Rodriguez-Rodriguez v. Ortiz-Velez

• Decision Date: 08 December 2004
• Docket Number: No. 03-2123.,03-2123.
• Citation: 391 F.3d 36
• Parties: Reynaldo RODRÍGUEZ-RODRÍGUEZ, Zenaida Vega-Santiago and their conjugal partnership; Radamés Santiago-López and Angel O. Vélez-Pacheco, Plaintiffs, Appellees, v. Miguel G. ORTIZ-VÉLEZ and Katia Medina-Pedraza, in their personal capacities, Defendants, Appellants. Sabana Grande Municipality; Luis A. Báez, Sabana Grande Commissioner; Osvaldo Ocasio-Rodríguez; Persons X, Y, Z; JAnet Lnu, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

391 F.3d 36

Reynaldo RODRÍGUEZ-RODRÍGUEZ, Zenaida Vega-Santiago and their conjugal partnership; Radamés Santiago-López and Angel O. Vélez-Pacheco, Plaintiffs, Appellees, v. Miguel G. ORTIZ-VÉLEZ and Katia Medina-Pedraza, in their personal capacities, Defendants, Appellants Sabana Grande Municipality; Luis A. Báez, Sabana Grande Commissioner; Osvaldo Ocasio-Rodríguez; Persons X, Y, Z; JAnet Lnu, Defendants.

No. 03-2123.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Heard September 10, 2004.

Decided December 8, 2004.

Johanna M. Emmanuelli-Huertas with whom Law Offices of Pedro E. Ortiz-Álvarez, PSC was on brief for appellants.

Francisco R. González with whom F.R. González Law Office was on brief for appellees.

Before BOUDIN, Chief Judge, LYNCH, Circuit Judge, and SCHWARZER,^* Senior District Judge.

BOUDIN, Chief Judge.

This appeal involves a federal civil rights suit brought by Reynaldo Rodríguez-Rodríguez ("Rodríguez") arising out of an election-week fracas that occurred on November 2, 2000, in the municipality of Sabana Grande, Puerto Rico. The defendants included Miguel Ortiz-Vélez ("Ortiz"), the mayor of Sabana Grande, and municipal police officer Katia Medina-Pedraza ("Medina"). These two defendants now appeal from the district court's denial of their motion for summary judgment which rested in part on their qualified immunity defense.

The underlying facts are far from clear. About all that the two sides agree upon is that on November 2, 2000, Rodríguez was driving a sound truck for the NPP (one of Puerto Rico's two main political parties) near a local headquarters of the PDP (the other main party); that PDP Mayor Ortiz and multiple persons on the street engaged in a physical confrontation with Rodríguez during which Rodríguez hit Ortiz; and that Officer Medina sought to intervene.

Rodríguez' version of events, drawn from his complaint and two nearly identical sworn statements made by him,¹ are that rocks were thrown at his vehicle; that when he stopped to inspect the damage, Medina arrived in her police car and asked why he had stopped; that while he was answering, Ortiz appeared with a mob of supporters, told Medina that he (Ortiz) would handle the matter, and then struck Rodríguez in the face with a blackjack; that Rodríguez managed to hit back at Ortiz, after which Medina struck Rodríguez with her baton; and that Rodríguez was then attacked by the crowd on the street.

The aftermath included criminal proceedings against Rodríguez in state court and fruitless efforts by Rodríguez to have the mayor criminally charged. In the present lawsuit (but not in the complaint), Rodríguez asserted that the mayor, while at one of Rodríguez' criminal trials, was greeted by another official of Ortiz' PDP party who went to the judge's chambers and who then left, signaling to the mayor that he (the other official) had "made the necessary arrangements."

Based on these alleged events, Rodríguez brought the present action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) against Ortiz, Medina, the municipality of Sabana Grande, the police commissioner and others. The legal claims asserted in the complaint were various and not well defined. In essence, Rodríguez claimed that Ortiz and Medina had each wrongfully struck him, that Ortiz and Medina had together "initiated, instigated, planned, participated and directed" the "multitudinous assault and battery" and that they had both failed to protect Rodríguez when he was being beaten.

