Howe v. St. Louis Union Trust Co.

• Citation: 392 S.W.2d 625
• Decision Date: 12 July 1965
• Docket Number: No. 50935,No. 1,50935,1
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
• Parties: Loyd F. HOWE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ST. LOUIS UNION TRUST OCMPANY, a Corporation, Kenneth H. Eggers, Milton R. Wismar, Centrifugal & Mechanical Industries, Inc., a Corporation, Elmer O. Binder, James E. Bilderback, Parker W. Bigley, John McDermott, Wade R. Coon, Wilfred Widdows, and A. Lowell Morriss, Defendants-Respondents

Page 625

392 S.W.2d 625

Loyd F. HOWE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ST. LOUIS UNION TRUST OCMPANY, a Corporation, Kenneth H.

Eggers, Milton R. Wismar, Centrifugal & Mechanical

Industries, Inc., a Corporation, Elmer O. Binder, James E.

Bilderback, Parker W. Bigley, John McDermott, Wade R. Coon,

Wilfred Widdows, and A. Lowell Morriss, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 50935.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

July 12, 1965.

Opinion Modified on Court's Own Motion and Motion for

Rehearing or to Transfer to Court En Banc Denied

Aug. 3, 1965.

Eugene V. Krell, St. Louis, for appellant.

R. H. McRoberts, Jr., St. Louis, Bryan, Cave, McPheeters & McRoberts, St. Louis, of counsel, for respondents St. Louis Union Trust Co., Kenneth H. Eggers and Milton R. Wismar.

Jerome F. Duggan, Sidney W. Horwitz, Dubinsky & Duggan, St. Louis, for respondents Centrifugal & Mechanical Industries, Inc., Elmer O. Binder, James E. Bilderback, Parker W. Bigley, John McDermott, Wade R. Coon, Wilfred Widdows and A. Lowell Morris.

HYDE, Presiding Judge.

Action in four counts for actual and punitive damages of $78,800.00, for wrongful discharge from employment and failure to furnish a service letter in compliance with Sec. 290.140 RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S. The Court directed a verdict for defendants on all counts at the close of plaintiff's evidence and plaintiff has appealed from the judgment entered.

The individuals sued and their connection with the corporate defendants was as follows: Defendant Kenneth Eggers was Vice President, and Milton R. Wismar, Trust Officer of defendant St. Louis Union Trust Company, hereinafter called Trust Company. The other defendants were officers and employees of defendant Centrifugal & Mechanical Industries, Inc., hereinafter called Centrifugal: Elmer O. Binder, President; James E. Bilderback, Vice President; Parker W. Bigley, Executive Vice President; John McDermott, Purchasing Agent; Wade R. Coon, Engineer; Wilfred Widdows, Plant Superintendent. A. Lowell Morriss, lawyer for Centrifugal, was co-executor of the estate of Andrew F. Howe, deceased, along with Trust Company.

Count I of plaintiff's petition alleged that the individual defendants, Binder, Bilderback, Bigley, McDermott, Eggers, Wismar and Morriss, individually and collectively, maliciously and wilfully and with intent to prevent plaintiff from having employment with Centrifugal, induced Centrifugal to discharge plaintiff from his employment, thereby interfering with his contractual relations, to plaintiff's damage. Though named in Count I, the prayer did not ask for a judgment against Centrifugal. Plaintiff sought $18,800.00 actual damages for loss of wages and $40,000.00 punitive damages.

Count II alleged that defendants, Centrifugal, Binder, Bilderback, Bigley, McDermott, Widdows, Coon, Trust Company, Eggers, Wismar and Morriss, maliciously and wilfully conspired to and did cause a severance of plaintiff's employment with Centrifugal, thereby interfering with plaintiff's potential advantage of employment during the administration of the probate estate of Andrew Francis Howe, and his participation in and knowledge of the operation of the corporation. Plaintiff sought judgment against the aforementioned defendants for $38,800.00 actual damages, which included the $18,800.00 for loss of wages sued for in Count I and $40,000.00 punitive damages.

Count III charged that defendants, Binder, Bilderback, Bigley, McDermott, Coon, Widdows and Morriss communicated injurious and false statements concerning plaintiff to the Trust Company, Eggers, Wismar and Centrifugal, causing plaintiff to lose his employment. Plaintiff sought actual damages against the individual defendants, exclusive of Eggers and Wismar, for said alleged injurious falsehood in the amount of $18,800.00.

Count IV alleged that Centrifugal and Binder, in the issuance of Centrifugal's service letter to plaintiff on his demand, failed to comply with the Missouri statute relative to same, and failed to state the true cause of plaintiff's discharge. Plaintiff claimed actual damages in the amount of $18,800.00 and punitive damages of $40,000.00.

