Thorpe v. Housing Authority of City of Durham

• Decision Date: 17 April 1967
• Docket Number: No. 712,712
• Citation: 386 U.S. 670,87 S.Ct. 1244,18 L.Ed.2d 394
• Parties: Joyce C. THORPE, Petitioner, v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF the CITY OF DURHAM
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

386 U.S. 670

87 S.Ct. 1244

18 L.Ed.2d 394

Joyce C. THORPE, Petitioner,

v HOUSING AUTHORITY OF the CITY OF DURHAM.

No. 712.

Argued March 21, 1967.

Decided April 17, 1967.

James M. Nabrit, III, New York City, for petitioner.

Daniel K. Edwards, Durham, N.C., for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

In November 1964, the petitioner became a tenant in McDougald Terrace, a federally assisted, low-rent public housing project owned and managed by the Housing Authority of the City of Durham, North Carolina. The lease provided for a tenancy from month to month, and gave both the tenant and the Authority the right to terminate by giving notice at least 15 days before the end of any monthly term. On August 10, 1965, the petitioner was elected president of a McDougald Terrace tenants' organization. The next day the Authority gave her notice of termination of her tenancy as of August 31. The notice did not give any reasons for the cancellation, and the Authority declined to accede to the petitioner's demands for an explanation. The petitioner refused to vacate the premises, and the Authority thereupon brought a summary ejectment action in the Justice of the Peace Court in Durham. The Authority there obtained a judgment of eviction, which was affirmed on appeal by the Superior Court of Durham County and the Supreme Court of North Carolina.¹ We granted certiorari. 385 U.S. 967, 87 S.Ct. 515, 17 L.Ed.2d 432. The petitioner has remained in possession of her apartment pursuant to a stay granted by the North Carolina Supreme Court.

The petitioner contends that she was constitutionally entitled to notice setting forth the reasons for the termination of her lease, and a hearing thereon. She also suggests that her eviction was invalid because it allegedly was based on her participation in constitutionally protected associational activities.² We find it unnecessary to reach the large issues stirred by these claims, because of a significant development that has occurred since we granted the writ of certiorari.

On February 7, 1967, the Department of Housing and Urban Development issued a directive to local housing authorities. After reciting the fact that dissatisfaction had been expressed with eviction procedures in low-rent housing projects and that suits had been brought to challenge evictions in which the local authority had not given any reason for its action, the circular stated:

'Since this is a federally assisted program, we believe it is essential that no tenant be given notice to vacate without being told by the Local Authority, in a private conference or other appropriate manner, the reasons for the eviction, and given an opportunity to make such reply or explanation as he may wish.'

The circular goes on to require local authorities to keep future records of evictions, the reasons therefor, and summaries of any conferences held with tenants in connection with evictions.³

While the directive provides that certain records shall be kept commencing with the date of its issuance, there is no suggestion that the basic procedure it prescribes is not to be followed in all eviction proceedings that have not become final. If this procedure were accorded to the petitioner, her case would assume a posture quite different from the one now presented.⁴ Compare Wabash R. Co., State of Missouri ex rel., v. Public Service Comm'n, 273 U.S. 126, 131, 47 S.Ct. 311, 313, 71 L.Ed. 575; Patterson v. State of Alabama, 294 U.S. 600, 607, 55 S.Ct. 575, 578, 79 L.Ed. 1082; Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 69 S.Ct. 384, 93 L.Ed. 266.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of North Carolina is accordingly vacated, and the case remanded for such further proceedings as may be appropriate in the light of the February 7 circular of the Department of Housing and Urban Development.

It is so ordered.

Judgment vacated and case remanded.

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, concurring.

Petitioner and her children have been tenants in a low-income housing project constructed with federal and state funds and operated by the Housing Authority of the City of Durham, an agency of the State of North Carolina. The Housing Authority was established under state law and is 'a public body and a body corporate and politic, exercising public powers.' N.C.Gen.Stat. § 157—9 (1964). It has 'all the powers necessary or convenient to carry out and effectuate the purposes and provisions' of the North Carolina Housing Authorities Law (N.C.Gen.Stat. § 157—1 et seq. (1964)), including the powers 'to manage as agent of any city or municipality * * * any housing project constructed or owned by such city' and 'to act as agent for the federal government in connection with the acquisition, construction, operation and/or management of a housing project.' Id., § 157—9 (1964).

