Crook v. Girard Iron & Metal Co.

• Citation: 39 A. 94,87 Md. 138
• Parties: CROOK v. GIRARD IRON & METAL CO.
• Decision Date: 05 January 1898
• Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland

39 A. 94

87 Md. 138

CROOK v. GIRARD IRON & METAL CO.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

January 5, 1898

Appeal from superior court of Baltimore city.

Replevin by Edward D. Crook against the Girard Iron & Metal Company. From a ruling in favor of defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Argued before MCSHERRY, C.J., and BRYAN, BRISCOE, ROBERTS, and BOYD JJ.

Dan. L Brinton and Robt. H. Smith, for appellant. Isidor Rayner and R. H. Worthington, for appellee.

ROBERTS J.

This is an action of replevin brought by the appellant against the appellee to recover the possession of a lot of electrical machinery. The appellant is a citizen of the state of Maryland. The appellee is a body corporate of the state of New Jersey. The appellee in June, 1896, purchased at sheriff's sale in Baltimore city the above-mentioned machinery, and paid cash for the same. After the sale and delivery of said machinery, the appellant, claiming that he had purchased the same from the appellee, and was entitled to the possession thereof, sued out the writ of replevin, and took possession of the goods in dispute. The writ having been served upon Mr. Ginsberg, the agent of the appellee, it appeared in the court below for the sole purpose of filing a motion to quash the writ of summons and to set aside the return of the sheriff; assigning as a reason therefor that it was a corporation not chartered by the laws of this state and did not hold and exercise franchises in this state at the time of the service of the writ issued in this case. There is but one question arising on this appeal which it will be necessary for us to consider and determine, and that relates solely to the right of the appellant to maintain this action under the state of case which the record presents. In the view which we entertain of the disposition which should be made of the motion to quash it will not be requisite to pass upon any other question in the record, for the reason that, if no legal service of the writ of replevin has been made upon the appellee, it will be useless to consider any other question in the case. The character of the question before us has been sufficiently indicated in what we have already said. The decisions upon this question are by no means uniform. To the contrary, they are somewhat confused. But we think the decided weight of authority is in favor of the proposition that, so long as a corporation confines its operation to the state in which it was created, it cannot be sued in a state where it has no office, or transacts no business, by serving process on its president or other officer when temporarily present within such state. Thomp. Corp. § 7994; Moulin v. Insurance Co., 24 N. J. Law, 222; Camden Rolling-Mill Co. v. Swede Iron Co., 32 N. J. Law, 15; U.S. v. American Bell Tel. Co., 29 F. 17. The provisions of the Code which relate to this subject are sections 295-297 of article 23. For the purpose of this opinion it will only be necessary to quote the language of section 295, which reads as follows: "Any corporation not chartered by the laws of this state, which shall transact business...