Dobbs v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.

Decision Date27 October 1994
Docket NumberNo. 93-8023,93-8023
Parties129 Lab.Cas. P 57,822 Kevin J. DOBBS, Joel L. Kerns, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CHEVRON U.S.A., INC., Dennis Bones, James Stephen Carpenter, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

John W. McKendree, Denver, CO (Richard Rideout, Herschler, Freudenthal, Salzburg, Bonds & Rideout, Cheyenne, WY, with him on the brief), for plaintiffs-appellants.

Brandin Hay, Dray, Madison & Thomson, Cheyenne, WY (Douglas G. Madison, Dray, Madison & Thomson, with him on the brief), for defendants-appellees.

Before KELLY, SETH, Circuit Judges and OWEN *, District Judge.

OWEN, Senior District Judge:

Two employees of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. separately sued Chevron and their two supervisors in the District Court of Wyoming, alleging various contract and tort claims. The District Court of Wyoming consolidated their actions and thereafter dismissed their claims against their supervisors for lack of personal jurisdiction and awarded Chevron summary judgment. We affirm.

Plaintiff-appellants Joel L. Kerns and Kevin J. Dobbs worked for defendant-appellee Chevron U.S.A. as members of a seismic exploration team, Party Five. Party Five worked in various locations in Texas, California, Wyoming, Colorado, Nevada and North Dakota. Individual defendant-appellees Dennis Bones and James Stephen Carpenter, Chevron employees, were supervisors for Party Five.

Dobbs, a resident of Wyoming, began working for Chevron in February 1987, recording seismic data and overseeing field operations. Two months later he was injured in an on-the-job vehicle accident in California. He was hospitalized and released the following day. Although he returned to work the following week, he later underwent two spinal operations, and after the second operation he did not return to work. According to Dobbs, subsequent to the accident his immediate supervisors on Party Five, Bones and Carpenter, harassed and humiliated him. Dobbs alleges that Carpenter repeatedly refused to let Dobbs miss work to see a doctor, and that Bones similarly disallowed a short medical leave during June or July 1989. Dobbs claims that he was demoted to second observer from his previous position as first observer because he was on light duty and could not lift heavy objects. Dobbs alleges that Carpenter ridiculed his ailments, displayed open belligerence toward him, and disparaged his abilities. Dobbs also contends that Carpenter, who was later dismissed for alcohol abuse, while drunk hit him in the back with his fist. He also contends that a certain report on his 1989 California accident was withheld from him until 1990. Dobbs filed a workers' compensation claim in California, which has provided benefits covering medical care, prescription drugs, and a biweekly compensation check. Dobbs remains employed by Chevron, though on long-term medical disability leave without pay.

Kerns, an Oklahoma resident, was hired by Chevron in 1989. He was a field clerk for Party Five, responsible for compiling daily time records of hourly employees and inventory, billing and expense reports. He was also responsible for moving the field office whenever Party Five began a new assignment at a different location. About a year after being hired, Kerns sustained a hernia while setting up a Party Five field office in Laredo, Texas. He maintains that notwithstanding his injury, he was required to work twelve hours every day for several weeks before being permitted to seek medical treatment, and that Bones and Carpenter, his supervisors, harassed and mistreated him, threatening him with the loss of his job and making derogatory comments. He asserts that they said his injuries would not be covered because he did not report the injury immediately. However, Kerns did file a workers' compensation claim, and very shortly thereafter Chevron agreed to provide disability benefits. Kerns underwent a hernia operation in Oklahoma in May 1990. He returned to work on June 23, but his hernia continued to plague him, and he obtained a medical release from a Wyoming physician. He thereafter settled his compensation claim against Chevron, left its employ, and now works elsewhere.

Dobbs asserts claims against Chevron for negligence concerning the vehicle accident, breach of contract, negligent supervision of employees, and negligent representation. Against Bones and Carpenter, he asserts claims of tortious interference with contract, and civil conspiracy to interfere with his contract of employment and prospective economic advantage; and against all defendants for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and punitive damages. Kerns' claims include the foregoing plus a claim of retaliatory discharge for filing a workers' compensation claim.

The district court, in a lengthy opinion, dismissed the claims as against Bones and Carpenter for lack of personal jurisdiction, and in a separate opinion and order granted summary judgment to Chevron.

