Winship v. Brewer School Committee

• Decision Date: 29 August 1978
• Citation: 390 A.2d 1089
• Parties: Walter A. WINSHIP v. BREWER SCHOOL COMMITTEE.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 1089

390 A.2d 1089

Walter A. WINSHIP v. BREWER SCHOOL COMMITTEE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Aug. 29, 1978.

Sunenblick, Fontaine & Reben by Donald F. Fontaine, Portland (orally), for plaintiff.

Eaton, Peabody, Bradford & Veague by Bernard J. Kubetz (orally), John E. McKay, Bangor, for defendant.

Before DUFRESNE, C. J., and POMEROY, WERNICK, ARCHIBALD, DELAHANTY and GODFREY, JJ.

ARCHIBALD, Justice.

Brewer School Committee (hereinafter "the Committee") has appealed, seeking to reverse a decision of the Superior Court which reinstated Walter A. Winship to his teaching position at Brewer High School.

We deny the appeal.

On February 26, 1975, after conducting a hearing, the Committee issued a certificate of dismissal pursuant to 20 M.R.S.A. § 473(4), ¹ in which it made the following findings:

"1. That on Thursday, January 30, 1975, the said Walter A. Winship engaged in a shouting match with . . . a sophomore (female) student in the general mathematics class being conducted by the said Walter A. Winship, resulting in the said Walter A. Winship Striking (the student) with a chair, after having directed that the (student) leave the room, the said Striking taking place as she was leaving the room.

2. The said chair did cause injury and pain to the (student) and did cause an emotional upset to the (student).

3. The said Walter A. Winship did further place his hand on the back of the neck of said (student) and forcibly eject her from the classroom.

4. While the said (student's) attitude and demeanor in the classroom were objectionable, the conduct of (the student) did not, in any way, justify the physical actions taken by the said Walter A. Winship.

5. Based upon the testimony of all of the witnesses, it is clear that profanity is used in classes conducted by the said Walter A. Winship, that he, Walter A. Winship does use profanity and that students in his classes also use profanity and obscene language.

6. The classes conducted by the said Walter A. Winship and specifically, the sophomore general mathematics class, are often noisy and unruly, and the said sophomore general mathematics class was noisy and unruly on January 30, 1975. The charge, however, that the said classes are disturbing to other classes and teachers in the vicinity of the classes being conducted by the said Walter A. Winship is not sustained.

Based upon the foregoing findings of fact, it is the decision of this Committee that:

1. The said Walter A. Winship is Unfit to teach in the Brewer School System; and

2. The Services of the said Walter A. Winship are Unprofitable to the Brewer School System." (emphasis supplied)

Mr. Winship filed a complaint seeking judicial review of the Committee's decision pursuant to Rule 80B, M.R.Civ.P. The complaint alleged, Inter alia, a lack of substantial evidence to support the Committee's findings.

A single Justice of the Superior Court, utilizing the record of the testimony taken at the Committee hearing conjoined with testimony and exhibits received in evidence before him, after noting his authority to review the Committee's decision for errors of law, concluded that since the dismissal was

"not supported by substantial evidence of a causal or reasonable relation between findings # 1-4 and the policy underlying the statutory grounds for dismissal,"

that "the dismissal of the Plaintiff pursuant to 20 M.R.S.A. § 473(4) cannot be upheld." The Justice reasoned as follows:

"To uphold a dismissal on the grounds of unprofitability to the school, a single classroom incident would have to have grave adverse implications upon the future relationship between the teacher and his colleagues or administrators, or upon the relations between the school and its surrounding community.";

and:

"The test for upholding a dismissal for unfitness is now whether the facts found by the committee as supported by the record demonstrate an 'undermining' of the teacher's future classroom performance and overall impact on his students."

In a subsequent order the Justice below concluded in part as follows:

(1) "(S)ubstantial evidence does not support the Committee's derivative findings # 5 and # 6 in the notice of dismissal.

