Jones v. Blanas

Citation393 F.3d 918
Decision Date27 December 2004
Docket NumberNo. 02-17148.,02-17148.
PartiesOscar W. JONES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Lou BLANAS; County of Sacramento, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)

Grace K. Won and Darrell A. Fruth, Farella Braun + Martel LLP, San Francisco, CA, for the plaintiff-appellant.

David A. Melton, Porter, Scott, Weiberg & Delehant, Sacramento, CA, for the defendants-appellees. With him on the briefs was Terence J. Cassidy.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California; William S. Shubb, Chief Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-00-02811-WBS(JFM).

Before B. FLETCHER, NOONAN, and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

BETTY B. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-appellant Oscar W. Jones ("Jones") appeals from a grant of summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in favor of defendants-appellees Sheriff Lou Blanas and the County of Sacramento. Jones seeks damages based on violations of his constitutional rights while he was confined in jail as a civil detainee. He had completed his criminal sentence, but was awaiting proceedings under California's Sexually Violent Predator Act. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm in part and reverse in part the grant of summary judgment, and we remand for additional discovery. We further direct the district court to appoint counsel for Jones.

I. BACKGROUND

Our summary of the facts reflects two important principles. First, as this is an appeal from summary judgment, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to Jones, the nonmoving party. Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir.2002) (en banc). Second because Jones is pro se, we must consider as evidence in his opposition to summary judgment all of Jones's contentions offered in motions and pleadings, where such contentions are based on personal knowledge and set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence, and where Jones attested under penalty of perjury that the contents of the motions or pleadings are true and correct. McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 197 (9th Cir.1987) (verified pleadings admissible to oppose summary judgment); Johnson v. Meltzer, 134 F.3d 1393, 1399-1400 (9th Cir.1998) (verified motions admissible to oppose summary judgment); Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 n. 10 (9th Cir.1995) (pleading counts as "verified" if the drafter states under penalty of perjury that the contents are true and correct).

At issue in this case is whether Jones's constitutional rights were violated while he was civilly detained in the Sacramento County Jail under California's Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA), Cal. Welf. & Inst.Code § 6600 et seq. The SVPA authorizes the state to seek the involuntary commitment of any person who has been convicted of certain enumerated violent sex offenses against at least two victims and who has a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a dangerous likely recidivist. Id. §§ 6600(a)(1), 6601(a)(1). When an individual in state custody is identified by the Director of Corrections as a candidate for commitment under the SVPA, the state may continue to hold him for 45 days beyond his scheduled release date for an evaluation by the state Department of Mental Health. Id. §§ 6601(c)-(i); 6601.3. If a judge determines there is probable cause to believe the individual is likely to commit sexually violent offenses upon release, the judge must order a trial to determine whether the individual is a sexually violent predator as defined in the act. Id. § 6602(a). The individual is to "remain in custody in a secure facility" until the completion of the trial. Id. If the court (or jury, upon request, id. § 6603(a)) concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual is a sexually violent predator, the individual is to be civilly committed for two years "for appropriate treatment and confinement in a secure facility." Id. § 6604.

Though the SVPA does not specify any particular type of "secure facility" in which detainees under the law are to be held, state law provides that individuals who are held under civil process must be "confined separately and distinctly" from individuals awaiting criminal trials and from individuals held under criminal sentence. Cal.Penal Code § 4001; see also id. § 4002(a)("Persons committed on criminal process and detained for trial, persons convicted and under sentence, and persons committed on civil process, shall not be kept or put in the same room."). In 2001, the California legislature added the following provision: "Inmates who are held pending civil process under the sexually violent predator laws shall be held in administrative segregation. For purposes of this subdivision, administrative segregation means separate and secure housing that does not involve any deprivation of privileges other than what is necessary to protect the inmates and staff." Id. § 4002(b).

In June 1997, Jones was incarcerated at the Susanville State Prison for a parole violation. On December 3, 1997, shortly before the conclusion of Jones's six-month sentence, he was transferred to the Sacramento County Jail to await a hearing on a petition for commitment as a sexually violent predator; the following day, the court ordered Jones detained at that facility under the SVPA. Although the SVPA requires a probable cause hearing within 55 days, see Cal. Welf. & Inst.Code §§ 6601.3, 6601.5, it was not until September 16, 1998, that the state superior court found probable cause to continue to hold Jones for SVPA commitment proceedings. On December 13, 1999, at the conclusion of Jones's trial by jury, he was found to be a sexually violent predator. Jones was committed to Atascadero State Hospital on January 4, 2000.

In total, Jones was incarcerated at the Sacramento County Jail from December 3, 1997, to January 4, 2000, a period of over two years. For roughly the first year of his time at the County Jail — from December 3, 1997, to December 9, 1998 — Jones was housed with the general criminal population of the Jail. For Jones's remaining time at the Sacramento County Jail — from December 9, 1998, to January 4, 2000he was housed in an administrative segregation unit known as "T-Sep." According to the declaration of a sheriff's deputy, this is not a disciplinary housing unit. However, in T-Sep Jones was subject to far more restrictive conditions than those afforded to the general jail population. Jones's recreational activities were completely taken away, and he was allowed only one hour of exercise every other day. Phone calls and visiting privileges were considerably more limited in T-Sep. The time Jones was allowed out of his cell was reduced more than tenfold. Jones was denied access to religious services. Jones's law library access was considerably curtailed: while in T-Sep, Jones was denied physical access to the law library; he could request, by citation only, copies of cases no more than twenty pages long.

Throughout his time at the Sacramento County Jail, Jones was subjected to numerous strip searches, some of which were conducted outdoors, and many of which were conducted at gunpoint in the middle of the night and accompanied by various intimidating tactics including poking with large weapons. On at least three occasions, Jones was led to the outside recreation area; forced at gunpoint to remove all clothing within the sight of many deputies (including female deputies); forced to lift his penis and testicles for inspection, run his fingers through his hair, then run his fingers inside his mouth; and forced to bend over, spread his buttocks apart with his hands, and cough three times.

On December 29, 2000, Jones brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Sheriff Lou Blanas and the County of Sacramento for damages based on violations of his constitutional rights during the twenty-five-month period he was confined awaiting adjudication and eventually commitment under the SVPA.1 On appeal, Jones claims that Blanas and the County violated his rights to free exercise of religion, access to the courts, freedom from unreasonable searches, and substantive due process as to conditions of confinement. Jones also claims that the district court abused its discretion in preventing adequate discovery.

On July 6, 2001, the magistrate judge ordered a four-month discovery period, with written discovery requests due sixty days before the end of the discovery period. Some of Jones's discovery requests were timely; some were filed several weeks after the deadline. On October 24, 2001, Jones moved the court for a thirty-day extension of discovery, because mail service had been discontinued at Atascadero due to the events of September 11, 2001, and because of disagreements with the defendants over discovery. Stating that Jones had failed to show good cause for an extension, the court denied the motion.

Blanas and the County soon thereafter moved for summary judgment. Jones responded first with a cross-motion for summary judgment, and then with a motion to stay defendant's summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f). Jones also moved to compel responses to his discovery requests; the court once again found no good cause to extend discovery and denied Jones's motion.

The magistrate judge then denied Jones's Rule 56(f) motion and issued Findings and Recommendations (which the district court judge later adopted in full as his opinion). One of the magistrate judge's recommendations was that the court grant summary judgment to defendants on Jones's free exercise claim, because Jones had not explained how his inability to participate in religious services inhibited his practice of religion. In Jones's Objections to the Findings, he attempted to expand his record by including a statement discussing the importance of religious services to his Christian...

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