386 U.S. 18 (1967), 95, Chapman v. California

Docket Nº:No. 95
Citation:386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705
Party Name:Chapman v. California
Case Date:February 20, 1967
Court:United States Supreme Court

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386 U.S. 18 (1967)

87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705




No. 95

United States Supreme Court

Feb. 20, 1967

Argued December 7-8, 1966



Petitioners were convicted following a California state criminal trial during which the prosecutor, as then permitted by a state constitutional provision, extensively commented on their failure to testify. The trial judge also charged the jury that it could draw adverse inferences from such failure. After the trial, but before petitioners' appeal was considered, the state constitutional provision was invalidated by Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609. Though admitting that petitioners had been denied a federal constitutional right, the California Supreme Court, applying the State Constitution's harmless error provision, upheld the convictions.


1. This Court has jurisdiction to formulate a harmless error rule that will protect a defendant's federal right under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to be free from state penalties for not testifying in his criminal trial. Pp. 20-21.

2. Before a constitutional error can be held to be harmless, the court must be able to declare its belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Pp. 21-24.

3. The State in this case did not demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecutor's repetitive comments to the jury, and the trial court's instruction concerning the petitioners' failure to testify did not contribute to their convictions. Pp. 24-26.

63 Cal.2d 178, 404 P.2d 209, reversed.

BLACK, J., lead opinion

MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioners, Ruth Elizabeth Chapman and Thomas LeRoy Teale, were convicted in a California state court

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upon a charge that they robbed, kidnaped, and murdered a bartender. She was sentenced to life imprisonment, and he to death. At the time of the trial, Art., § 13, of the State's Constitution provided that,

in any criminal case, whether the defendant testifies or not, his failure to explain or to deny by his testimony any evidence or facts in the case against him may be commented upon by the court and by counsel, and may be considered by the court or the jury.

Both petitioners in this case chose not to testify at their trial, and the State's attorney prosecuting them took full advantage of his right under the State Constitution to comment upon their failure to testify, filling his argument to the jury from beginning to end with numerous references to their silence and inferences of their guilt resulting therefrom.1 The trial court also charged the jury that it could draw adverse inferences from petitioners' failure to testify.2 Shortly after the trial, but before petitioners' cases had been considered on appeal by the California Supreme Court, this Court decided Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, in which we held California's constitutional provision and [87 S.Ct. 826] practice invalid on the ground that they put a penalty on the exercise of a person's right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself, guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the

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United States Constitution and made applicable to California and the other States by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1. On appeal, the State Supreme Court, 63 Cal.2d 178, 404 P.2d 209, admitting that petitioners had been denied a federal constitutional right by the comments on their silence, nevertheless affirmed, applying the State Constitution's harmless error provision, which forbids reversal unless "the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice."3 We granted certiorari limited to these questions:

Where there is a violation of the rule of Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, (1) can the error be held to be harmless, and (2) if so, was the error harmless in this case?

383 U.S. 956-957.

In this Court, petitioners contend that both these questions are federal ones to be decided under federal law; that, under federal law, we should hold that denial of a federal constitutional right, no matter how unimportant, should automatically result in reversal of a conviction, without regard to whether the error is considered harmless, and that, if wrong in this, the various comments on petitioners' silence cannot, applying a federal standard, be considered harmless here.


Before deciding the two questions here -- whether there can ever be harmless constitutional error and whether the error here was harmless -- we must first decide whether

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state or federal law governs. The application of a state harmless error rule is, of course, a state question where it involves only errors of state procedure or state law. But the error from which these petitioners suffered was a denial of rights guaranteed against invasion by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, rights rooted in the Bill of Rights, offered and championed in the Congress by James Madison, who told the Congress that the "independent" federal courts would be the "guardians of those rights."4 Whether a conviction for crime should stand when a State has failed to accord federal constitutionally guaranteed rights is every bit as much of a federal question as what particular federal constitutional provisions themselves mean, what they guarantee, and whether they have been denied. With faithfulness to the constitutional union of the States, we cannot leave to the States the formulation of the authoritative laws, rules, and remedies designed to protect people from infractions by the States of federally guaranteed rights. We have no hesitation in saying that the right of these petitioners not to be punished for exercising their Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment [87 S.Ct. 827] right to be silent -- expressly created by the Federal Constitution itself -- is a federal right which, in the absence of appropriate congressional action, it is our responsibility to protect by fashioning the necessary rule.


We are urged by petitioners to hold that all federal constitutional errors, regardless of the facts and circumstances, must always be deemed harmful. Such a holding,

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as petitioners correctly point out, would require an automatic reversal of their convictions and make further discussion unnecessary. We decline to adopt any such rule. All 50 States have harmless error statutes or rules, and the United States long ago, through its Congress, established for its courts the rule that judgments shall not be reversed for "errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties." 28 U.S.C. § 2111.5 None of these rules, on its face, distinguishes between federal constitutional errors and errors of state law or federal statutes and rules. All of these rules, state or federal, serve a very useful purpose insofar as they block setting aside convictions for small errors or defects that have little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial. We conclude that there may be some constitutional errors which, in the setting of a particular case, are so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction.


In fashioning a harmless constitutional error rule, we must recognize that harmless error rules can work very unfair and mischievous results when, for example, highly important and persuasive evidence, or argument, though legally forbidden, finds its way into a trial in which the question of guilt or innocence is a close one. What

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harmless error rules all aim at is a rule that will save the good in harmless error practices while avoiding the bad, so far as possible.

The federal rule emphasizes "substantial rights," as do most others. The California constitutional rule emphasizes "a miscarriage of justice,"6 but the California courts have neutralized this to some extent by emphasis, and perhaps overemphasis, upon the court's view of "overwhelming evidence."7 We prefer the approach of this Court in deciding what was harmless error in our recent case of Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85. There we said: "The question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction." Id. at 86-87. Although our prior cases have indicated that there are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be [87 S.Ct. 828] treated as harmless error,8 this statement in Fahy itself belies any belief that all trial errors which violate the Constitution automatically call for reversal. At the same time, however, like the federal harmless error statute, it emphasizes an intention not to treat as harmless those constitutional errors that "affect substantial rights" of a party. An error in admitting plainly relevant evidence which possibly influenced the jury adversely to a litigant cannot, under Fahy, be conceived

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of as harmless. Certainly error, constitutional error, in illegally admitting highly prejudicial evidence or comments, casts on someone other than the person prejudiced by it a burden to show that it was harmless. It is for that reason that the original common law harmless error rule put the burden on the beneficiary of the error either to prove that there was no injury or to suffer a reversal of his erroneously obtained judgment.9 There is little, if any, difference between our statement in Fahy v. Connecticut about "whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction" and requiring the beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. We therefore do no more than adhere to the meaning of our Fahy case when we hold, as we now do, that, before...

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