Melton v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit

• Decision Date: 19 November 2004
• Docket Number: No. 04-10043.,04-10043.
• Citation: 391 F.3d 669
• Parties: Roger MELTON, Individually and as next friend of his son, Jason Melton; Sue Melton, Individually and as next friend of her son, Jason Melton; Advocacy, Incorporated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DALLAS AREA RAPID TRANSIT, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 669

391 F.3d 669

Roger MELTON, Individually and as next friend of his son, Jason Melton; Sue Melton, Individually and as next friend of her son, Jason Melton; Advocacy, Incorporated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DALLAS AREA RAPID TRANSIT, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 04-10043.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

November 19, 2004.

Laurance L. Priddy (argued), M. Elise Mitchell, Advocacy Inc., Dallas, TX, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Harold R. McKeever (argued), Dallas, Area Rapid Transit, Dallas, TX, for Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.

Before GARWOOD, JOLLY and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:

Between 1992 and early 1999, Dallas Area Rapid Transit's paratransit service picked up the disabled Jason Melton in the alley directly behind his house. Dallas Area Rapid Transit ("DART") discontinued this practice in early 1999, citing safety concerns. Since 1999, DART has picked up Jason where the alley meets the street, approximately one block away from the house. Plaintiffs-appellants Roger and Sue Melton, as next friends of their disabled adult son Jason Melton, and Advocacy, Incorporated (collectively the "Meltons") seek an injunction requiring defendant-appellee DART to make "reasonable modification" to its paratransit services to require alley pick-up for Jason, contending that the failure to modify its plan is in violation of title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131, et seq., and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 794, et seq. We hold that DART is not required by the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act to make reasonable modification to its paratransit services. This holding means that the Meltons have failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under either the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act, and we thus affirm the judgment of the district court.

I

Jason Melton is a disabled individual who qualifies for DART's paratransit services. The front yard of the Melton home, in which Jason lives with his parents, includes a steep slope that prevents the Meltons from taking Jason down to the street in his wheelchair. Instead, the Meltons have constructed a ramp in their garage to allow Jason access to the rear drive and paved public alley.

Although DART's paratransit service previously had picked up Jason in the alley directly behind the house, DART has picked up Jason where the alley meets the street since 1999. The Meltons cite numerous health, safety, and convenience concerns resulting from the pick-up's relocation to the end of the alley.

DART's current paratransit plan — which is approved as compliant with title II of the ADA by the Federal Transit Administration ("FTA") — provides curb-to-curb, shared-ride service for people with disabilities who are unable to use DART's fixed route system of buses or trains. DART's "Guide to Paratransit Service" provides that riders using the system must wait at the sidewalk, or at another safe waiting area in front of, or as close as possible to, the entrance of the pick-up location. The rider is responsible for travel to the pick-up location; that is to say, DART has no responsibility under the plan to get the rider to the point of pick-up. Paratransit drivers are instructed to wait for riders at the curb of a public street, in front of, or as close as possible to, the rider's house, building or other designated pick-up location.

On February 5, 2002, the Meltons filed this action against DART, contending that DART's refusal to pick up Jason in the alley directly behind his house constituted illegal discrimination against Jason under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. They sought an injunction requiring DART to make "reasonable modification" to its paratransit services to provide an alleyway pick-up for Jason.

DART moved for summary judgment arguing that the law does not require it to make reasonable modification to its paratransit service. The Meltons concurrently filed an opposing motion for partial summary judgment. The district court granted DART's motion for summary judgment and denied the Meltons' motion for partial summary judgment, holding that neither the ADA nor the Rehabilitation Act required DART to make reasonable modification to its paratransit service. Melton v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 326 F.Supp.2d 767 (N.D.Tex.2003). The Meltons filed a timely motion for a new trial, which was effectively a motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). The district court denied this motion, and the Meltons filed a timely notice of appeal.

II

This court reviews a district court's order granting a party's summary judgment motion de novo. Whittaker v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 206 F.3d 532, 534 (5th Cir.2000). Summary judgment is appropriate if the record discloses "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In making this determination, the court must evaluate the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Whittaker, 206 F.3d at 534.

A

The Americans with Disabilities Act,¹ 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq., was passed by Congress with the specific mandate of eliminating discrimination against individuals with disabilities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). The focus of this case is title II of the ADA, which covers discrimination in the provision of public services. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131, et seq. Title II is divided into two parts: part A covers public services generally, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131, et seq.; part B applies specifically and only to public transportation provided by public entities, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12141, et seq. It is undisputed that DART's paratransit service is covered by part B of title II; the parties dispute the application of part A to the issue presented in this case.

A plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination before relief under the ADA can be considered. To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that he is a qualified individual within the meaning of the ADA; (2) that he is being excluded from participation in, or being denied benefits of, services, programs, or activities for which the public entity is responsible, or is otherwise being discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) that such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination is by reason of his disability. Lightbourn v. County of El Paso, Texas, 118 F.3d 421, 428 (5th Cir.1997).

The parties agree that Jason Melton is a qualified individual within the meaning of the ADA. The second element of the prima facie case, however, is a point of contention. The district court concluded, and DART argues on appeal, that the Meltons failed to show that Jason has been excluded from participation in, or is being denied the benefits of, DART's paratransit service. See Melton, 326 F.Supp.2d at 771. Although Jason has not been entirely prohibited from using DART's paratransit service, the Meltons argue that Jason has been denied "meaningful access" because the discontinuation of alleyway pick-ups makes his use of the system dangerous and extremely difficult. The Meltons assert that the district court erred by not applying a "meaningful access" standard to evaluate the Meltons' claims of denial of access. Although Supreme Court precedent suggests that denial of "meaningful access" is equivalent to a full denial of access under the ADA,² we need not decide whether the "meaningful access" standard should be applied here; the district court's application of an incorrect standard of access is not reversible error unless the Meltons also demonstrate discrimination on the basis of Jason's disability, the third element of the prima facie case.

Thus, we turn to the question of whether the failure of DART to modify its plan constituted discrimination prohibited by the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. Discrimination on the basis of disability differs from discrimination in the constitutional sense. Reickenbacker v. Foster, 274 F.3d 974, 981 (5th Cir.2001) (citing Thompson v. Colorado, 258 F.3d 1241, 1254 (10th Cir.2001)). To determine whether DART discriminated against Jason on the basis of his disability, we examine the ADA itself and its own definitions of discrimination.³ If the ADA requires reasonable modification of DART's paratransit plan, the Meltons may have stated a prima facie case of discrimination and in which case we assume that summary judgment in favor of DART would be inappropriate. On the other hand, if the ADA imposes no such requirement, as we hold, the Meltons have failed to establish a prima facie case and summary judgment is appropriately granted to DART.

B

We now turn to the question at the heart of this case: whether a paratransit service that is consistent with an FTA-approved plan is sufficient for compliance with the ADA, or whether the ADA requires a public transportation system to make reasonable modifications to its paratransit service. This difficult question is an issue of first impression not only for our Court, but for all circuits. A proper analysis requires an examination of both the statutory and regulatory frameworks of the ADA.

As we have noted above, title II of the ADA is divided into two subparts. Part A governs all public entities, and part B applies specifically to the provision of public transportation by public entities. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134; 42 U.S.C. §§ 12141-12150. The Attorney General is directed to promulgate regulations to implement part A under 42 U.S.C. § 12134. But, it is the Secretary of Transportation who is directed to promulgate regulations to implement part B under 42 U.S.C. § 12149 and specifically to promulgate regulations regarding paratransit service under 42 U.S.C. §...