Ward v. Santa Fe Independent School Dist.

• Decision Date: 10 December 2004
• Docket Number: No. 03-41096.,03-41096.
• Citation: 393 F.3d 599
• Parties: Robert WARD, Individually, and as next friend of Marian Ward, a minor; Marjorie Ward, Individually and as next friend of Marian Ward, a minor; Marian Ward, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SANTA FE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

393 F.3d 599

Robert WARD, Individually, and as next friend of Marian Ward, a minor; Marjorie Ward, Individually and as next friend of Marian Ward, a minor; Marian Ward, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SANTA FE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 03-41096.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

December 10, 2004.

Kelly J. Coghlan (argued), Coghlan & Associates, Houston, TX, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Lisa A. Brown (argued), Philip D. Fraissinet, Bracewell & Patterson, Houston, TX, for Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

Before DeMOSS, DENNIS and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

DENNIS, Circuit Judge:

This appeal concerns plaintiffs who sought and received an injunction and nominal damages in an action brought against a school district. Despite their status as prevailing parties, the plaintiffs appeal from the district court judgment in their favor alleging, among other things, that the district court improperly failed to rule on the merits of their constitutional claim. We conclude that the plaintiffs lack standing to appeal from the judgment in their favor and, also, that the claims for which they have standing lack merit. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I.

In 1999, this court determined, in Doe v. Santa Fe Independ. School Distr., 168 F.3d 806 (5th Cir.1999), that a Santa Fe Independent School District ("School District") policy that invited and encouraged students to read religious messages from the stage at graduation ceremonies and over the public address system at football games violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The School District filed a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court.¹ Pending a decision on the petition, the School District adopted a policy prohibiting students from including prayer or reference to a deity in pre-game messages.

Following the adoption of the new policy, plaintiff Marian Ward was selected as student speaker for the 1999 football season. School officials informed Marian of the speaker policy and cautioned her to follow it. On September 2, 1999, before the first football game, Marian Ward's parents, Robert and Marjorie Ward, individually and as next friends of their daughter, brought an action alleging that the new policy violated Marian Ward's constitutional rights to free speech and free exercise of religion as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The plaintiffs² also alleged violations of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, certain provisions of the Texas state constitution and the Texas Religious Freedoms Restoration Act. The plaintiffs sought temporary and permanent injunctive relief, declaratory relief, nominal damages and attorneys' fees.

On September 3, 1999, the district court held a hearing on the plaintiffs' request for a temporary restraining order. At the hearing, the School Board stated that it agreed with the arguments presented by the plaintiffs and wanted to allow its students to deliver unrestricted messages over the public address system. The School Board, however, felt constrained by this court's decision in Doe, a decision the Board was seeking to reverse. The district court issued a temporary restraining order prohibiting the School Board from effectuating the policy or otherwise preventing Marian Ward from praying or invoking a deity over the public address system. Subsequently, the parties agreed to a preliminary injunction to the same effect. Thus, Marian Ward was allowed to deliver unrestricted messages at each 1999 home football game. After the 1999 football season ended, Marian Ward graduated, and she and her parents moved from the school district.

In July 2000, the School Board rescinded the enjoined speaker policy challenged by the plaintiffs and discontinued the practice of having student messages of any kind delivered at football games. On August 4, 2000, at an initial scheduling conference with the parties, the district court pronounced the plaintiffs' case moot and denied motions to amend the complaint to add a plea for actual damages and to add additional parties. The plaintiffs' filed a motion for reconsideration and a motion for a new trial. The district court issued a Memorandum and Order on March 23, 2001 upholding its prior rulings denying the motions, and dismissing Ward's parents as parties.

The plaintiffs appealed. A different panel of this court decided that Marian Ward's claims were moot. See Ward v. Santa Fe Independent School District, 34 Fed.Appx. 150 (5th Cir. 2002). That panel further concluded that the district court properly dismissed the claims of Ward's parents because, regardless of their standing, their individual claims were also mooted by the School Board's recision of the policy. Finally, the panel concluded that the district court correctly denied the plaintiffs' request for leave to amend the pleadings to include a claim for actual damages because: (1) there had been undue delay in filing the request, and (2) the complaint, as amended, failed to state a claim for actual damages.

