Paschal v. State

Citation2012 Ark. 127,388 S.W.3d 429
Decision Date03 May 2012
Docket NumberNo. CR 11–673.,CR 11–673.
PartiesDavid Waldon PASCHAL, Appellant v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.
CourtSupreme Court of Arkansas

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Validity Called into Doubt

Ark. Code Ann. § 5–14–125(a)(6).

Casey D. Copeland, Prairie Grove, for appellant.

Dustin McDaniel, Atty. Gen., Little Rock, by: Karen Virginia Wallace, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee

JIM HANNAH, Chief Justice.

Appellant David Waldon Paschal was convicted of four counts of second-degree sexual assault and one count of witness bribery. He was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment on each of three of the sexual-assault convictions, given ten years' suspended sentence for the fourth sexual-assault conviction,1 and fined $4000 for the witness-bribery conviction. On appeal, Paschal contends that the circuit court erred in (1) denying his motion for directed verdict on the witness-bribery charge, (2) refusing to admit evidence of bias on the part of the State's chief witness-bribery-charge witness, (3) failing to sever the witness-bribery charge, (4) finding the second-degree sexual-assault statute constitutional as it was applied to him, (5) admitting certain witness testimony during the penalty phase, and (6) rejecting proffered jury instructions. We affirm in part, reverse and remand in part, and reverse and dismiss in part.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence: Witness Bribery

Paschal contends that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict on the charge of witness bribery.2 On appeal, we treat a motion for directed verdict as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. E.g., Smoak v. State, 2011 Ark. 529, 385 S.W.3d 257. In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this court determines whether the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial. Id. Substantial evidence is evidence forceful enough to compel a conclusion one way or the other beyond suspicion or conjecture. Id. This court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and only evidence supporting the verdict will be considered. Id.

Arkansas Code Annotated section 5–53–108 provides in relevant part that a person commits witness bribery if he or she

(1) Offers, confers, or agrees to confer any benefit upon a witness or a person he or she believes may be called as a witness with the purpose of:

(A) Influencing the testimony of that person;

(B) Inducing that person to avoid legal process summoning that person to testify; or

(C) Inducing that person to absent himself or herself from an official proceeding to which that person has been legally summoned.

Ark.Code Ann. § 5–53–108(a)(1) (Repl.2005). An “official proceeding” is “a proceeding heard before any legislative, judicial, administrative, or other government agency or official authorized to hear evidence under oath, including any referee, hearing examiner, commissioner, notary, or other person taking testimony or depositions in any such proceeding.” Id. § 5–53–101(4)(A). “Testimony” means “an oral or written statement, document, or any other material that is or could be offered by a witness in an official proceeding.” Id. § 5–53–101(5).

Paschal, a high school teacher, had a months-long sexual relationship with eighteen-year-old A.D., a student at Elkins High School, where Paschal taught. Principal Rebecca Martin testified that on May 5, 2010, A.D. and her mother contacted school officials and informed them that A.D. and Paschal had engaged in a sexual relationship. Martin testified that Paschal told her that he knew his sexual relationship with A.D. was illegal and that he was concerned about whether his actions would have an effect on his career and his relationship with his children. Fayetteville Police Department Detective Jonathon Snyder interviewed Paschal that day in the school superintendent's office, and Paschal admitted that he had engaged in a sexual relationship with A.D. On June 2, 2010, Snyder arrested Paschal, and he was formally charged with four counts of second-degree sexual assault on August 13, 2010.

S.C., a senior at Elkins High School, testified that Paschal was his AP World History teacher during his junior year. S.C. said that A.D. was his friend and a year ahead of him in school. S.C. stated that he worked at the local Wal–Mart and that Paschal knew that he worked there. In June 2010, while S.C. was returning to work from a break, Paschal waved at him and walked up to him. According to S.C., Paschal said, [A.D.] knows that she's not gonna get any money out of this and if it's money she wants, I'll give her a couple of thousand if she'll drop the case.” S.C. testified that he attempted to contact A.D. through several of her friends, but when he was unable to make contact with her, he told Ms. Taylor, a geometry teacher at the school, what Paschal had told him. S.C. also stated that he told law enforcement officers what Paschal had said. S.C. identified Paschal in the courtroom as the person who had asked him to contact A.D. and offer her money.

