Langone v. Secretary of Com.

Decision Date16 February 1983
Citation446 N.E.2d 43,388 Mass. 185
PartiesFrederick C. LANGONE et al. 1 v. SECRETARY OF the COMMONWEALTH et al. 2
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

James F. Kavanaugh, Jr., Boston (John J. McGivney, Boston, with him), for Frederick C. Langone & others.

Alexander G. Gray, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen. (Gerald J. Caruso, Asst. Atty. Gen., with him), for the Attorney General, intervener.

David Berman, Medford, for Joel M. Pressman.

John Kenneth Felter, Boston (Richard A. Oetheimer and Samuel Hoar, Boston, with him), for Secretary of the Commonwealth.

James Roosevelt, Jr., Boston (Keith C. Long, James H. Wexler, Boston, with him), for Democratic State Committee.

William Highgas, Jr., Philip A. Chapman, Jr., Boston, J. Terence Gillan, and David Milstein, for the Governor, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and WILKINS, LIACOS, ABRAMS, NOLAN, LYNCH and O'CONNOR, JJ.

O'CONNOR, Justice.

Frederick C. Langone, four voters who claimed to be supporters of Langone's candidacy for Lieutenant Governor of the Commonwealth, and The Langone for Lieutenant Governor Committee, brought this action in the Superior Court against the Secretary of the Commonwealth. The complaint alleged that, by refusing to print Langone's name on the September 14, 1982, Democratic State party primary ballot as a candidate for the party's nomination for Lieutenant Governor, the Secretary deprived the plaintiffs of various rights provided by statutes of the Commonwealth and guaranteed by the United States and Massachusetts Constitutions. An injunction was sought that would have required the Secretary to place Langone's name on the primary ballot. The other defendants, whose names appeared on the primary ballot, and Joel M. Pressman, as plaintiff, were added to the case on the Secretary's motion. The Attorney General intervened as a plaintiff and filed a complaint seeking declaratory relief and an order requiring the Secretary to place the names of Langone, Pressman, and "other candidates who have fully complied with all applicable statutory requirements imposed by G.L. c. 53, on the ballot for the state primary for the Democratic Party, notwithstanding any contrary provision of the party charter."

A single justice of this court allowed a joint "Petition for Transfer" to the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County, and on a motion by all the parties, reserved and reported to the full court the following questions of law:

"1. Whether all candidates who have complied with applicable statutory requirements must appear upon the Democratic state primary ballots, notwithstanding the failure to obtain at least fifteen percent of the vote on any ballot of the Democratic Convention pursuant to Article Six, Section III of the 'Charter of the Democratic Party of the Commonwealth'?

"2. Whether the decision by the Secretary of the Commonwealth that he will not place upon the Democratic state primary ballots those candidates who failed to obtain at least fifteen percent of the vote on any ballot of the Democratic Convention pursuant to Article Six, Section III of the 'Charter of the Democratic Party of the Commonwealth', but otherwise complied with the statutory requirements to have their names placed upon the ballots violated the constitutional or statutory rights of the voters, the candidates, or their supporters?"

On July 6, 1982, we issued an order that said "[u]pon consideration of the argument and briefs of the parties, we interpret the State statutes in light of the State and Federal constitutions and rule that the Secretary must give effect to the relevant charter provision. Accordingly, we answer the questions reported, 'No.' " This opinion is an explanation of that order.

