Morton v. Shalala, 94-1340
| Decision Date | 04 November 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 94-1340,94-1340 |
| Citation | 39 F.3d 1177 |
| Parties | NOTICE: Fourth Circuit I.O.P. 36.6 states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Fourth Circuit. Teddy W. MORTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Donna E. SHALALA, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Winston-Salem. William L. Osteen, Sr., District Judge. (CA-92-227).
ARGUED: H. Russell Vick, Greensboro, NC, for appellant.
Cheryl L. Nikonovich-Kahn, Asst. Regional Counsel, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Health and Human Services, Atlanta, GA, for appellee.
Before HAMILTON and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and MERHIGE, Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation.
Teddy W. Morton appeals from the decision of the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, upholding the decision of the Secretary of Health and Human Services ("Secretary"). This appeal, filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 405(g), followed. Because the determination by the Secretary was supported by substantial evidence, we affirm.
Claimant Morton was born on August 6, 1930. He has a high school equivalency diploma and for 23 years he worked as a yarn supervisor in a textile mill. Morton claims to have been disabled since September 16, 1987 due to preinfarction syndrome, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease ("COPD"), costchronditis, and anxiety. His claim is to the effect that his disability has precluded his being engaged in substantial gainful activity since September 16, 1987.
Prior to that date, Morton had been hospitalized three times for chest problems and was diagnosed by Dr. Zarate, his treating physician, as suffering from COPD and preinfarction syndrome. He was advised by his doctor at that time to take a number of medicines and to stop smoking. Morton was hospitalized again in October of 1987, complaining of chest pains, shortness of breath and lack of energy.
His diagnosis at that time was that the pain was caused by esophageal disease. He was started on Cardiazem and his prognosis was good. In November of 1987, Dr. Zarate advised Morton that he could return to work. In January of 1988, he was diagnosed with mild obstructive lung disease, and in February of 1989, Dr. Zarate wrote a letter stating that Morton was totally disabled and had been since September of 1987. In April of 1989, Dr. Zarate's conclusion was supported by a Dr. Mendoza, a general surgeon.
Morton had a hearing before the Administrative Law Judge in May of 1989, at which time he complained of pain in his legs, hips and chest, shortness of breath, hand cramps when writing, difficulty sitting for long periods, or walking great distances. The evidence at that time reflected that Morton helped his wife with household chores including washing dishes, vacuuming floors, and driving her to the grocery store.
At the second hearing before the ALJ, occasioned by the fact that the Appeals Counsel had remanded the original decision denying Morton's claim, the ALJ once again denied his claim. That hearing revealed that in April of 1991, Morton had been examined by a board psychiatrist and neurologist who submitted a letter to the ALJ reporting that Morton had been dysfunctional since his cerebral vascular accident (stroke) in May of 1984. The letter, signed by a Dr. Badawi, went on to say that "during the last three years [Morton] has shown marked restrictions in his activities of daily living; marked constrictions of interests and repeated failure to perform tasks." The doctor's final diagnosis was that Morton was suffering from major depressive disorder, which was treatable with antidepressants and therapy.
To qualify for Social Security benefits, a claimant must establish that he is "disabled" as defined in the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 423(d). That section defines disability as "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment."
In his final decision, the ALJ determined that of all Morton's complaints, only the COPD was "severe." See 20 C.F.R. Secs. 404.1520(d), 404 Supt. P., App. 1 (1991). Under the regulations, the Secretary must determine if the impairment is severe, and if so, even though it does not meet the criteria in the agency listing, the Secretary is bound to examine whether the claimant retains the "residual...
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