Paschal contends that there was no evidence presented to the jury that he had offered A.D. money through S.C. for the purpose of influencing her testimony, inducing her to avoid legal process, or inducing her to absent herself from a legal proceeding to which she had been legally summoned. Paschal states that the conversation with S.C., which occurred in June 2010, was “a month or two” before he was formally charged in August 2010, so there were no legal proceedings at issue. Paschal contends that the evidence illustrates nothing more than his attempt to resolve the matter without all the attention of a trial, much like when prosecutors offer defendants plea offers in an attempt to resolve a pending case. We find no merit in Paschal's argument.

Paschal was in no position to attempt to “negotiate” with A.D. The State has the authority to bring criminal charges, irrespective of whether the victim wishes to pursue those charges. See, e.g., Clay v. State, 236 Ark. 398, 403 n. 4, 366 S.W.2d 299, 303 n. 4 (1963)noting that the State is the party in the criminal prosecution, not the victim). According to S.C., Paschal told him to tell A.D. that he would give her money if she would “drop the case against him. While the decision to bring criminal charges was the State's and not A.D.'s, A.D.'s allegations formed the basis of the State's case, and the State needed her cooperation as a witness. When Paschal spoke to S.C., he was aware that criminal charges against him were being investigated by the police, and Paschal was likely aware that A.D. could give a sworn statement for use against him in a criminal prosecution. Finally, even though Paschal's conversation with S.C. took place before formal charges were filed, the statute does not require that a criminal case or any other “official proceeding” actually be pending at the time of the offer. S.C.'s testimony established that Paschal offered to confer a benefit upon A.D. with the purpose of influencing her testimony. We hold that there is substantial evidence to support a conviction for witness bribery. The circuit court did not err in denying Paschal's motion for directed verdict.

II. Admission of Evidence of Bias

Paschal contends that the circuit court abused its discretion in rejecting his proffered evidence of the bias of S.C. The decision to admit or exclude evidence is within the sound discretion of the circuit court, and we will not reverse a circuit court's decision regarding the admission of evidence absent a manifest abuse of discretion. E.g., Rollins v. State, 362 Ark. 279, 208 S.W.3d 215 (2005).

At trial, Paschal sought to introduce evidence that S.C.'s father was sued in 2009 in a quiet-title action by J.P. Corporation of Northwest Arkansas, a corporation in which Paschal's father held an interest. The corporation lost the lawsuit, and title to the property was quieted in S.C.'s father on May 11, 2009. During voir dire examination of S.C., S.C. testified that he lived on the property at issue in the lawsuit and that he knew that Paschal's family was “on the other side of the lawsuit.” Neither S.C. nor Paschal was a party to the lawsuit, and S.C. said that he was not affected by the lawsuit “in any form or fashion.” S.C. testified that the extent of his knowledge of the lawsuit was “just hearing, just second-hand, just hearing it from my parents.” The circuit court concluded that the evidence was not relevant, that it had no probative value, and that it would be prejudicial.

The State contends that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by refusing the evidence because neither S.C. nor Paschal was a party to the lawsuit, which had ended favorably to S.C.'s father. The State also points out that the lawsuit ended in May 2009, which was nearly two years before S.C.'s testimony at Paschal's trial and over a year prior to Paschal's witness-bribery attempt.

As a general rule, all relevant evidence is admissible. Ark. R. Evid. 402 (2011). Relevant evidence is “evidence having a tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Ark. R. Evid. 401. Relevant evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Ark. R. Evid. 403.

“A witness's credibility is always an issue, subject to attack by any party.” Fowler v.State, 339 Ark. 207, 219, 5 S.W.3d 10, 16 (1999). The scope of cross-examination extends to matters of credibility. SeeArk. R. Evid. 611(b). A matter is not collateral if the evidence is relevant to show bias. Fowler, 339 Ark. at 219, 5 S.W.3d at 16. Proof of bias is “almost always relevant because the jury, as finder of fact and weigher of...

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