Nash v. Illinois
Decision Date | 16 October 1967 |
Docket Number | No. 163,M,163 |
Citation | 19 L.Ed.2d 681,19 L.Ed.2d 223,389 U.S. 906,88 S.Ct. 222 |
Parties | Dana Horton NASH, petitioner, v. ILLINOIS. isc |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
George L. Saunders, Jr., for petitioner.
William G. Clark, Atty. Gen. of Illinois, and John J. O'Toole and Donald J. Veverka, Asst. Attys. Gen., for respondent.
Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Illinois.
Denied.
Petitioner was convicted of murder on the testimony of William Triplett, an accomplice in the crime. The prosecutor promised Triplett leniency if he testified against the petitioner. Triplett, however, testified that he had not been promised anything. The prosecutor knew this testimony was false, and the jury heard Triplett's entire testimony under the erroneous impression that he had not received promises of leniency. Later in the trial, and over the prosecutor's objection, petitioner called Triplett's lawyer and the prosecutor as witnesses. Both admitted that the prosecutor promised Triplett leniency if he would testify.
I think this case is governed by the principle of Napue v. People of State of Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959).* It is true that in the present case, the prosecutor was called by the defense and compelled to admit that he offered leniency to the witness if he testified. So, here, the jury ultimately knew not only that the witness lied, but also that the prosecutor knew he was lying.
It may be that upon hearing the prosecutor's recantation, the jury could properly discount Triplett's testimony. However, the jury heard him under the impression that he was not receiving benefit for his testimony, and the subsequent recantation by the prosecutor, later in the trial, could not adequately overcome the jury's initial impression of the testimony. Accordingly, in these circumstances, we must conclude that petitioner was prejudiced by the prosecutor's acquiescence in the misrepresentation by his witness.
In any event, it is by no means clear that petitioner must show that the prosecutor's knowing acquiescence in a material falsehood prejudiced him. There is no place in our system of criminal justice for prosecutorial misconduct. See Giles v. State of Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 87 S.Ct. 793, 17 L.Ed.2d 737 (1967) (opinion of Brennan, J.); Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 785, 17 L.Ed.2d 690 (1967); Napue v. People v. State of Illinois, supra; Alcorta v. State of Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 78 S.Ct. 103, 2 L.Ed.2d 9 (1957); White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 65 S.Ct. 978, 89 L.Ed. 1348 (1945); Pyle v. State of Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 63 S.Ct. 177, 87 L.Ed. 214 (1942); and Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 55 S.Ct. 340, 79 L.Ed. 791 (1935). See also Giles v. State of Maryland, supra, 386 U.S. at 96, 87 S.Ct. 793 (opinion of Fortas, J.); and Brady v. State of Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Especially in a capital case, a...
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