We review both the dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction and the grant of summary judgment de novo. Ten Mile Industrial Park v. Western Plains Service Corp., 810 F.2d 1518, 1524 (10th Cir.1987); Goichman v. Aspen, 859 F.2d 1466, 1467 (10th Cir.1988). Summary judgment is appropriate only if no genuine issue exists as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Kansas Gas & Elec. Co., 862 F.2d 796, 798 (10th Cir.1988). We must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. McKenzie v. Mercy Hosp., 854 F.2d 365, 367 (10th Cir.1988). However, the "mere existence of some factual dispute will not frustrate an otherwise proper summary judgment." Missouri Pacific, 862 F.2d at 798, citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2509-10, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

Turning first to in personam jurisdiction, in this, a diversity action, a federal court has in personam jurisdiction as permitted by state law, consistent with "not offend[ing] the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Shanks v. Westland Equipment and Parts Co., 668 F.2d 1165, 1167 (10th Cir.1982). Wyoming's long-arm statute explicitly states that "[a] Wyoming court may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Wyoming or United States constitution." Wyo.Stat. Sec. 5-1- 107(a). Thus, a defendant must have "certain minimum contacts" with the forum state to satisfy due process. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222, 78 S.Ct. 199, 201, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957). Such contacts, if "continuous and systematic," confer general jurisdiction and allow the plaintiff to litigate matters occurring outside the forum state. Helicopteros v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415 & n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 1872 & n. 9, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984). On the other hand, if a claim arises from a matter occurring within the forum state, less is required and specific jurisdiction exists if the defendant has "purposefully avail[ed himself] of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State ..." Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 1239, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958). This requirement serves several functions. It identifies the acts that a defendant would reasonably expect to subject him to jurisdiction in the particular forum, and it ensures that only the defendant's acts involving the forum establish jurisdiction. Kennedy v. Freeman, 919 F.2d 126, 128 (10th Cir.1990). It also requires that the effects of the defendant's actions have a significant impact in the forum state. Anderson v. Perry, 667 P.2d 1155, 1157 (Wyo.1983).

We conclude that the District Court properly determined that Wyoming could not exercise personal jurisdiction over individual defendants Bones and Carpenter since neither maintained continuous and systematic contacts with Wyoming or purposefully availed himself of the privilege of acting there. Both were present in Wyoming only at the direction of Chevron. In this connection, we note that Dobbs was on medical leave at the time Party Five was in Wyoming. There could, therefore, be no general personal jurisdiction. Specific jurisdiction was similarly lacking because Carpenter's only alleged actions in Wyoming relevant to the action were his minor derogatory comments about Dobbs. Bones's only assertion of relevant action in Wyoming was the alleged unscheduled performance evaluation of Kerns, in which Bones is said to have made certain unspecified derogatory comments. These can hardly be regarded as having significant impact in Wyoming.

Accordingly, the claims against Bones and Carpenter were properly dismissed.

Plaintiff-appellants also asserted a number of claims against Chevron, all of which were dismissed by way of summary judgment. Those claims consisted of breach of employment contract; negligence as to Dobbs' vehicle accident; tortious interference with a contract and with prospective economic advantage; intentional infliction of emotional distress; negligent representation and supervision of employees; civil conspiracy to effect the above harms, and retaliatory discharge. We need deal with no more than the first claim: breach of employment contract.

At the outset, we observe that the district court properly applied Wyoming's choice of law rules, that being the forum state. Mitchell v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 902 F.2d 790, 792-93 (10th Cir.1990). Wyoming applies "the law of the state where the cause of action arose." Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 647 F.Supp. 1278, 1281 (D.Wyo.1986). Accordingly, in a contract action, the applicable law is that of the forum in...

To continue reading

Request your trial
16 cases
  • Land v. Midwest Office Technology, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Kansas
    • July 7, 2000
    ...upon them as creating a contract or promise is unwarranted. See id. at 1466; Orback, 97 F.3d at 433; see also Dobbs v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 39 F.3d 1064, 1069 (10th Cir. 1994) (vague oral statements by employer did not amount to contract for continued employment). The statements allegedly ......
  • Systems Material Handling Company v. Greenstein
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Kansas
    • February 8, 2000
    ...as permitted by state law, consistent with the due process requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment. Dobbs v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 39 F.3d 1064, 1067 (10th Cir.1994). The long-arm statutes of Massachusetts have been interpreted as exercising the broadest grant of jurisdiction consistent wit......
  • Trierweiler v. Croxton and Trench Holding Corp.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit
    • July 29, 1996
    ...jurisdiction as permitted by state law, consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment's due process requirement. Dobbs v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 39 F.3d 1064, 1067 (10th Cir.1994). Michigan's long-arm statutes have been interpreted as exercising the broadest grant of jurisdiction consistent with ......
  • Thomason v. Chemical Bank
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • July 18, 1995
    ...between the defendant's contacts with the forum and the existence of the plaintiff's lawsuit. See, e.g., Dobbs v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 39 F.3d 1064, 1068 (10th Cir.1994); United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America v. 163 Pleasant Street Corp., 960 F.2d 1080, 1088-89 and n. 9 (1s......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT