State v. Linze

• Decision Date: 10 November 2016
• Docket Number: Docket No. 43960
• Citation: 161 Idaho 605,389 P.3d 150
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. John Patrick LINZE, Jr., Defendant–Appellant.

161 Idaho 605

389 P.3d 150

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff–Respondent,

v.John Patrick LINZE, Jr., Defendant–Appellant.

Docket No. 43960

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, September 2016 Term.

Filed: November 10, 2016

Eric Fredericksen, Interim State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, attorney for appellant. Sally J. Cooley argued.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, attorney for respondent. Russell J. Spencer argued.

W. JONES, Justice

I. NATURE OF THE CASE

John Patrick Linze Jr. ("Appellant" or "Mr. Linze") appeals his conviction for possession of methamphetamine. He contends that the district court erred by refusing to suppress evidence obtained by police during a traffic stop. Specifically, Mr. Linze argues that: (1) the traffic stop was impermissibly extended in order to allow time for the drug detection dog to arrive; (2) the traffic stop was impermissibly extended in order to allow the drug detection dog to conduct a sweep; and (3) the alert of the drug detection dog was insufficient to establish probable cause to search the vehicle because the dog was unreliable. Mr. Linze's initial appeal before the Idaho Court of Appeals resulted in his conviction being vacated. That court held that the time during which the drug detection dog conducted its sweep of the vehicle was an impermissible extension of the original traffic stop. This case comes before this Court on a petition for review filed by the State of Idaho.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On November 25, 2013, at approximately 10:19 a.m., Officer J. Bridges of the Caldwell Police Department ("Officer Bridges") initiated a traffic stop in Caldwell, Idaho. The reason given for the stop was that the vehicle had a cracked front windshield in violation of Idaho Code section 49–902. Officer Bridges made contact with the driver of the vehicle, Rhea Monique Linze ("Mrs. Linze"), and the passenger, Mr. Linze, and explained the purpose of the stop. After initiating warrant checks on both Mrs. Linze and Mr. Linze, Officer Bridges called for a Canyon County Sheriff's Office Deputy K–9 Unit. The call for the K–9 Unit was placed at 10:28 a.m., approximately nine minutes after the stop was initiated. Officer Bridges testified that while the K–9 Unit was in transit he continued to conduct the warrant checks and wrote Mrs. Linze a citation for driving with a cracked windshield.

Deputy Bryce Moore ("Deputy Moore") arrived at the scene with his drug detection dog ("Hash") at approximately 10:38 a.m., ten minutes after he was called and nineteen minutes after the stop was initiated. At that time, Officer Bridges stopped writing the citation and running the warrant checks. Deputy Moore then approached Mrs. Linze and asked for consent to search her vehicle. When she refused consent, Deputy Moore walked Hash around the exterior of the vehicle. Hash gave a positive alert at the front of the vehicle. At trial, the State estimated, based on speaking with Officer Bridges, that the time from Deputy Moore's arrival to Hash's alert was two and a half minutes. The State conceded that during those two and a half minutes, Officer Bridges had stopped pursuing the original purpose of the stop and was instead serving a "backup function" to Deputy Moore.

Following Hash's alert, both officers searched the interior of the vehicle. Deputy Moore visually located a glass pipe with white crystal residue in the passenger door panel armrest. After retrieving the pipe, Officer Bridges informed Mr. and Mrs. Linze of their Miranda rights. Mr. Linze admitted to ownership of the pipe and admitted that he used it to consume methamphetamine.

Before the district court, Mr. Linze moved to suppress all physical evidence, testimony, lab reports, photos, documents, and incriminating statements resulting from the search of Mrs. Linze's vehicle. A hearing on the motion to suppress was held on April 28, 2014.

At the hearing, Officer Bridges testified that he did not delay the traffic stop while waiting for the K–9 Unit to arrive. He testified that the stop took twenty minutes because: "I was thorough. On warrant checks I ran both through the computer. And my handwriting is very sloppy, so I take my time when I write my tickets.... If I would have finished early, I would have called off the canine." Officer Bridges further testified that while Deputy Moore conducted the dog sweep, he stepped out of his car and provided "cover." "It's for his safety," Officer Bridges explained. "He's not paying attention to his surroundings when he's doing his canine sweep, so I just make sure that I watch and nobody comes and tries to do us harm."