On April 23, 1982, the Justices of this court issued an advisory opinion to the Governor. Opinion of the Justices, 385 Mass. 1201, 434 N.E.2d 960 (1982). The first sentence of G.L. c. 53, § 44, as amended through St.1981, c. 278, § 1, states, "The nomination of candidates for nomination at State primaries shall be by nomination papers." There was pending before the Governor for his approval, House Bill No. 5852, which would have added, after that sentence, the following sentence: "Notwithstanding the charter, rule or by-law of a political party, any candidate, who is enrolled in such political party, submitting nomination papers subject to the provisions of this chapter shall be a candidate for nomination at the state primary." The proposed language, if constitutional, would have rendered ineffective Article Six, Section III, of the charter of the Democratic party of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts which provides: "There shall be a State Convention in even-numbered years for the purpose of endorsing candidates for statewide offices in those years in which such office is to be filled. Endorsements for statewide office of enrolled Democrats nominated at the Convention shall be by majority vote of the delegates present and voting, with the proviso that any nominee who receives at least 15 percent of the Convention vote on any ballot for a particular office may challenge the Convention endorsement in a State Primary Election." This is popularly known as the 15% rule. The Justices interpreted the proviso to mean that a convention nominee who fails to receive at least 15% of the convention vote on any ballot is not entitled to have his or her name placed on the primary ballot. Id. at 1025, 434 N.E.2d 960. The Justices advised the Governor that "[i]f House No. 5852 were approved, G.L. c. 53, § 44, as thereby amended, would abridge the constitutional rights of the Democratic party and its members to associate by allowing candidates to be placed on the Democratic State primary ballot in contravention of the party's charter." Id. at 1207-1208, 434 N.E.2d 960.

On May 21 and 22, 1982, the State Democratic party held its convention for the purpose of endorsing its candidates for statewide office. The defendants Murphy, Rotondi, Kerry, Pines, and Nickinello received at least 15% of the convention vote cast on one or more ballots. The plaintiffs Langone and Pressman failed to obtain at least 15% of the vote on any ballot. On May 25, 1982, the chairman of the Democratic State Committee sent a certified copy of the party charter to the Secretary and gave him the names of those individuals who had obtained at least 15% of the vote on one or more ballots, the Secretary released a statement that pursuant to the April 23 Opinion of the Justices, supra, he would be unable to place on the State primary ballot the names of Langone and Pressman although they had filed valid nomination papers. On the following day the director of elections sent letters to Langone and Pressman containing the same information. This action was commenced on June 2, 1982.

Candidates of political parties for statewide office in this Commonwealth are nominated at primaries held for that purpose. G.L. c. 53, §§ 2, 41. General Laws c. 53 provides several requirements for primary ballot access, including requirements that only persons certified as enrolled members of a political party may be candidates for that party's nomination, § 48, and that candidates for the nomination of a political party must file nomination papers containing at least 10,000 certified voter signatures. G.L. c. 53, § 44. 3 General Laws c. 53, § 44, further provides that "[t]he nomination of candidates for nomination at state primaries shall be by nomination papers," and § 2, as appearing in St.1975, c. 600, § 7, provides that "[n]o candidates shall be nominated ... in any other manner than is provided in this chapter or chapter fifty-two." 4 These several sections of G.L. c. 53 may reasonably be construed in two ways: as providing the only requirements for primary ballot access, excluding all others, or, in the alternative, as providing minimum requirements for primary ballot access but permitting imposition by the party of additional requirements that are consistent with a primary election system and do not infringe the constitutional rights of candidates and voters. Under the first construction, a candidate who satisfies the express statutory requirements would have a right to the printing of his or her name on the primary ballot. Under the second construction, compliance with the express statutory requirements would not entitle candidates to appear on the ballot in the absence of compliance with the party rule also. If we were to adopt the first construction, we think that G.L. c. 53 would be unconstitutional. However, we think that, since the provisions of G.L. c. 53 are not expressly preemptive, the second construction is permitted by reasonable principles of construction and would avoid constitutional difficulties. Therefore, we adopt it. "It is our duty to construe statutes so as to avoid ... constitutional difficulties, if reasonable principles of interpretation permit it." School Comm. of Greenfield v. Greenfield Educ. Ass'n, 385 Mass. 70, 79-80, 431 N.E.2d 180 (1982). Staman v. Assessors of Chatham, 351 Mass. 479, 486-487, 221 N.E.2d 861 (1966). We discuss below our reasons for concluding that constitutional considerations require the second construction of G.L. c. 53.

In Opinion of the Justices, 385 Mass. at 1204, 434 N.E.2d 960, the Justices stated that the right to associate with the political party of one's choice is an integral part of the freedom of association for the advancement of common political beliefs protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56-57, 94 S.Ct. 303, 307, 38 L.Ed.2d 260 (1973). The Justices further stated that there is implicit in that freedom a political party's substantial interest in ensuring that party members have an effective role in determining who will appear on a general election ballot as that party's candidate, citing Democratic Party of...

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