The claim against Medina was framed as one of excessive force by a police officer. Ortiz, according to Rodríguez, was acting under color of state law when he allegedly told Medina to step aside and then struck Rodríguez. Rodríguez also claimed that the defendants wrongfully failed to protect him from the crowd's attacks. He further alleged that they violated his substantive due process rights and his First Amendment rights; the latter claim is premised on Rodríguez' view that "[t]he reason for the assault and mob beating was that [Rodríguez] was ... exercising his First Amendment [rights] of Political Speech and association."

Rodríguez also alleged that the mayor and the municipal government failed to properly train and supervise the police and others and failed to enforce regulations, thereby endangering individuals' constitutional rights. Finally, Rodríguez has asserted that Medina and Ortiz obstructed justice by not arresting Ortiz or prosecuting others who were involved in the incident.

After discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment. Their version of what happened, backed by their own affidavits and affidavits from others, was quite different in crucial respects. They claimed that Rodríguez had driven with his sound truck blaring past the PDP party headquarters and that he had stopped there, dismounted, and got in an altercation with a 15-year-old boy that ended with Rodríguez striking the boy and breaking his glasses.²

Medina's sworn statement said that she had arrived at the scene after a fight had broken up and that Ortiz approached her and asked her to file a complaint against Rodríguez for assaulting the boy. According to Medina, Rodríguez responded by striking the mayor. She says she tried to arrest Rodríguez, but was unable to do so because of the large crowd that then attacked him. Unable to break up the crowd, Medina said that she radioed for assistance and returned to try to protect Rodríguez from the crowd, which finally dispersed as paramedics arrived.

In his own sworn statement, the mayor supported Medina's story (although he didn't observe what she did after he was hit by Rodríguez). Another witness's story roughly corroborated Medina's — although he testified that the first punch was thrown by someone other than the mayor or Rodríguez and that during the fracas Medina "tried in, with her baton, taking ... the ones who [were] fighting."

In moving for summary judgment on the merits, Ortiz and Medina argued that Medina had been acting reasonably, that Ortiz had not in any event been a state actor in the encounter, that neither had been acting in concert with the other, and that the criminal charges brought thereafter against Rodríguez were filed by the Puerto Rico Department of Justice and not any of the defendants. Medina and the mayor quite briefly invoked qualified immunity, saying that neither had foreseen how events would develop.

The district judge denied the motions for summary judgment without explanation and this appeal by Ortiz and Medina followed. Normally the denial of a motion for summary judgment is not immediately appealable, but a denial of qualified immunity may be appealed to the extent the decision is a "purely legal" one, Dwan v. City of Boston, 329 F.3d 275, 278 (1st Cir.2003); what cannot be appealed is a district court's denial of qualified immunity based on the court's determination that "the pretrial record sets forth a `genuine' issue of fact." Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 320, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995).

A denial of summary judgment because of a genuine issue of material fact is itself a ruling of law and not a finding of fact; but Johnson makes clear that this class of legal rulings is not immediately appealable even if the district court is mistaken in thinking that there was a genuine issue. Still, a denial of qualified immunity on such a ground can be appealed immediately on the issue whether the plaintiffs' own version of events together with uncontested facts entitles the defendant to immunity. See Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 313, 116 S.Ct. 834, 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996); Camilo-Robles v. Hoyos, 151 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1105, 119 S.Ct. 872, 142 L.Ed.2d 773 (1999).

Although we could remand for clarification of the district court's reasoning if we thought it necessary, Camilo-Robles, 151 F.3d at 8 n. 5, the district court almost surely thought (1) that the two sides' stories were in direct conflict on crucial points — which they self-evidently are — and (2) that on Rodríguez' version qualified immunity would not be available. The latter ruling is reviewable now under Johnson. We are constrained to agree with the district court that Rodríguez' allegations preclude qualified immunity at the present time, although only barely so as to Medina.

Starting with Medina, in principle a constitutional claim can be made under the Fourth Amendment against a police officer who uses excessive force during a "seizure." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395-96, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). Even if there is no "seizure" for Fourth Amendment purposes, a constitutional claim of conscience-shocking force can be made out against an officer under substantive due process principles. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843, 846-47, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998). Assuming that Rodríguez could prove at trial his own sworn version...