The plaintiffs filed a petition for rehearing before the appellate panel arguing that the case was not moot because they sought the recovery of nominal damages. On rehearing, the panel agreed that there remained a cognizable claim for nominal damages, again affirmed the district court's ruling denying leave to amend the complaint and remanded the case to the district court without reaching the issue of whether Ward's parents were properly dismissed as parties. See Ward v. Santa Fe Independent School District, 35 Fed.Appx. 386 (5th Cir. 2002).

Following the remand, the district court ordered counsel for the parties to file, within two weeks, an agreed final judgment awarding nominal damages. Alternatively, if the parties could not agree upon the form of the final judgment and the amount of nominal damages, the court ordered, counsel must file instead, within two weeks, a memorandum of law, of five pages or less, stating their positions and attaching a proposed final judgment. The plaintiffs responded by filing a motion to reconvene the initial scheduling conference, to schedule discovery and other pre-trial matters, and to proceed to a trial on the merits. The plaintiffs also sought reconsideration of the individual standing of Robert and Marjorie Ward. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed a thirty-four page proposed final judgment. In a memorandum of law filed with the proposed final judgment, the plaintiffs urged the court to proceed with discovery and stated their intent to file another motion to amend the complaint to allege actual damages.

The defendant filed a response to the court's order offering to pay one dollar in nominal damages as well as reasonable attorney's fees. Subsequently, the defendant made a Rule 68 offer of judgment, offering to pay the plaintiffs thirty-six dollars in nominal damages, with each plaintiff receiving one-third, and reasonable attorney's fees in an amount to be decided by the court. The plaintiffs did not accept the offer.

The district court denied the plaintiffs' motions. The plaintiffs filed further motions including two to amend the pleadings, a motion to compel the defendant to provide Rule 26 disclosures and a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law to be included in the final judgment. On May 1, 2003, the district court issued a Memorandum and Order denying all of the plaintiffs' motions and rendering judgment awarding plaintiff Marian Ward one dollar in nominal damages and $52,397.34 in attorneys' fees and costs. The Memorandum and Order of the district court included an excerpt from its September 3, 1999 oral ruling on the plaintiffs' request for a temporary restraining order stating: "Because the court found that the [School District] had violated Marian Ward's First Amendment rights, Marian Ward is entitled to an award of nominal damages." The district court specifically declined to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law and no other discussion of the merits of the plaintiffs constitutional claims appears in the Memorandum and Order.

On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the district court erroneously: (1) failed to address the merits of the plaintiffs' constitutional claims and failed to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law; (2) denied the plaintiffs' motions for a scheduling order, disclosures and discovery; (3) denied the plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend the complaint to include a claim for actual damages; (4) dismissed Robert and Marjorie Ward as parties without notice or opportunity for discovery; (5) failed to address or to allow trial or judgment on the plaintiffs' pendent state claim; and (6) miscalculated attorney's fees. We affirm the judgment of the district court.

II.

The plaintiffs present two arguments regarding the substance of the district court's decision: (1) the district court erroneously entered judgment without making findings of fact and conclusions of law, and (2) the district court erroneously concluded that the defendant's offer to pay nominal damages prevented a ruling on the merits. We sua sponte conclude that the plaintiffs lack standing to appeal the judgment in their favor. See S.E.C. v. Forex Asset Management LLC, 242 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir.2001) (this court may consider standing to appeal sua sponte.)

It is a central tenet of appellate jurisdiction that a party who is not aggrieved by a judgment of the district court has no standing to appeal it. Matter of Sims, 994 F.2d 210, 214 (5th Cir.1993) ("It is more than well-settled that a party cannot appeal from a judgment unless `aggrieved' by it.") Thus, a prevailing party generally may not appeal a judgment in its favor. Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 292 U.S. 151, 176, 54 S.Ct. 658, 78 L.Ed. 1182 (1934) ("The Company was...