Fortnightly Corporation v. United Artists Television, Inc
Citation | 88 S.Ct. 2084,392 U.S. 390,20 L.Ed.2d 1176 |
Decision Date | 17 June 1968 |
Docket Number | No. 618,618 |
Parties | FORTNIGHTLY CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. UNITED ARTISTS TELEVISION, INC |
Court | United States Supreme Court |
Robert C. Barnard, Washington, D.C., for petitioner.
Louis Nizer, New York City, for respondent.
The petitioner, Fortnightly Corporation, owns and operates community antenna television (CATV) systems in Clarksburg and Fairmont, West Virginia.1 There were no local television broadcasting stations in that immediate area until 1957. Now there are two, but, because of hilly terrain, most residents of the area cannot receive the broadcasts of any additional stations by ordinary rooftop antennas. Some of the residents have joined in erecting larger cooperative antennas in order to receive more distant stations, but a majority of the householders in both communities have solved the problem by becoming customers of the petitioner's CATV service.2
The petitioner's systems consist of antennas located on hills above each city, with connecting coaxial cables, strung on utility poles, to carry the signals received by the antennas to the home television sets of individual subscribers. The systems contain equipment to amplify and modulate the signals received, and to convert them to different frequencies, in order to transmit the signals efficiently while maintaining and improving their strength.3
During 1960, when this proceeding began, the petitioner's systems provided customers with signals of five television broadcasting stations, three located in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; one in Steubenville, Ohio; and one in Wheeling, West Virginia.4 The distance between those cities and Clarksburg and Fairmont ranges from 52 to 82 miles.5 The systems carried all the programming of each of the five stations, and a customer could choose any of the five programs he wished to view by simply turning the knob on his own television set. The petitioner neither edited the programs received nor originated any programs of its own.6 The petitioner's customers were charged a flat monthly rate regardless of the amount of time that their television sets were in use.7
The respondent, United Artists Television, Inc., holds copyrights on several motion pictures. During the period in suit, the respondent (or its predecessor) granted various licenses to each of the five television stations in question to broadcast certain of these copyrighted motion pictures. Broadcasts made under these licenses were received by the petitioner's Clarkburg and Fairmont CATV systems and carried to its customers. At no time did the petitioner (or its predecessors) obtain a license under the copyrights from the respondent or from any of the five television stations. The licenses granted by the respondent to the five stations did not authorize carriage of the broadcasts by CATV systems, and in several instances the licenses specifically prohibited such carriage.
The respondent sued the petitioner for copyright infringement in a federal court, asking damages and injunctive relief. The issue of infringement was separately tried, and the court ruled in favor of the respondent. 255 F.Supp. 177. On interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. 377 F.2d 872. We granted certiorari, 389 U.S. 969, to consider an important question under the Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 1075, as amended, 17 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.
The Copyright Act does not give a copyright holder control over all uses of his copyrighted work.8 Instead s 1 of the Act enumerates several 'rights' that are made 'exclusive' to the holder of the copyright.9 If a person, without authorization from the copyright holder, puts a copyrighted work to a use within the scope of one of these 'exclusive rights,' he infringes the copyright. If he puts the work to a use not enumerated in § 1, he does not infringe.10 The respondent's contention is that the petitioner's CATV systems infringed the respondent's § 1(c) exclusive right to 'perform * * * in public for profit' (nondramatic literary works)11 and its § 1(d) exclusive right to 'perform * * * publicly' (dramatic works).12 The petitioner maintains that its CATV systems did not 'perform' the copyrighted works at all. 13
At the outset it is clear that the petitioner's systems did not 'perform' the respondent's copyrighted works in any conventional sense of that term,14 or in any manner envisaged by the Congress that enacted the law in 1909.15 But our inquiry cannot be limited to ordinary meaning and legislative history, for this is a statute that was drafted long before the development of the electronic phenomena with which we deal here.16 In 1909 radio itself was in its infancy, and television had not been invented. We must read the statutory language of 60 years ago in the light of drastic technological change.17
The Court of Appeals thought that the controlling question in deciding whether the petitioner's CATV systems 'performed' the copyrighted works was: '(H)ow much did the (petitioner) do to bring about the viewing and hearing of a copyrighted work?' 377 F.2d, at 877. Applying this test, the court found that the petitioner did 'perform' the programs carried by its systems.18 But mere quantitative contribution cannot be the proper test to determine copyright liability in the context of television broadcasting. If it were, many people who make large contributions to television viewing might find themselves liable for copyright infringement—not only the apartment house owner who erects a common antenna for his tenants, but the shopkeeper who sells or rents television sets, and, indeed, every television set manufacturer. Rather, resolution of the issue before us depends upon a determination of the function that CATV plays in the total process of television broadcasting and reception.
