Mesa v. Granville

Decision Date21 December 2016
Docket NumberNo. CR–16–0053–PR,CR–16–0053–PR
Parties Jesse Mesa, Petitioner, v. Hon. Warren J. Granville, Judge of the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, in and for the County of Maricopa, Respondent Judge, State of Arizona, Real Party in Interest.
CourtArizona Supreme Court

Eric W. Kessler (argued), Sandra Hamilton, Mesa, Attorneys for Jesse Mesa

William G. Montgomery, Maricopa County Attorney, Karen Kemper (argued), Deputy County Attorney, Phoenix, Attorneys for State of Arizona

Maricopa County Public Defender's Office, Amy Kalman (argued), Mikel Steinfeld, Deputy

Public Defenders, Phoenix, and Amy P. Knight, Kuykendall & Associates, Tucson, Attorneys for Amici Curiae Maricopa County Public Defender's Office and Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice

Natman Schaye, Arizona Capital Representation Project, Tucson, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Arizona Capital Representation Project

CHIEF JUSTICE BALES authored the opinion of the Court, in which VICE CHIEF JUSTICE PELANDER and JUSTICES BRUTINEL, TIMMER and BOLICK joined.

CHIEF JUSTICE BALES, opinion of the Court:

¶ 1 Under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 15.1(i)(1), the state, within sixty days of arraignment, "shall provide to the defendant notice of whether [it] intends to seek the death penalty." Here, the State did not file such a notice after Jesse Mesa was arraigned; instead, after discovering new evidence, it obtained a second indictment adding two charges, dismissed the first case, and filed a death notice in the second case. We hold that when the state complies with Rule 16.6 in dismissing a prosecution and obtains a new indictment, the time limits for filing a notice under Rule 15.1(i)(1) start anew, absent bad faith by the state or prejudice to the defendant. We further hold that the untimely filing of a death notice does not itself invalidate the notice but may result in sanctions, including an order striking the notice, under Rule 15.7.

I.

¶ 2 A grand jury indicted Mesa in May 2014 for first degree murder and other charges (the "2014 charges") related to the shooting of a clerk in a Phoenix smoke shop. Mesa was arraigned the same month. The State did not file a notice of intent to seek the death penalty, and trial was set for June 2015.

¶ 3 Lorenzo Garcia was also indicted in May 2014 for charges related to the same crime. In October 2014, Garcia engaged in a "free talk" and told prosecutors that he and Mesa had discussed robbing the smoke shop at gunpoint. Garcia said that a girl named Erica "Vibe" Vasquez had waited outside as a "lookout." Garcia also stated that Mesa had shot the clerk in the face and that Mesa later laughed while telling others the clerk had talked about his children before he was killed.

¶ 4 After the free talk, the State investigated the reliability of Garcia's information, including conducting a polygraph test on Garcia in December 2014. Garcia eventually entered into a plea agreement. In a March 2015 interview, Vasquez told investigators that Mesa had said he had shot the clerk in the head. She also said that Mesa bragged about the shooting and recounted the clerk mentioning his children while begging Mesa not to shoot him.

¶ 5 Based on the information obtained from Garcia and Vasquez, the State obtained a new indictment of Mesa in April 2015. The new indictment alleged the same charges as the first indictment but added charges of first degree burglary and conspiracy to commit first degree murder (the "2015 charges"). Mesa was arraigned in May 2015. After the arraignment, the State dismissed the 2014 charges without prejudice.

¶ 6 The parties stipulated to extend the time for the State to file a death notice for the 2015 charges, but Mesa reserved an objection to the State's failure to file a notice for the 2014 charges. In September 2015, the State filed a notice of intent within the stipulated deadline, and the trial court set the trial for August 2017.

¶ 7 Mesa moved to strike the State's notice of intent, arguing that it was invalid because the State had not timely filed a notice after he was arraigned for the 2014 charges. Denying the motion, the trial court ruled that the new indictment restarted the time limit under Rule 15.1(i)(1). Mesa sought special action relief in the court of appeals, which declined jurisdiction. We granted review to address recurring legal issues of statewide importance.

II.

¶ 8 Rule 15.1 addresses disclosure by the state in criminal cases, and subsection (i) mandates "Additional Disclosure in a Capital Case." Rule 15.1(i)(1) provides:

The prosecutor, no later than 60 days after the arraignment in superior court, shall provide to the defendant notice of whether the prosecutor intends to seek the death penalty. This period may be extended up to 60 days upon written stipulation of counsel filed with the court. Once the stipulation is approved by the court, the case shall be considered a capital case for all administrative purposes including, but not limited to, scheduling, appointment of counsel under Rule 6.8, and assignment of a mitigation specialist. Additional extensions may be granted upon stipulation of the parties and approval of the court. The prosecutor shall confer with the victim prior to agreeing to an extension of the 60 day deadline or any additional extensions, if the victim has requested notice pursuant to A.R.S. Section 13–4405.

