Com. v. Crowley

• Decision Date: 28 November 1984
• Citation: 393 Mass. 393,471 N.E.2d 353
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. James CROWLEY.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 353

471 N.E.2d 353

393 Mass. 393

COMMONWEALTH v. James CROWLEY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,

Hampden.

Argued Sept. 10, 1984.

Decided Nov. 28, 1984.

Maureen B. Brodoff, Boston, for defendant.

William W. Teahan, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., for the Commonwealth.

Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and LIACOS, NOLAN, LYNCH and O'CONNOR, JJ.

LYNCH, Justice.

The defendant appeals from his conviction of assault with intent to commit rape. He challenges the finding of the Superior Court judge that he was competent to stand trial. He argues that under G.L. c. 123, § 15(d ), the judge improperly imposed the burden of disproving competency on the defendant and then applied an unconstitutional standard in finding him competent. He also contends that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of competency. He argues further that the judge erred in failing to inquire into the defendant's competency after the competency hearing and during trial when defense counsel asserted that the defendant was unable to communicate rationally. The defendant also challenges the judge's exclusion of certain questions addressed by defense counsel to the sole witness at the trial.

We conclude that in light of the slim evidence of competency at the hearing, and the uncertainty as to where the judge placed the burden of proof, a new trial is required if it can be demonstrated that the defendant is now competent to stand trial.

The defendant was indicted on May 12, 1982, for assault with intent to commit rape. He pleaded not guilty to the charge on May 28, 1982, and was subsequently examined on several occasions to determine his competency to stand trial. On June 8, 1983, a competency hearing was held during which the judge heard testimony from Harry Michelson, M.D., a board-certified psychiatrist, Sara Eddy, Ed.D., a psychologist, and David P. Hoose, defense counsel. Dr. Michelson testified that the defendant was incompetent to stand trial. Dr. Eddy concluded that the defendant was competent to stand trial. Mr. Hoose testified as to the defendant's inability to communicate effectively with counsel. Based on this testimony, the judge found the defendant competent to stand trial. The following day, June 9, 1983, the defendant was tried and convicted of assault with intent to commit rape. He was sentenced to serve from four and one-half to ten years at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole, and is presently serving his sentence at Bridgewater State Hospital.

Prior to the hearing on June 8, 1983, the defendant was examined on numerous occasions pursuant to G.L. c. 123, § 15, to determine his competency to stand trial and his criminal responsibility. Dr. Michelson filed a report dated July 19, 1982, in which he concluded that the defendant was incompetent to stand trial. On the morning of the hearing, Dr. Michelson conducted another competency examination and he again found the defendant incompetent to stand trial. Pursuant to court order, Dr. Sara Eddy also conducted several examinations for competency and criminal responsibility. Dr. Eddy submitted reports dated August 31, 1982, December 2, 1982, and May 18, 1983, in which she concluded that the defendant was competent to stand trial.

The competency hearing was held on June 8, 1983. At its commencement, the Commonwealth stated that "[defense counsel] would agree the burden is on the defendant," to which defense counsel responded, "I don't quarrel with that...." The defense then called the first witness, Dr. Michelson, who testified that the defendant was incompetent to stand trial. After Dr. Michelson's testimony concluded, the parties agreed that the Commonwealth would call its witness, Dr. Eddy, as the second witness. The judge allowed the Commonwealth to call Dr. Eddy "out of turn," because defense counsel's second witness, Mr. Hoose, was not in the courtroom. In order to save time, Dr. Eddy testified prior to Mr. Hoose, who was the third and final witness at the hearing. Mr. Hoose testified that the defendant was unable to communicate with him in any meaningful way or to assist in the preparation of his defense.

Doctors Michelson and Eddy agreed that the defendant suffered from a form of psychosis known as chronic paranoid schizophrenia. At the time of the hearing and trial, he was on medication administered to control the psychosis. Dr. Michelson concluded, based on his examinations on July 14, 1982, and on the day of the competency hearing, that the defendant was incompetent to stand trial because his psychotic manifestations were so pronounced that he was unable to have a rational understanding of the charges against him, to discuss his predicament with or otherwise assist defense counsel, or to pay attention to the proceedings. He stated that the defendant suffered from delusions, including the belief that he is a genius, that the police are trying to get him to "the court of lords," that he has a record of 2,000 knockouts in boxing, and that he is "St. James and a virgin because this is God's will."

