Lanman v. Johnson County, Kansas, No. 03-3316.

Citation393 F.3d 1151
Decision Date30 December 2004
Docket NumberNo. 03-3316.
PartiesSusan LANMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOHNSON COUNTY, KANSAS, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (10th Circuit)

Kirk D. Holman, Sanders, Simpson & Fletcher, L.C., Kansas City, MO, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Lawrence L. Ferree, III, (Kirk T. Ridgway with him on the brief) Ferree, Bunn, O'Grady & Rundberg, Chtd., Overland Park, KS, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before KELLY, HOLLOWAY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.

PAUL KELLY, JR., Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-Appellant Susan Lanman appeals from a grant of summary judgment in favor of her former employer, Defendant-Appellee Johnson County Sheriff's Department ("County") on her hostile work environment and constructive discharge claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213. ("ADA"). Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Background

Viewing the proper summary judgment evidence1 in the light most favorable to Ms. Lanman, the record establishes the following facts. Ms. Lanman began working for the County as a deputy sheriff in 1987. Beginning in March 2001, Ms. Lanman testified on deposition that some of her co-workers in the Classification Unit began treating her as if she were mentally ill, sometimes calling her "nuts" or "crazy." She claims that when someone "hyped up on drugs" or "hostile" would be placed in a special holding cell (1A4), Deputy Judd Brungardt would tell her "Lanman, there is someone like you. Go get your relative out of 1A4. They act just like you." She also testified Deputy Bernie Beletsky made comments like the following approximately once a week: "Oh Lanman, you are going off the deep end again," or "Let's give her some chocolate and let's see her go off the deep end," and "Are you off your medication?," or "Why don't you try a different medication." When she approached Sergeant David Haney about an inmate with erratic and agitated behavior who Ms. Lanman thought was in a manic phase, Sergeant Haney told her "Are you okay? You're scaring me." Sergeant Haney also told her she had a "flat affect."

Ms. Lanman admitted that officers commonly teased each other, and that some of the comments made about her were good natured. She also admitted some officers disliked her, and that this was the reason she was ridiculed. Further, she thought some people disliked her because "[she] was the only female back in classifications ... It was a boys club back there and [she] didn't fit in."

In April 2001, after Ms. Lanman had been working in Classifications for several years, she made serious errors misclassifying inmates, and she was transferred to Operations. Commenting on her transfer, she patted a fellow Classifications deputy on the cheek three times and said, "I sure am going to miss working with you Pieruccie. You are one of the nice ones that I had to work with." Deputy Pieruccie filed a written report of the incident saying her actions "confused [him] and made [him] feel very uncomfortable." Sergeant Haney also filed a written report claiming that on May 8, Ms. Lanman veered her vehicle back and forth in the parking lot as she drove towards him and Deputy Michael Jackson, and made a vulgar gesture. However, Deputy Jackson's report does not corroborate Sergeant Haney's allegations, and Ms. Lanman denies the incident.

Based on these events, Ms. Lanman was placed on administrative leave on May 9, pending the results of a psychological fitness for duty exam. The treating physician found no signs she was unfit for duty and cleared her to return to work. She was never disciplined for the incidents reported by Haney or Pieruccie. Upon returning to duty on June 13, Ms. Lanman was interviewed by Captain Brett Cortright. They discussed her prior problems, and he told her she was starting fresh without regard to the past. Ms. Lanman became emotional and stated she did not understand why people thought so negatively of her. Captain Cortright told her she should consider quitting if things were not working out for her, and she was relieved from further duty that day due to her emotional state.

On June 18, Ms. Lanman reported for duty in her new unit and was assigned to work with a training officer. She confronted her supervisors about the assignment arguing that she was an experienced officer and did not need to be trained; however, the assignment was not changed. She then went to her duty station in the jail and yelled at her fellow officers in front of the inmates. As a result, she was suspended for three days without pay.

After taking almost a month of medical leave, Ms. Lanman was set to return to work in mid July. However, a few days before, the officers were informed at roll call that she would be returning and told that any concerns they might have could be raised privately with the supervising sergeant. Upon hearing this had occurred, Ms. Lanman submitted her resignation stating she wanted to pursue other career opportunities, and she never returned to work. In a termination form given to the County, she further stated she "felt the need to voluntarily resign due to the extreme hostile conditions [she] faced repeatedly since 2001." She had never made any related written or oral grievances to the County. On August 7, Ms. Lanman filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. She then filed suit against the County alleging violations of the ADA.

Discussion

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment and its conclusions of law de novo, applying the same legal standard. Steele v. Thiokol Corp., 241 F.3d 1248, 1252 (10th Cir.2001). Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Thus, to survive summary judgment the plaintiff has the burden to put forth sufficient evidence to warrant a verdict as a matter of law; a scintilla of evidence will not suffice. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "When applying this standard, we view the evidence and draw reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Steele, 241 F.3d at 1252.

A. Hostile Work Environment Claim under the ADA

Ms. Lanman asserts she was subjected to a hostile work environment in violation of the ADA. We have not previously decided whether a hostile work environment claim can be brought under the ADA. See Steele, 241 F.3d at 1252. For the following reasons, we join our sister circuits that have held such claims are actionable. See Flowers v. S. Reg'l Physician Servs. Inc., 247 F.3d 229 (5th Cir.2001); Fox v. Gen. Motors Corp., 247 F.3d 169 (4th Cir.2001); Shaver v. Indep. Stave Co., 350 F.3d 716 (8th Cir.2003).