¶ 9 This case also involves Rule 16.6, which governs dismissals of a prosecution. A court may dismiss a case upon the prosecutor's motion as long as it is not filed to avoid the provisions of Rule 8, which concern a defendant's right to a speedy trial. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 16.6(a). Such a dismissal is "without prejudice to commencement of another prosecution" unless the court finds that the "interests of justice" require otherwise. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 16.6(d). Here, consistent with Rule 16.6, the trial court dismissed the 2014 charges without prejudice.

¶ 10 Mesa argues that Rule 15.1(i)(1) imposes a "jurisdictional" deadline for the filing of the state's notice of intent to seek the death penalty. Once a defendant is arraigned on charges of first degree murder and the deadline passes, Mesa contends, the state is barred from seeking a death sentence for that murder, even if, as occurred here, the state commences a new prosecution. These arguments, however, run counter to both the language of Rule 15.1(i)(1) and our general approach to determining time deadlines when a new prosecution follows a dismissal without prejudice.

¶ 11 When a case is dismissed without prejudice, the state's filing of a new indictment generally begins a separate matter. See Godoy v. Hantman , 205 Ariz. 104, 105 ¶ 1, 106 ¶ 8, 67 P.3d 700, 701–02 (2003) ; State v. Rose , 121 Ariz. 131, 137, 589 P.2d 5, 11 (1978). Time limits under the rules begin anew for the separate matter "absent a showing of bad faith on the part of the prosecution or prejudice to the accused." Rose , 121 Ariz. at 137, 589 P.2d at 11 (restarting speedy trial time limits); see also Godoy , 205 Ariz. at 106 ¶ 7, 67 P.3d at 702 (restarting change-of-judge time limits). Relying on Godoy , the trial court here concluded that the deadline for filing a death notice restarted when Mesa was arraigned on the 2015 charges.

¶ 12 If the general rule reflected by Godoy and Rose applies, the State timely filed its notice in September 2015. Mesa argues that the State acted in bad faith because it sought a new indictment and dismissed the 2014 charges in order to circumvent the Rule 15.1(i)(1) deadline. The record, however, reflects that the State sought a new indictment and filed its notice in 2015 after learning additional information that significantly changed Mesa's alleged role in the murder. These actions do not reflect bad faith. Cf. Rose , 121 Ariz. at 137, 589 P.2d at 11 (noting record did not reveal bad faith in holding that speedy trial time limits began anew upon refiling after dismissal).

¶ 13 Mesa also argues that he was prejudiced by restarting the deadline. Citing Holmberg v. De Leon , 189 Ariz. 109, 938 P.2d 1110 (1997), Mesa argues that the passage of time between his arraignment for the 2014 charges and the State's filing a death notice based on the 2015 indictment in itself constituted prejudice, because for most of that time he did not have a capital defense team in place. We do not read Holmberg to hold that the passage of time alone establishes prejudice. Instead, in finding actual prejudice to the defendant and the administration of justice, Holmberg noted that the state failed to file notice until a few weeks before the scheduled trial date, some fifteen months after the defendant had been arraigned and after the parties had engaged in extensive discovery with no mention of the death penalty.

Id. at 112, 938 P.2d at 1113. Rather than hold that the passage of time alone established prejudice, this Court noted that the defendant had been handicapped in preparing his defense and the state had recognized at the time of indictment that the case involved a potential capital offense. Id.

¶ 14 We reject Mesa's argument that the passage of time between his initial arraignment and the State's filing its notice establishes "prejudice" that would preclude restarting the Rule 15.1(i)(1) time periods. Although he is correct that a capital defense team was not assembled until after the 2015 indictment, he has not specifically identified how he was prejudiced by the delay in terms of preparing his defense. And unlike the defendant in Holmberg , Mesa received the State's notice almost two years before the 2017 trial date. Finally, although resetting the deadline may expose Mesa to a death sentence, that result is not the sort of prejudice that would preclude treating a successive prosecution as a separate matter with its own time deadlines. See, e.g. , Rose , 121 Ariz. at 137, 589 P.2d at 11 (finding no prejudice while recognizing charges could effectively be barred if speedy trial deadlines did not...

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