d 716, 719 (1st Cir. 1972).

When the court considers the materials accompanying a motion for summary judgment, "the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts contained in such materials must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Hub Assocs. v. Goode, 357 Mass. 449, 451, 258 N.E.2d 733 (1970), quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 994, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962). "Also, all doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the party moving for summary judgment." Gross v. Southern Ry., 414 F.2d 292, 297 (5th Cir. 1969). "(T)he moving party must affirmatively show that there is no real issue of fact." Hub Assocs. v. Goode, supra. Indeed, "(a) party moving for summary judgment assumes the burden of affirmatively demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of fact on every relevant issued raised by the pleadings. This is so even though ... he would have no burden if the case were to go to trial." Mack v. Cape Elizabeth School Bd., 553 F.2d 720, 722 (1st Cir. 1977). See Felix v. Young, 536 F.2d 1126, 1134-1135 (6th Cir. 1976).

Relying on these principles, the defendants claim that the judge erred in granting the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment because there are genuine issues of material fact. We do not agree.

2. Statutory Arguments as to the Applicability of G.L. c. 72, § 2, to Grace Bible Church Christian School.

a. Grace Bible Church Christian School is a school subject to the reporting requirement of G.L. c. 72, § 2. The defendants claim that their affidavits, denying that the Grace Bible Church Christian School is a "school," raise genuine issues of material fact which cannot be decided on a motion for summary judgment. On this record, we think that the issue whether the Grace Bible Church Christian School is a "school" within the meaning of G.L. c. 72, § 2, is a question of law, and thus is a proper subject for a motion for summary judgment.

General Laws c. 72, § 2, as amended by St.1966, c. 14, § 62, requires "(t)he school committee of each town (to) ascertain the number of pupils ... whose parents or guardians are residents of the town and who are enrolled for full-time attendance, in kindergarten and grades up to and including grade twelve, in public and vocational schools and classes in the commonwealth and nonpublic schools anywhere." To enable school committees to carry out this duty, G.L. c. 72, § 2, mandates that "(t)he supervisory officers of all private schools shall, within thirty days after the enrolment or registration of any child of compulsory school age, report his name, age and residence to the superintendent of schools of the town where the child resides ...."

Grace Bible Church Christian School provides full time instruction in reading, writing, spelling, history, mathematics, science, geography, language, poetry, art, physical education, phonics, and the Bible, to children in grades one through six. The stated educational goals of the school include teaching children "(t)o develop creative skills for communication, and mathematical skills; (t)o develop critical thinking and intellectual integrity; and (t)o train latent abilities, intellectual or physical." "In its ordinary meaning, the word 'school' denotes a place for systematic instruction in any branch or branches of knowledge.... '(I)t means a place where systematic instruction in any or all of the useful branches of learning is given by methods common to schools and institutions of learning.' " Chicopee v. Jakubowski, 348 Mass. 230, 232, 202 N.E.2d 913 (1964), quoting Kesselring v. Bonnycastle Club, Inc., 299 Ky. 585, 589, 186 S.W.2d 402 (1929). Thus, we believe that the Grace Bible Church Christian School is a "school" within the meaning of G.L. c. 72, § 2. 6

Our conclusion is consistent with the purpose of G.L. c. 72, § 2. General Laws c. 72, § 2, was intended to facilitate the enforcement of the compulsory attendance law. G.L. c. 76, § 1. Under G.L. c. 76, § 1, school committees approve those private schools which a child may attend to satisfy the compulsory attendance law. 7 A child may satisfy the compulsory attendance law by attending a school run under religious auspices. To determine which children are complying with the compulsory attendance law, the school committee must identify all children attending private schools, both secular and religious. We believe that the Legislature intended the reporting requirement of G.L. c. 72, § 2, to apply to all private schools, including those run by religious organizations. Thus, the Grace Bible Church Christian School is not immunized from the reporting requirement of G.L. c. 72, § 2, because it is run under the supervision of the board of elders of the Grace Bible Church.

In addition, we believe that G.L. c. 72, § 2, applies to all private schools whether or not they have been approved. To ascertain which children are in compliance with G.L. c....

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