Barrett v. Steubenville City Schools

Decision Date15 November 2004
Docket NumberNo. 03-4373.,03-4373.
Citation388 F.3d 967
PartiesPatrick BARRETT, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STEUBENVILLE CITY SCHOOLS, Richard Lucci, in his individual capacity only, Daniel Spahn, in his official capacity only, Ruth Ann Bruzzese, in her official capacity only, William Kerr, in his official capacity only, William Hendricks, in his official capacity only, and Richard Beal, in his official capacity only, Defendants-Appellants.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, George C. Smith, J ON BRIEF: John C. Albert, Crabbe, Brown & James, Columbus, OH, for Appellants. Rayl L. Stepter, Columbus, OH, for Appellee.

Before: KEITH, MARTIN, and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

KEITH, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which MARTIN, J., joined. ROGERS, J. (pp. 974-76), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.

OPINION

KEITH, Circuit Judge.

Defendants-Appellants Steubenville City Schools, Superintendent Richard Lucci, in his individual capacity only, and Board Members, Daniel Spahn, Ruth Ann Bruzzese, William Kerr, William Hendricks, and Richard Beal, in their official capacities only, appeal the district court's denial of qualified immunity in this action claiming a deprivation of plaintiff's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights in defendants' failure to offer plaintiff a permanent teaching position. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM the district court's decision.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff-Appellee, Patrick Barrett ("Barrett"), received his Bachelor's degree in education in 1997 and was subsequently certified to teach elementary education. In November 1998, Wells Elementary School ("Wells"), a Steubenville City School, hired Barrett as a substitute teacher. Beginning in January 1999, Barrett substituted for an eight-week term, taking the place of a first grade teacher on maternity leave. The principal at Wells, John Holub ("Holub"), then offered Barrett a substitute teaching position for the remainder of the school year to take the place of a fourth grade teacher on maternity leave. Barrett accepted the position with the hope of receiving a full-time teaching contract for the following school year.

In May 1999, Barrett was scheduled to be interviewed for a full-time teaching position with Steubenville City Schools. Prior to the interview, Holub advised Barrett that Richard Lucci ("Lucci"), who would be assuming the position of Superintendent during the next school year, would not give Barrett a teaching contract unless his son attended Steubenville City Schools. From the time that he was in kindergarten, Barrett's son had attended All Saints, a Catholic school. After Barrett's conversation with Holub, Barrett was interviewed by Steubenville City Schools administrators, including Lucci, then-Assistant Superintendent. Lucci asked Barrett where his son would be attending school the following year, and Barrett told him that his son would finish the eighth grade next year at All Saints. After the interview, Barrett had another conversation with Holub, who again indicated that Lucci would not give Barrett a teaching contract until he moved his son out of All Saints and into Steubenville City Schools.

During the summer of 1999, two teaching positions became available. Barrett did not receive an offer for either position. In fact, a teacher who had not substituted with Steubenville City Schools was hired, despite a tradition within the school district to hire teachers who had previously substituted.

In August 1999, Barrett again interviewed with now Superintendent Lucci and informed him that his former job had recalled him back to work and he needed to make a decision. Barrett asked Lucci for a full-time teaching contract with Steubenville City Schools. Barrett claims that Lucci told him, "I can't promise a job if someone new is in this position, but if I am, you have a future here because you do such a good job." Barrett claims that he relied on this promise in declining to return to his full-time position with his former employer and instead served for another year as a substitute teacher.

During the 1999-2000 school year, Holub often expressed to Barrett Lucci's disapproval of Barrett's son attending private school. Barrett claims that in May 2000, Holub once again told Barrett that he would never receive a full-time teaching contract until he enrolled his son in Steubenville City Schools. Also in May 2000, Lucci informed Barrett that he should consider moving his son to public school for at least one year, insisting that Barrett's son would like it. Barrett claims that he was under such pressure, especially after turning down full-time employment with his former employer, that during the summer he enrolled his son in Steubenville High School for the 2000-01 school year. Even after he enrolled his son in Steubenville City Schools, Barrett was not offered teaching positions when they became available.

In August 2000, Barrett again went to speak with Lucci about his position. Lucci asked Barrett how his son felt about changing schools, and Barrett replied that his son was unhappy. Lucci informed Barrett that "it would be held against him" if his son did not attend Steubenville High School. Lucci also explained to Barrett that the school board liked for teachers to enroll their children in the public school system because it "looked good" to those parents whose children attended Steubenville City Schools. Lucci stated that if Barrett returned as a long-term substitute, then he would be given a full-time contract after his sixty-day period was complete.1

Barrett began the 2000-01 school year as a full-time substitute teacher with the expectation that he would receive a full-time teaching contract. Barrett, however, reconsidered his decision regarding his son's education, removed him from Steubenville High School, and enrolled him in Catholic Central High School. On September 29, 2000, Barrett met with Lucci and the Assistant Superintendent. Barrett claims that Lucci told him that he was being removed from his position as a fourth grade substitute teacher at Wells. When Barrett questioned Lucci about the reason for his removal, Lucci told him that he was being disloyal. Lucci also expressed that he thought public high school would be better for Barrett's son. Barrett then reminded Lucci of his agreement to grant him a full-time contract after Barrett completed his sixty days of teaching in the classroom. Lucci became irate, denied ever making such a promise, and ordered Barrett to clean out his classroom that day.

Consequently, in June 2001, Barrett filed suit in the district court against Defendants-Appellants Steubenville City Schools, Superintendent Lucci, in his individual capacity, and Board Members Spahn, Bruzzese, Kerr, Hendricks, and Beal, in their official capacities only. Barrett asserted several claims, including: civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, religious discrimination under Ohio law, breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and tortious interference with present contractual relations or prospective contractual relations or both. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court granted Defendants' motion as to Barrett's federal and state claims of religious discrimination and as to Barrett's claim of equal protection and free exercise of religion under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court denied, however, defendants' motion as to Barrett's parental rights claim under § 1983 and the remaining state law claims. Defendants timely filed this appeal.

The only issue before us on appeal is whether Lucci is entitled to qualified immunity. In answering that question, we must determine whether the district court erred in finding that there is a clearly established constitutional right for parents to direct the education of their children and that Lucci's actions violated that right. For the reasons that follow, we find that the district court did not err in its conclusion.

II. DISCUSSION

A denial of summary judgment is ordinarily not a final judgment and therefore not reviewable on appeal. Hoover v. Radabaugh, 307 F.3d 460, 465 (6th Cir.2002). The present case, however, involves a decision by the district court to deny qualified immunity to a public official accused of violating plaintiff's constitutional rights. "[D]istrict court denials of qualified immunity may be appealed as collateral orders where (1) the defendant is a public official asserting the defense of qualified immunity, and (2) the issue appealed concerns not which facts the parties might be able to prove, but whether certain alleged facts reflect a violation of clearly established law." Id. (citations omitted). Because Defendants are not challenging the facts but rather claim that they did not violate the law, the jurisdictional requirements are met in the present case.

Whether qualified immunity applies to an official's actions is a question of law that this court reviews de novo. Virgili v. Gilbert, 272 F.3d 391, 392 (6th Cir.2001). Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that shields government officials performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does "not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Once the defense is raised, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the defendant's conduct violated a right so clearly established that a reasonable official in that position would have clearly understood that he or she was under an affirmative duty to refrain from such conduct. Rich v. City of Mayfield Heights, 955 F.2d 1092, 1095 (6th Cir.1992). The plaintiff, thus, bears the ultimate burden of proof to show that the defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity....

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