Plaintiff's evidence consisted of his own testimony and portions of depositions of defendants offered as admissions. Plaintiff's father, who died February 7, 1961, owned 43,181 shares of the 43,200 outstanding shares of the common stock of Centrifugal. (Plaintiff's testimony showed that at the time of the trial these shares were not in his father's estate, having been sold apparently during administration although still in the estate at the time of his discharge.) Plaintiff, who was 68 years of age at the time of the trial, was employed by his father as a wood pattern maker on August 10, 1959 and was paid $3.60 per hour. Prior to that time, plaintiff had been a wood pattern maker for the Caterpillar Tractor Company at Peoria, Illinois. Plaintiff said he had worked as a pattern maker for over fifty years. Plaintiff was discharged on May 19, 1961. After that time, patterns for Centrifugal were purchased from pattern manufacturers.

It appears from the depositions in evidence that after the death of plaintiff's father, plaintiff wanted to take part in management of the company, and complained he was not being informed about 'what was going on.' It was the view of the officers of Centrifugal that plaintiff 'did not have management ability.' The executive committee of Centrifugal, consisting of the President and the two Vice Presidents, discussed the matter of plaintiff's discharge at least twenty times because he was interfering with the employees, butting into directors' meetings and making himself a general nuisance. The matter was brought to a conclusion when plaintiff during his vacation wanted to go to a trade show at Cleveland, Ohio, where Centrifugal had a booth. It appears that plaintiff's expressed purpose was 'to protect his interests,' saying 'he intended to go into the booth and report to the trade that he was one of the heirs of Mr. Howe's Estate and would at one time be operating the company.' The officers did not want him to go, considering that plaintiff was not familiar with the company's work and not being a salesman he might damage its association with some of its prospects. Plaintiff did not go but was discharged soon afterwards. Other material facts will be stated in connection with our rulings.

Counts, I, II and III are all for damages for wrongful discharge. Plaintiff suggests, as one theory of liability, interference with contractual relations, citing Prosser on Torts, 3rd Ed., 955 et seq., Chapter 26. However, this discussion mainly concerns inducing a person to break an existing contract of employment under the principles established by the leading case of Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & Bl. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749. See also Downey v. United Weatherproofing, Inc., 363 Mo. 852, 253 S.W.2d 976. The trouble with plaintiff's case is that he had no definite contractual relations with Centrifugal; he neither alleged nor had any evidence of any employment contract for continuing service. It appears only that he was employed on an hourly wage basis. "The rule is well established in this state and elsewhere that in the absence of a contract for employment for a definite term or a contrary statutory provision, an employer may discharge an employee at any time, without cause or reason, or for any reason and, in such case, no action can be maintained for wrongful discharge. Culver v. Kurn, 354 Mo. 1158, 193 S.W.2d 602, 166 A.L.R. 644; Forsyth v. Board of Trustees of Park College, 240 Mo.App. 622, 212 S.W.2d 82; Bell v. Faulkner, Mo.App., 75 S.W.2d 612; Odell v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 10 Cir., 201 F.2d 123.' Christy v. Petrus, 365 Mo. 1187, 295 S.W.2d 122, 124.' Smith v. Arthur C. Baue Funeral Home, Mo.Sup., 370 S.W.2d 249, 252. See also Morsinkhoff v. DeLuxe Laundry & Dry Cleaning Co., Mo.App., 344 S.W.2d 639; Maddock v. Lewis, Mo.Sup., 386 S.W.2d 406, 411. Plaintiff says Count III is based on injurious falsehood communicated by the named officers and employees of Centrifugal to the executor of his father's estate, the Trust Company and its officers, but the relief sought is damages for wrongful discharge. This could not state a cause of action, if his discharge was not wrongful because, having no contract for employment, plaintiff could have been discharged 'at any time, without cause or reason or for any reason.' Furthermore, Trust Company was not his employer.

Although plaintiff says there was ample evidence to indicate that the defendants conspired to effect plaintiff's discharge, he also says that 'individually and collectively' defendants 'committed malicious, wilful acts to his damage.' Acts he points out are that the executive committee discussed the matter of his discharge any time they were together, being at least 20 times; that President Binder at all times recommended discharge; that the Trust Company and its officers intended that plaintiff stay in the employ of Centrifugal but that the other defendants persuaded them he should be discharged; and that in answer to an interrogatory as to how defendants knew plaintiff was 'incompetent, interfering, unnecessary employee and undesirable as an employee' (admitted in their answer as made to Trust Company) they said 'by constant daily observation of plaintiff's action as an employee.' Plaintiff states that such constant observation is at least an unlawful means to accomplish a lawful act, citing the difinition of conspiracy in Royster v. Baker, Mo.Sup., 365 S.W.2d 496, 499. Our view of the evidence is that plaintiff's discharge was a lawful act for the reasons hereinabove stated and that upon consideration of the whole record we must find no unlawful means was shown. The law of civil conspiracy is well stated in the Royster case; see also Gruenewaelder v. Wintermann, Mo.Sup., 360 S.W.2d 678, 687. An instructive case on the situation here is Darrow v. Briggs, 261 Mo. 244, 169 S.W. 118,...