Harvey v. Huffman
Citation | 39 F. 646 |
Parties | James E. HARVEY v. Thomas HUFFMAN |
Decision Date | 23 September 1889 |
Court | D. Indiana |
The petition in this case states that James E. Harvey was, on the 19th day of June, 1889, in the city of Hammond, offering to sell, and selling, fresh meat of an animal slaughtered in the state of Illinois, and which animal had not been inspected by the inspector of the city of Hammond, or in Lake county Ind., before such slaughter; that on the said day he was arrested for such sale and so offering to sell, taken before a magistrate, tried, convicted, and fined; that he refused to pay or replevy such fine, and that a mittimus was issued to commit him to a jail of Lake county; that the defendant in the case is the officer to whom said mittimus was issued and who has the petitioner in custody, preparatory to his incarceration in the jail. He therefore prayed that a writ of habeas corpus might issue, which writ was granted, issued served, and made returnable on June 24th. The defendant, in his return to the writ, admits the foregoing facts, and with such return sets up a copy of the proceedings had before the magistrate. To this return the petitioner files his exceptions, putting in question the constitutionality of the act of the legislature under which he was arrested and fined, and which is as follows:
Section 1119, St. Ind. 1881, provides, among other things, that 'no court shall have power to inquire into the legality of the judgment or process whereby any party is in custody upon any process issued on any final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction. ' This might at first blush appear to deprive this court of authority to issue the writ; but, notwithstanding this provision, the validity of a judgment may always be assailed on the ground that the act of the legislature under which the indictment was found is unconstitutional. An unconstitutional law is void, and is no law. The offense created by it is not a crime, and conviction under it is illegal and void. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371. If this statute is constitutional and valid, then the relief prayed for cannot be granted; otherwise the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of the writ, and should be discharged. Courts are loath to interfere, and should be very guarded and careful in rendering any opinion that destroys the effect of an act of the legislature; but when such act is clearly unconstitutional they should not hesitate so to pronounce it.
I shall first consider the case with reference to the first exception to the return. If the act in question does not interfere with interstate commerce, then, as to that exception, it is valid. If it does so interfere, it is an assumption of power on behalf of the state beyond its authority, and is unconstitutional and void. It was this exercise of power by the several states over matters which could only be safely intrusted to national authority which rendered the original articles of confederation only a rope of sand; and the confusion produced by the hostile interests of the several states led to the adoption of our present constitution. As Chief Justice MARSHALL has stated the rule on the subject: 'Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 446. The provision referred to in the constitution of the United States is section 8, art. 1, which provides that congress shall have the power 'to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states. ' Any law, then, of any state, which contravenes this provision of the constitution, is null and void. Does, then, this statute of Indiana attempt to regulate, or does it interfere with, interstate commerce? True, it is entitled an act for the protection of the public health by promoting the growth and sale of healthy cattle and sheep; yet, in whatever language a statute may be framed, its purpose and its constitutional validity must be determined by its natural and reasonable effect. This statute amounts to a prohibition against the introduction into our state for consumption of all dressed fresh meats. None other can be marketed in our cities except such as has been inspected alive within the bounds of the county and state in which the city is situated, or such as farmers within the state may have raised or fed and slaughtered. It is well known that dressed fresh meat has become an important article of commerce, and is quite extensively shipped from one state to another, as well as into foreign countries. In fact, in very many of our cities our meat markets are largely supplied with fresh meats shipped from adjoining states. It is, then, judged by the authorities on the question, an article of interstate commerce. Whenever an article has begun to move as an article of trade from one state to another, commerce in that commodity between the states has begun. The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557; Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 11-25, 9 S.Ct. 6. That the transportation of property from one state to another is a branch of interstate commerce is undeniable. Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 469. In Webster's Unabridged Dictionary 'commerce' is defined as 'the exchange of merchandise on a large scale between different places or communities. ' This embraces two distinct ideas: First, that of exchange in its largest sense, including barter,-- the giving of one commodity for another; and sale,-- the exchange of an article of property for money, the representative of all values. From this definition it will be seen that there can be no commerce unaccompanied by exchange or sale. The other idea embraced in the definition is that of transportation; for, to constitute commerce, the exchange must be between different places or communities; and any law that either prevents the transportation or sale of merchandise totally destroys commerce by the exercise of that power alone. Commerce, then, involves the idea of carrying the commodity intended for exchange to another place, where, as we may say, the market is to be held, and the sale accomplished. Hence, without both transportation and liberty of sale, there can be no interstate commerce.
No power of congress has been more jealously guarded against usurpation than this; and the attempt of different states in varied form to invade it in pursuit of some partial and temporary advantage, and the uniform and wise ruling of the supreme court of the United States against all attempts to evade and avoid this exclusive power of the national legislature, is one of the most interesting subjects of federal jurisprudence. In 1872 the legislature of Missouri passed an act providing that no Texas, Mexican, or Indian cattle should be driven or otherwise conveyed into or remain in any county of the state between the 1st day of March and the 1st day of December in each year, except as the same were conveyed through the state by railroad or steam-boat. This statute, in practical effect, is not far different from the one under consideration. Each, in effect, amounts to a prohibition of certain articles of commerce. The supreme court of the United States pronounced this statute an invasion of the exclusive power of the national le...
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