Dr. Michelson did find that the defendant understood that he was in court to establish his competency and that he understood the functions of the judge, district attorney, witnesses, and lawyers in a criminal proceeding. Dr. Michelson found, though, that the defendant was unable to focus his attention on matters discussed with him and became incoherent, bizarre, and paranoid as time went on. He concluded that even if one were to spend more time with the defendant, it is doubtful that he would be able to focus his attention to any greater degree. Dr. Michelson's finding of incompetency was grounded largely in his conclusion that the defendant was unable to assist his counsel in preparing a defense.

Dr. Eddy met with the defendant six or seven times prior to the hearing and evaluated him for competency three times between August, 1982, and May, 1983, at Bridgewater State Hospital. She testified that he displayed many of the classic symptoms of chronic paranoid schizophrenia, including distortion of perception, delusional thinking, and ideas of persecution. The defendant had exhibited symptoms of the disease for about twenty years. He was hospitalized at Bridgewater State Hospital between 1965 and 1969 and again in 1980, and had multiple admissions to Northhampton State Hospital dating back to 1964.

Dr. Eddy reported that she was able to discuss the case with him only in a very limited fashion and only after seeing him on a number of occasions. The defendant had a difficult time discussing the charges against him because he feared that if he said the words of the charge, he would incriminate himself. Dr. Eddy, therefore, devised a creative technique from which she was able to conclude that he had an accurate and rational understanding of the charges: she prepared a list of possible charges and asked the defendant to point to the one with which he was charged and to rank the charges in order of seriousness. The defendant was willing to perform these tasks, but refused to circle the crime with which he was charged or to speak about it.

Like Dr. Michelson, Dr. Eddy was able to elicit through conversations that the defendant had a general understanding of the judicial process and the roles of the various participants in that process. Dr. Eddy testified, however, that the question of the defendant's ability to consult with his lawyer was "the most difficult issue in the matter of Mr. Crowley's competence." She explained that "it's my opinion that Mr. Crowley does have the capacity to cooperate with counsel and [sic ] in a meaningful way in the preparation of a defense. However, I think that the task for counsel is an extremely difficult one. Mr. Crowley is very frightened of being incriminated and very frightened of talking about the incident for fear that [he] would incriminate himself, and I think that cooperation in a meaningful sense depends a great deal on the patience and ability to structure the interview. I can't underestimate how difficult this is. I don't wish to underestimate its difficulty. Mr. Crowley is easily agitated. He can become tangential. He becomes quite anxious, but I did find it was possible in a preliminary way to discuss matters of his case with him."

Dr. Eddy conducted a brief examination of the defendant on the day of the hearing and concluded that his mental status was essentially unchanged. He was oriented and understood the nature of the proceedings, but was somewhat more agitated, restless, and suspicious than he had been at Bridgewater. He was at times quite tangential and continued to have delusions. Even though he was medicated, the defendant still showed "symptoms of a serious and chronic mental illness." Dr. Eddy thought that his mental illness was somewhat exacerbated by being out of the structural setting of Bridgewater and confined in jail. Dr. Eddy concluded her direct testimony by opining that the defendant remained competent to stand trial with the qualification that "I must say that he was--he had more difficulty cooperating today than he had three weeks ago...."

David Hoose, the defendant's attorney, also testified at the competency hearing. He had met with the defendant on several occasions between May, 1982, and June, 1983, and described his attempts to communicate with the defendant. Mr. Hoose stated that he had great difficulty in discussing the case with the defendant and concluded that his meetings with the defendant had not enabled him to prepare a defense "in any significant meaning of that term." On cross-examination, Mr. Hoose testified that the defendant's denial of his guilt coupled with his refusal to talk in any substance about the allegations was unusual in the sense that, when the usual defendant denies having committed a crime, "we can go on to discuss whether there's an alibi or the likelihood of jurors or a judge believing the accusor's testimony. We have never gotten to that level...