(2) These findings (1 through 4) are supported by substantial evidence only if a particular interpretation is given to the word 'striking' in finding # 1. . . . The chair was held with the back horizontal at approximately chest height by the Plaintiff; the legs of the chair faced away from the Plaintiff. In this elevated position the Plaintiff carried the chair for a few steps toward the student and 'pushed' it toward the student. . . . The chair was not thrown or released by the Plaintiff in the direction of the student, but the push was of sufficient force that upon contact the student stumbled backward approximately two to four feet."

On December 3, 1975, the Court held another hearing which was limited to the issues of damages and declaratory or injunctive relief. Subsequently, a "Final Judgment and Order" was filed, sustaining the plaintiff's appeal, mandating the plaintiff's reinstatement as of April 12, 1976, and awarding judgment to the plaintiff for damages in the amount of $10,346.00.

I

The Committee contends that an examination of the transcript of the hearing before it reveals substantial evidence to support its factual findings 1 through 4. ² In addition, it argues that the Court exceeded the proper scope of review by conducting a "de novo factual evaluation" of the evidence.

In Wright v. Superintending School Committee, Me., 331 A.2d 640, 646 (1975), where we sustained the appeal of a teacher who had been dismissed pursuant to 20 M.R.S.A. § 473(4), we noted

"that in a Rule 80B review, the Court below was without authority to overrule findings of fact supported by Substantial evidence." (emphasis supplied)

See also Fernald v. City of Ellsworth Superintending School Committee, Me., 342 A.2d 704, 707 (1975).

The "substantial evidence" standard of review of decisions of administrative agencies requires "the reviewing court to 'search the entire record . . . to determine whether on the basis of all the testimony and exhibits before the agency it could fairly and reasonably find the facts as it did."

In Re Maine Clean Fuels, Inc., Me., 310 A.2d 736, 741 (1973), Citing Braniff Airways, Incorporated v. C. A. B., 126 U.S.App.D.C. 399, 408, 379 F.2d 453, 462 (1967).

With regard to the Committee's findings 1 through 4, the Superior Court held that these findings were supported by substantial evidence "only if a particular interpretation is given to the word 'striking' in finding # 1." At the hearing before the Committee, there was conflicting testimony as to whether appellee "threw" the chair at the student or merely "pushed" her with it. Of those who actually witnessed the incident, however, only the student herself testified that appellee "threw" the chair. On direct examination she stated that the teacher "hit" her with his desk chair. On cross-examination, when asked if he "pushed" her with the chair, she responded affirmatively. She admitted on cross-examination that at one point she had changed her mind and had informed the school principal that appellee did not throw the chair at her. Later, however, upon further cross-examination by a member of the Committee, she insisted that the chair was thrown at her. Given the equivocal nature of the student's testimony, we believe the Court acted within the appropriate scope of review when it sought, in the so-called "de novo factual evaluation," to clarify the meaning of the word "striking" as used in the Committee's findings.

II

The Committee next contends that its findings relevant to the classroom incident support the dismissal of Winship on the basis that his services had become unprofitable to the school system.

We disagree.

The Superior Court correctly observed that the question of whether there is a causal connection between the Committee's findings of fact and the statutory grounds for dismissal is a question of law subject to judicial review. Fernald, supra at 707.

Therefore, if the teacher's dismissal is to be sustained on the basis of his "unprofitability" to the school, there must be some showing that his usefulness has been impaired and that the good of the school requires his dismissal. Fernald, supra at 708; Hopkins v. Inhabitants of Bucksport, 119 Me. 437, 441, 111 A. 734, 736 (1920). Our review of the record supports the conclusion reached by the Superior Court, namely, "(n)o causal or reasonable relation between the Plaintiff's conduct and the statutory dismissal cause of unprofitability to the school was proven." We note that the certificate of dismissal did not state as a fact How the usefulness of Mr. Winship has been impaired or Why the good of the school required his dismissal. Nor do we find any testimony or other evidence of a substantial nature in the record which would support the Committee in arriving at such a conclusion. As we pointed out in Fernald, supra at 707, "it is highly...