Following the hearing, the district court denied Mr. Linze's motion to suppress. It held as follows: (1) "Officer Bridges had a reasonable articulable suspicion that the vehicle had a cracked front windshield and was being driven contrary to traffic laws"; (2) "the length of the investigatory detention was not unlawfully extended from the time of the initial stop to the time Corporal Moore's canine gave a positive alert on the vehicle"; and (3) "the canine alert gave officers probable cause to search the interior of the vehicle."

On appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals overturned the district court's denial of the motion to suppress. The State petitioned this Court for review.

III. ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Did the district court err in determining that Officer Bridges’ actions did not unlawfully extend the traffic stop such that Mr. Linze's Fourth Amendment rights were violated?

2. Did the district court err in determining that Officer Bridges and Deputy Moore had probable cause to search Mrs. Linze's vehicle?

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court reviews the denial of a motion to suppress using a bifurcated standard. State v. Purdum , 147 Idaho 206, 207, 207 P.3d 182, 183 (2009). "This Court will accept the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous." Id. "However, this Court may freely review the trial court's application of constitutional principles in light of the facts found." Id.

State v. Svelmoe , 160 Idaho 327, 330, 372 P.3d 382, 385 (2016).

V. ANALYSIS

A. The traffic stop was impermissibly extended in violation of Mr. Linze's Fourth Amendment rights.

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. Const. amend. IV.

The stop of a vehicle by law enforcement constitutes a seizure of its occupants to which the Fourth Amendment applies. Delaware v. Prouse , 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1395–96, 59 L.Ed.2d 660, 667 (1979). The seizure of a vehicle's occupants in order to investigate a traffic violation is a "reasonable seizure" under the Fourth Amendment so long as the seizing officer had reasonable suspicion that a violation had occurred. See Rodriguez v. U.S. , ––– U.S. ––––, ––––, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1614, 191 L.Ed.2d 492, 498–99 (2015) ("A seizure for a traffic violation justifies a police investigation of that violation."). However, "[b]ecause addressing the infraction is the purpose of the stop, it may ‘last no longer than is necessary to effectuate that purpose.’ " Id . (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407, 125 S.Ct. 834, 836–37, 160 L.Ed.2d 842, 846 (2005) ). "Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed." Id.

Here, we have a case in which a police officer had probable cause because Mrs. Linze was driving with a cracked windshield, which constitutes a traffic violation. It follows that the initial seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The pertinent question before this Court is whether or not the seizure remained reasonable under the Fourth Amendment once Officer Bridges abandoned the purpose of the seizure in order to aid in a search for contraband. We hold that it did not.

This Court's holding is guided by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Rodriguez . ––– U.S. at ––––, 135 S.Ct. at 1613, 191 L.Ed.2d at 497–98. In Rodriguez , a Nebraska K–9 officer pulled a vehicle over after observing it veer onto the shoulder of the highway. Id. After calling for a second officer, the K–9 officer finished running a records check and wrote a warning ticket to the driver of the vehicle. Id. The officer gave the driver the warning ticket, but did not allow him to leave. Id. Instead, the officer instructed the driver to wait for the second officer to arrive. Id. After roughly six minutes, the second officer arrived, at which time the two officers conducted a drug dog sweep. Id. The dog alerted, and methamphetamine was located in the vehicle. Id.

The United States Supreme Court framed the question before it as "whether police routinely may extend an otherwise-completed traffic stop, absent reasonable suspicion, in order to conduct a dog sniff." Id. at ––––, 135 S.Ct. at 1614, 191 L.Ed.2d at 498–99. However, the United States Supreme Court did not restrict its analysis to cases in which the underlying purpose of the traffic stop was completed prior to a drug dog sweep. Id . Instead, the United States Supreme Court reached a much broader holding: "a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution's shield against unreasonable seizures." Id. This rule is both broad and inflexible. It applies to all extensions of traffic stops including those that could reasonably be considered de minimis . Id. at ––––, 135 S.Ct. at 1615–16, 191 L.Ed.2d at 499–501 (rejecting the application of a de minimis exception previously adopted by the Eighth Circuit).

The parties before this Court have suggested two competing interpretations of the United States Supreme Court's holding in Rodriguez . The State suggests that Rodriguez allows a seizing officer to deviate from the purpose of a traffic stop up until the time at which the stop should have been...