The lease under which petitioner has occupied the project had an initial term from November 11 to November 30, 1964, and provided that it would be automatically renewed thereafter for successive terms of one month, provided there were no changes in income or family composition and no violations of the lease terms. The lease provides that '(t)he Management may terminate this lease by giving to the Tenant notice in writing of such termination fifteen * * * days prior to the last day of the term.' The lease 'shall be automatically terminated at the option of the Management' with an immediate right of re-entry and all notices required by law waived, if the tenant misrepresents a material fact in his application or if 'the Tenant fails to comply with any of the provisions of (the) lease.'

As I have said, petitioner and her children moved into their home in the project on November 11, 1964. All apparently went well for eight months; the record reveals no complaints from the manager of the housing project. On August 10, 1965, petitioner was elected president of the Parents' Club, a group composed of tenants of the housing project. On August 11, 1965, the Housing Authority's Executive Director delivered a notice that petitioner's lease would be canceled effective August 31, at which time she would have to vacate the premises. No reasons were given for the sudden cancellation. The Authority merely referred to the provision of the lease stating that management may terminate the lease by giving the tenant notice 15 days prior to the last day of the term.

Petitioner requested a hearing to determine the reason for the termination; the request was summarily denied. Since she was given no reason and no hearing, petitioner refused to vacate her home. The Housing Authority brought a summary ejectment action in the Justice of the Peace Court of Durham; the court ordered that petitioner and her family be removed from their home. Petitioner appealed to the Superior Court. It was stipulated that the Superior Court could make findings and decide the case on the basis of the stipulations and affidavits. Petitioner's motion to quash claimed that her 'eviction primarily resulted from her community activities as an organizer of tenants, thus constituting an unconstitutional abridgement of her freedom of expression and a denial of equal protection of the laws.' Her affidavit alleged 'that her eviction was prompted by (the) Manager of the Housing Authority, who wants to get her out of the project because of her efforts to organize the tenants of (the housing project) * * *.' It was stip- ulated that the Executive Director of the Housing Authority would testify that 'whatever reason there may have been, if any, for giving notice to (petitioner) of the termination of her lease, it was not for the reason that she was elected president of any group organized in (the housing project) * * *.' (Emphasis added.) The Superior Court found that petitioner had not been evicted due to her efforts to organize the tenants nor due to her election as president of the Parents' Club. The court held that the Housing Authority was not required to give petitioner a hearing and was not required to give any reason for the lease termination.

The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed. 267 N.C. 431, 148 S.E.2d 290. It held that the Housing Authority is the 'owner' of the apartment and that petitioner 'has no right to occupy it except insofar as such right is conferred upon her by the written lease which she and the (Housing Authority) plaintiff signed.' Id., at 433, 148 S.E.2d, at 291. Since petitioner had refused to quit after the Housing Authority terminated the lease, she could be evicted so as to restore to the Authority' the possession of that which belongs to it.' Id., at 433, 148 S.E.2d at 291—292. The court thought it 'immaterial what may have been the reason for the lessor's unwillingness to continue the relationship of landlord and tenant * * *.' Id., at 433, 148 S.E.2d, at 292. Under the rationale of the North Carolina Supreme Court, a public housing authority, organized under state law and operating a housing project financed by federal and state funds, is assimilated to the position of a private property owner who can terminate a lease for any reason or no reason at all.

The circular upon which the Court bases its decision to vacate and remand comes from the office of the Assistant Secretary for Renewal and Housing Assistance and was issued February 7, 1967, after we granted certiorari. It is directed to 'Local Housing Authorities, Assistant Regional Administrators for Housing Assistance, and HAA Division and Branch Heads' and reads in part:

'Since this is a federally assisted program, we believe it is essential that no tenant be given notice to vacate without being told by the Local Authority, in a private conference or other appropriate manner, the reasons for the eviction, and given an opportunity to make such reply or explanation as he may wish.'

It goes on to provide that '(i)n addition to informing the tenant of the reason(s) for any proposed eviction action, from this date each Local Authority shall maintain a written record of every eviction from...