The ADA provides that no employer covered by the Act "shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to... terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (emphasis added). Congress borrowed this language from Title VII, which similarly provides that it "shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (emphasis added). Since 1986, well before the ADA was enacted in 1991, the Supreme Court has consistently held this language in Title VII encompasses a hostile work environment claim. E.g., Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993). "Thus, we can presume that Congress was aware of the Court's interpretation of `terms, conditions, or privileges of employment' when it chose to use parallel language in the ADA." Fox, 247 F.3d at 175-76. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 696-97, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ("It is always appropriate to assume that our elected representatives, like other citizens, know the law...."). As such, Congress' incorporation of this language into the ADA is indicative of its intent that the language mean the same in the ADA as it does in Title VII.

The parallel purposes and remedial structures of the two statutes also support a consistent interpretation. Both statutes seek to eliminate employment discrimination against defined classes of people. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) ("It is the purpose of [the ADA] to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities."), with Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756, 99 S.Ct. 2066, 60 L.Ed.2d 609 (1979) (stating purpose of Title VII is to eliminate workplace discrimination), and Jones v. Runyon, 32 F.3d 1454, 1456 (10th Cir.1994) (same). Further, the ADA explicitly provides that "[t]he powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in [Title VII] shall be the powers, remedies, and procedures [the ADA] provides." 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a). Given these similarities, this court, and many others, have used similar analyses when interpreting the two statutes. See Bristol v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 281 F.3d 1148, 1164 (10th Cir.2002) (noting definition of employer substantially similar and applying Title VII cases in ADA context), vacated in part on other grounds by 312 F.3d 1213 (10th Cir.2002) (en banc); Butler v. City of Prairie Vill., 172 F.3d 736, 744 (10th Cir.1999) (noting reasons for precluding individual supervisor liability under Title VII apply equally to ADA); Roe v. Cheyenne Mountain Conference Resort, Inc., 124 F.3d 1221, 1230 (10th Cir.1997) ("Congress'...

To continue reading

Request your trial
98 cases
  • Mickens v. Polk County School Bd.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida
    • 4 Abril 2006
    ...of mental health terminology) generally do not establish a perceived impairment on the part of the employer." Lanman v. Johnson County, Kansas, 393 F.3d 1151, 1157 (10th Cir.2004); Cody v. CIGNA Healthcare of St. Louis, Inc., 139 F.3d 595, 599 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that an employer's "me......
  • Jones v. United Parcel Service, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Kansas
    • 2 Febrero 2006
    ...believes that an actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities. Lanman v. Johnson County, Kan., 393 F.3d 1151, 1156 (10th Cir.2004) (quoting Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999)). "In both cases, ......
  • Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. C.R. England Inc.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (10th Circuit)
    • 3 Mayo 2011
    ...the similarities between the ADA and Title VII, we generally interpret those statutes consistently. See, e.g., Lanman v. Johnson Cnty., Kan., 393 F.3d 1151, 1155 (10th Cir.2004) (“Given the [ ] similarities [between the ADA and Title VII], this court, and many others, have used similar anal......
  • Floyd v. Office of Representative Sheila Jackson Lee
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • 30 Septiembre 2013
    ...SeeJohnson v. Shinseki, 811 F.Supp.2d 336, 345 (D.D.C.2011) (discussing hostile work environment based on gender); see alsoLanman, 393 F.3d at 1155; Shaver, 350 F.3d at 719; Flowers, 247 F.3d at 232–35; Fox, 247 F.3d at 175–77 (all holding that ADA provides for hostile work environment clai......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
3 books & journal articles
  • Disability discrimination
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Federal Employment Jury Instructions - Volume I
    • 30 Abril 2014
    ...Indep. Stave Co. , 350 F.3d 716, 719 (8th Cir. 2003). Tenth : Harassment claims under the ADA are actionable. Lanman v. Johnson County , 393 F.3d 1151, 1154-56 (10th Cir. 2004). §4:730.10 ADADefinitions— Hostile or Abusive Work Environment—Alternate— Third Circuit Full instruction can be ac......
  • Disabling Complexity: the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 and Its Interaction With Other Federal Laws
    • United States
    • University of Nebraska - Lincoln Nebraska Law Review No. 38, 2022
    • Invalid date
    ...Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 317. Lanman v. Johnson County, Kan., 393 F.3d 1151, 1155 (10th Cir. 2004); Shaver v. Indep. Stave Co., 350 F.3d 716, 720 (8th Cir. 2003); Flowers v. S. Reg'l Physician Servs., Inc., 247 F.3d ......
  • Disabling Complexity: the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 and Its Interaction With Other Federal Laws
    • United States
    • Creighton University Creighton Law Review No. 38, 2004
    • Invalid date
    ...Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 317. Lanman v. Johnson County, Kan., 393 F.3d 1151, 1155 (10th Cir. 2004); Shaver v. Indep. Stave Co., 350 F.3d 716, 720 (8th Cir. 2003); Flowers v. S. Reg'l Physician Servs., Inc., 247 F.3d ......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT