Thornton v. Buchmann, 16235.

Citation392 F.2d 870
Decision Date05 February 1968
Docket NumberNo. 16235.,16235.
PartiesCarl F. THORNTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. J. Leo BUCHMANN, Robert Bosman, Arthur Riley, Gordon Elsen, Robert Petersen and Abe Toigo, all individually and as police officers of the city of Kenosha, jointly and severally, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Alvin R. Ugent, Sidney Podell, Podell & Ugent, Milwaukee, Wis., for plaintiff-appellant.

David L. Phillips, Burton A. Scott, Phillips & Richards, Kenosha, Wis., for defendants-appellees.

Before HASTINGS, Chief Judge, and SCHNACKENBERG and FAIRCHILD, Circuit Judges.

FAIRCHILD, Circuit Judge.

Action against police officers for deprivation of constitutional rights.1

During the early hours of January 3, 1964, Thomas Heather was robbed and shot, at the filling station in Kenosha where he was employed. He died without regaining consciousness. The present action concerns activities of the city police in connection with their investigation of the homicide.

Plaintiff Carl Thornton worked part time at the same filling station as Heather, and also worked at the American Motors plant on a shift ending at 12:30 a. m. He was not on duty at the filling station at the same hours as Heather, but often worked on his own car there at times when Heather was on duty. At about 6:30 p. m. January 6, city detectives came to the plant and asked if Thornton would be willing to go to the police station and answer some questions. He said "yes" and went. There is no evidence that he was deprived of liberty at that time.

About two hours later Thornton thought the questioning had ended and got up to leave. He was told to remain. It is clear that he was no longer free from restraint. He signed two consents to "lie detector" tests and they were carried out. At some time between midnight and 1:20 a. m., an officer told him he was under arrest. No warrant had been issued. He spent the night in a cell, and was taken the next day to the state crime laboratory at Madison. He admitted at trial he had been perfectly willing to go to Madison and had so told the officers. After another "lie detector" test at Madison, he was brought back to Kenosha and released about 7 p. m., with instructions to return the next morning.

He did not return, however, and has not again been taken into custody. At some later date, the officers discussed the evidence with the district attorney, who declined to issue a warrant.2 The police file contains a notation that the case against Thornton is "dismissed" but "could be reopened."

The foregoing facts are undisputed in the present record.

Trial was begun before a jury. Plaintiff Thornton not only proved that he had been arrested without a warrant, detained for some 18 or 19 hours after the formal arrest, and then released and not further prosecuted, but his counsel also inquired of several defendants, whom he had called to testify as adverse parties, about the basis for the their actions. As a result many of the facts asserted by defendants as justification were in the record when plaintiff rested.

At the close of plaintiff's case, upon motion by defendants, the court directed a verdict. Plaintiff has appealed from the judgment accordingly entered.

The district judge was satisfied that the evidence disclosed, as a matter of law, that the defendant officers had probable cause to arrest Thornton.

"Whether that arrest was constitutionally valid depends in turn upon whether, at the moment the arrest was made, the officers had probable cause to make it — whether at that moment the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the petitioner had committed or was committing an offense. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879; Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102, 80 S.Ct. 168, 4 L.Ed.2d 134. `The rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception affording the best compromise that has been found for accommodating * * * often opposing interests. Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow less would be to leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice'. Brinegar v. United States, supra, at 176 69 S.Ct. 1302, at 1311."3

The successive stages of the transaction under scrutiny may be outlined as follows: (1) From 6:30 or 7 p. m. to 8:30 or 9 p. m. Thornton was questioned at the police station. His presence was voluntary. (2) At about 8:30 or 9 the officers told Thornton he was not free to leave, and questioning continued. (3) Some time between midnight and 1:20 a. m., the officers formally arrested Thornton and he remained in custody for 18 or 19 hours thereafter.

The distinction, if any, between detention for questioning and arrest, and between the extent of information required to justify either, has not been decided by the Supreme Court. There were two items of information acquired during the questioning and described as parts of the basis for the arrest. We shall assume the officers did not have these items until after Thornton was told he could not leave, though the testimony is not clear on the point.

Defendant Bosman was the officer immediately in charge. He described the information he had, in substance, as follows: Thornton was an employee at the filling station. Two men had reported seeing a man at the station shortly before 3 a. m. the morning Heather was shot. They were not in a position to see his face, but they believed the man was Thornton. The officers who answered the call to the filling station passed an old model Plymouth near the station, but proceeding away from it. It was reported that on the morning after the shooting, Thornton mentioned to someone that he had heard on the radio that Heather had been shot, but the police learned that the radio station did not give the name on that broadcast. Heather had been shot with a 22-caliber revolver. About a week earlier, Thornton had told the proprietor of the station that he kept a 22-caliber revolver under the seat of his car.

The two items of information, previously referred to, which were produced during the questioning, were (1) that Thornton denied being at the station the morning of January 3, but when he was told of the report that he had been...

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    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • 25 de setembro de 1984
    ...right. There is no constitutional right to Miranda warnings. See, e.g., Guenther, supra, at 601 (citing Thornton v. Buchmann, 392 F.2d 870, 874 (7th Cir.1968); O'Hagan v. Soto, 523 F.Supp. 625, 629 (S.D.N.Y.1981)). Further, it is clear from the plaintiff's own allegations that he never conf......
  • Lenard v. Argento
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • 15 de fevereiro de 1983
    ...the offense has been committed." Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102, 80 S.Ct. 168, 171, 4 L.Ed.2d 134 (1959); Thornton v. Buchmann, 392 F.2d 870, 872-73 (7th Cir.1968). See also United States v. Watson, 587 F.2d 365, 368 (7th In examining the particulars of this case, it is undisputed......
  • Jones v. Cannon, 97-2378
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit
    • 11 de maio de 1999
    ...a Miranda violation is the exclusion from evidence of any compelled selfincrimination, not a section 1983 action"); Thornton v. Buchmann, 392 F.2d 870, 874 (7th Cir.1968) (holding that failure to give Miranda warnings would prevent use of statements in a criminal trial, but has no significa......
  • Alexander v. City of South Bend
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana
    • 18 de maio de 2004
    ...right, our inquiry is at an end. Id. Other courts have followed suit with the reasoning in Hensley as well. See e.g. Thornton v. Buchmann, 392 F.2d 870, 874 (7th Cir.1968) (finding that the failure to give Miranda warnings is not cognizable under Section 1983); Duncan v. Nelson, 466 F.2d 93......
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1 books & journal articles
  • Miranda deconstitutionalized: when the Self-Incrimination Clause and the Civil Rights Act collide.
    • United States
    • University of Pennsylvania Law Review Vol. 143 No. 2, December 1994
    • 1 de dezembro de 1994
    ...self-incrimination, failure to give warnings did not subject the detectives to [sections] 1983 liability. See also Thornton v. Buchmann, 392 F.2d 870, 874 (7th Cir. 1968) (holding that statements made by a defendant who had not been Mirandized would be inadmissible at trial but finding no v......

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