Television viewing results from combined activity by broadcasters and viewers. Both play active and indispensable roles in the process; neither is wholly passive. The broadcaster selects and procures the program to be viewed. He may produce it himself, whether 'live' or with film or tape, or he may obtain it from a network or some other source. He then converts the visible images and audible sounds of the program into electronic signals,19 and broadcasts the signals at radio frequency for public reception.20 Members of the public, by means of television sets and antennas that they themselves provide, receive the broadcaster's signals and reconvert them into the visible images and audible sounds of the program. The effective range of the broadcast is determined by the combined contribution of the equipment employed by the broadcaster and that supplied by the viewer.21
The television broadcaster in one sense does less than the exhibitor of a motion picture or stage play; he supplies his audience not with visible images but only with electronic signals. The viewer conversely does more than a member of a theater audience; he provides the equipment to convert electronic signals into audible sound and visible images. Despite these deviations from the conventional situation contemplated by the framers of the Copyright Act, 22 broadcasters have been judicially treated as exhibitors, and viewers as members of a theater audience. Broadcasters perform.23 Viewers do not perform.24 Thus, while both broadcaster and viewer play crucial roles in the total television process, a line is drawn between them. One is treated as active performer; the other, as passive beneficiary.
When CATV is considered in this framework, we conclude that it falls on the viewer's side of the line.25 Essentially, a CATV system no more than enhances the viewer's capacity to receive the broadcaster's signals; it provides a well-located antenna with an efficient connection to the viewer's television set.26 It is true that a CATV system plays an 'active' role in making reception possible in a given area, but so do ordinary television sets and antennas. CATV equipment is powerful and sophisticated, but the basic function the equipment serves is little different from that served by the equipment generally furnished by a television viewer.27 If an individual erected an antenna on a hill, strung a cable to his house, and installed the necessary amplifying equipment, he would not be 'performing' the programs he received on his television set. The result would be no different if several people combined to erect a cooperative antenna for the same purpose. The only difference in the case of CATV is that the antenna system is erected and owned not by its users but by an entrepreneur.
The function of CATV systems has little in common with the function of broadcasters.28 CATV systems do not in fact broadcast or rebroadcast. 29 Broadcasters select the programs to be viewed; CATV systems simply carry, without editing, whatever programs they receive. Broadcasters procure programs and propagate them to the public; CATV systems receive programs that have been released to the public and carry them by private channels to additional viewers. We hold that CATV operators, like viewers and unlike broadcasters, do not perform the programs that they receive and carry.30
We have been invited by the Solicitor General in an amicus curiae brief to render a compromise decision in this case that would, it is said, accommodate various competing considerations of copyright, communications, and antitrust policy.31 We decline the invitation.32 That job is for Congress. 33 We take the Copyright Act of 1909 as we find it. With due regard to changing technology, we hold that the petitioner did not under that law 'perform' the respondent's copyrighted works.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
Reversed.
Mr. Justice DOUGLAS and Mr. Justice MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Mr. Justice HARLAN took no part in the decision of this case...
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