Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, Dept. of W. & P.

Decision Date15 January 1975
Docket NumberCiv. No. 73-2272-HP.
Citation387 F. Supp. 980
PartiesMarie MANHART et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, DEPARTMENT OF WATER AND POWER, a body corporate and politic, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Central District of California

Katherine Stoll Burns, Los Angeles, Cal., for individual plaintiffs and Committee to Protect Women's Retirement Benefits.

Robert M. Dohrmann, Michael Evan Gold, Schwartz, Steinsapir & Dohrmann, Los Angeles, Cal., for Plaintiff, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 18.

Burt Pines, City Atty., Edward C. Farrell, Chief Asst. City Atty., Madeleine I. Flier, Gilbert W. Lee, Deputy City Attys., Los Angeles, Cal., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

PREGERSON, District Judge.

This matter arises upon a motion for preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs, Marie Manhart, Carolyn Mayshack, and other employees of the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power initiated this action against the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power because female employees of the Department are required to make larger monthly contributions than their male counterparts in order to receive the same monthly retirement benefits as these male employees. In plaintiffs' view, this practice violates § 703 of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S. C.A. § 2000e-2 (West 1974). According to defendants, however, this differentiation between male and female employees is justified by actuarial tables which indicate that women as a class tend to live longer than men and that therefore female employees are likely to receive retirement benefits for a longer duration than their male counterparts. In short, defendants argue that women should pay more to get more.

In order to issue a preliminary injunction, the court must make the following determinations: (1) that plaintiffs are likely to prevail on the merits, (2) that plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm without preliminary relief, (3) that defendants will not be unduly injured by the injunction, and (4) that an injunction promotes the public interest. Seamen v. Spring Lake Park Independent School District No. 16, 363 F.Supp. 944, 945 (D.Minn.1973); United States v. Local 638, 337 F.Supp. 217, 220 (S.D. N.Y.1972). See King v. Saddleback Junior College Dist., 425 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1970).

The major question on this motion is whether plaintiffs have a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits. To make this determination, the court must decide whether the Department's practice of requiring women to make larger monthly contributions to the retirement plan than men constitutes "discrimination against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's . . . sex . . ." within the meaning of § 703(a)(1) of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (West 1974).

Several sources of authority support the conclusion that the Department's practice in question here constitutes sexual discrimination under § 703(a)(1). Initially, it should be pointed out that this section applies to retirement plans. Bartmess v. Drewrys USA, Inc., 444 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1971); Rosen v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 477 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1973). Moreover, current regulations of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued under the authority of § 713 of the Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-12 (West 1974), not only suggest that § 703(a)(1) applies in this case, but also indicate that the Department's practice gives rise to sexual discrimination. According to these current regulations, "it shall not be a defense under Title VII to a charge of sex discrimination in benefits that the cost of such benefits is greater with respect to one sex than the other," 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(e), and "it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to have a pension or retirement plan . . . which differentiates in benefits on the basis of sex." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(f).

The EEOC has recently applied these standards to an analogous case in which retired female employees received lower monthly payments under their annuities than their male counterparts. Decision No. 74-118, CCH EEOC Decisions ¶ 6431 (Employment Practices Guide, 1974). Under the facts of that case, female employees had contributed the same amounts for the annuity benefits as male employees. In rejecting the argument that equalization of monthly payments would discriminate against males, who, as a class, would receive less because they tend to die sooner, and in favor of females, who would receive more because they generally die later, the EEOC stated:

A argues that equal payments to female retirees would in fact discriminate in their favor because females, statistically, live longer than men. The logic of this argument is that usually used to support discrimination: an appeal to the average characteristics of a particular sex, race, or other group protected under Title VII. But no person knows when he or she will die.
* * * * * *
Thus we think that A's argument misses the point. All that A's sex-segregated actuarial tables purport to predict is risk spread over a large number of people; the tables do not predict the length of any particular individual's life.
In our view, any use of sex-segregated actuarial table that results in payment of different periodic pension benefits to males and females is highly suspect. Because actuarial tables do not predict the length of any individual's life, any claim that such tables may be used to assure equal pension payments over a lifetime between males and females must fail. In order to achieve compliance with Section 703(a) of Title VII and with the Commission's Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex the periodic pension benefits paid to males and females in equivalent circumstances must be equal. Moreover, it would not be a defense to Charging Party's charge that equalizing males' and females' periodic pension benefits would result in higher costs to Respondents if indeed this were shown to be a fact. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 CFR Sec. 1604.9(3). See, also, Taylor v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 5 EPD Para. 8545, 6 FEP Cases 50 (N.D.Ala., 1972).

(Footnotes omitted.) EEOC Decision 74-118, pp. 3-5.

As plaintiffs correctly point out, the only difference between the facts of EEOC Decision 74-118 and the facts of the case at bar is that instead of taking equal contributions from both sexes and supplying lower benefits to females, the defendants in the present action take more contributions from females and supply equal benefits to both sexes. In either case, the reason for this differential treatment is the actuarial fact of female longevity which, in effect, involves the application of characteristics that may be true of a class of people to individuals within the class for which the characterization may or may not be true. Therefore, EEOC Decision 74-118 is directly applicable to the present case, and dictates a finding of sexual discrimination here. As such, it is entitled to great deference in this court. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-434, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971).

The conclusion that the defendants' differential treatment of female employees violates § 703(a)(1) is supported by a recent Harvard Law Review comment, Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 Harv.L.Rev. 1109, 1172-1176 (1971). In its discussion of discrimination based on statistical differences and life insurance benefit programs, the comment takes the position that employers must provide the same life insurance benefits to male and female employees even though employers must pay higher premiums for males than for females due to actuarial female longevity. The comment reaches this...

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7 cases
  • City of Los Angeles, Department of Water and Power v. Manhart
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • April 25, 1978
    ...Local Union No. 18. 8 See Cal.Govt.Code Ann. § 7500 (West Supp. 1978). 9 The court had earlier granted a preliminary injunction. 387 F.Supp. 980 (1975). 10 553 F.2d 581 (1976). Two weeks after the Ninth Circuit decision, this Court decided General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 97 S......
  • Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, Dept. of Water and Power
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • November 23, 1976
    ...against women, and awarded a refund of all excess contributions made on or after April 5, 1972. Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, Department of Water and Power, C.D.Cal., 1975, 387 F.Supp. 980. This is a class action brought by women employees and retirees of the City of Los Angeles, Departme......
  • EEOC v. County of Los Angeles
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Central District of California
    • January 29, 1982
    ...(7th Cir. 1973) and Armstrong v. O'Connell, 416 F.Supp. 1325, 1331 (E.D.Wis.1976). As was stated in Manhart v. Los Angeles Department of Water & Power, 387 F.Supp. 980, 984 (C.D. Cal.1975), aff'd, 553 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. Where statutory civil rights of employees are found to have been violat......
  • Theodore v. Elmhurst College, 76 C 2283.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • September 15, 1976
    ...Standard, Inc., 488 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1973); Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970); Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, 387 F.Supp. 980 (C.D.Cal.1975); Held v. Missouri Pac. R. R., 373 F.Supp. 996 (S.D.Tex.1974); United States v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 327 F.Su......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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