Doe v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 03-15321.
| Citation | 394 F.3d 891 |
| Decision Date | 22 December 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 03-15321.,03-15321. |
| Parties | Jane DOE, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee, v. CELEBRITY CRUISES, INC., in personam, Zenith Shipping Corporation, in personam, Apollo Ship Chandlers, Inc., in personam, Celebrity Catering Services Partnership, in personam, Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants, Baris Aydin, in personam, M/V ZENITH, her engines, boilers, tackle, etc., in rem, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit) |
Richard M. Ziccardi, Stephen Skoufalos, Manuel R. Llorca, Skoufalos, Llorca & Ziccardi, Stamford, CT, Gerhardt A. Schrieber, Schreier Rodon-Alvarez, P.A., Miami FL, Manuel Antonio Molina, Skoufalos, Llorca & Ziccardi, LLP, New York City, for Doe.
Jeffrey Bradford Maltzman, Darren Wayne Friedman, Kaye, Ros & Maltzman, LLP, Miami, FL, Ralph Oliver Anderson, Ralph O. Anderson, P.A., Davie, FL, for Appellees.
Michael Duke Eriksen, Romano, Eriksen & Cronin, West Palm Beach, FL, for Amici Curiae.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.
Before HULL and MARCUS, Circuit Judges, and MILLS,* District Judge.
This appeal presents the question of what standard of care governs when a cruise line's crew member sexually batters a passenger. In a pre-trial ruling, the district court determined that a cruise line, as a common carrier, owes a duty of protection and safe transport to its passengers, and thus is strictly liable for crew member assaults on passengers. The jury trial focused on whether the plaintiff consented or was sexually battered by the crew member.
After the verdict and entry of judgment for the plaintiff, the district court sua sponte raised an entirely new issue regarding which of the four defendants actually employed the errant crew member and whether that employer was a common carrier. Soon thereafter, the district court granted a Rule 50(b) judgment as a matter of law to all defendants, concluding that the plaintiff failed to prove any single defendant was both a common carrier and the employer of the crew member and therefore that no defendant was liable for the crew member's assault.
After review and oral argument, we reverse the Rule 50(b) entry of judgment for the defendants because the district court lacked authority to enter judgment under Rule 50(b) on a new ground not raised by any party prior to submission of the case to the jury. We also reinstate and affirm the jury's verdict for the plaintiff because we conclude that under federal maritime law, a cruise line is strictly liable for crew member assaults on passengers during the cruise.
On July 17, 1999, Plaintiff Jane Doe, as a passenger on the cruise ship M/V ZENITH, embarked on a one-week round-trip cruise from New York City to Bermuda. During the cruise, Doe reported to the cruise line's medical staff that Baris Aydin, a crew member and Doe's dinner waiter, raped her. The medical staff treated Doe, and the cruise line flew her home from Bermuda on July 21, 1999.
On July 14, 2000, Doe filed a nine-count complaint against defendants Celebrity Cruises, Inc., Zenith Shipping Corporation, Apollo Ship Chandlers, and against the M/V ZENITH, her engines, boilers, tackle, etc., in rem.1
Based on Aydin's rape of Doe, the complaint alleged one count each of sexual assault, sexual battery, and negligence, two counts of breach of the contract of carriage, two counts of intentional infliction of emotional distress, and two counts of negligent infliction of emotional distress.2
The defendants collectively moved to dismiss the complaint, contending that they are not liable for Aydin's intentional misconduct. Defendants argued that they are liable (1) only for their own breach of reasonable care under the circumstances and (2) only for their employees' intentional conduct while acting within the scope of their employment and in furtherance of the defendants' business purposes.
Denying defendants' motion in part, the district court ruled that a cruise line, as a common carrier, is strictly liable for crew member assaults on passengers. The district court dismissed without prejudice parts of Doe's complaint and allowed Doe to amend her complaint to allege vicarious or strict liability causes of action.3
Doe amended her complaint three times. Those amendments (1) added Celebrity Catering Services Partnership as a defendant, (2) alleged more specific facts on two theories of negligence, and (3) added four vicarious or strict liability counts. The third amended complaint alleged five causes of action against all four defendants: (1) several theories of negligence; (2) vicarious or strict liability for Aydin's sexual assault of Doe; (3) vicarious or strict liability for Aydin's battery of Doe; (4) vicarious or strict liability for Aydin's intentional infliction of emotional distress against Doe; and (5) vicarious or strict liability for Aydin's negligent infliction of emotional distress upon Doe.
In each strict liability count, Doe alleged that all defendants "are responsible and/or are strictly liable for the acts of their respective employees, servants and/or agents, including defendant Aydin," as follows:
As a crew member of the M/V ZENITH, Aydin owed a duty to protect and care for the plaintiff's safety. He, instead, deliberately, knowingly and intentionally breached this duty by sexually assaulting, raping and/or battering the plaintiff.... Defendants Celebrity, ZSC, M/V ZENITH, Apollo and/or Celebrity Catering are responsible for and/or are strictly or vicariously liable for the acts of their respective employees, servants and/or agents, including defendant Aydin.
After the ruling on the defendants' motion to dismiss and the filing of the third amended complaint, the parties litigated the case as a tort case.
On October 18, 2002, the parties entered into a pre-trial stipulation. Notably, they stipulated that "[f]or the purposes of the forthcoming trial, the parties will try only those issues relating to the strict (vicarious) liability standard as articulated and ordered by [the district court] in [its] Order dated February 26, 2001." Specifically the parties' stipulation stated that these issues of fact remained to be litigated:
A. As to the issue of rape, sexual assault and battery, whether or not the Plaintiff consented to the sexual contact with Aydin.
B. As to damages, the precise nature and extent of the damages claimed.
C. The Plaintiff has a cause of action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. The parties disagree whether this cause of action is subsumed within the strict liability count or whether it should be presented separately at trial.
No one raised a legal or fact issue about which of the four defendants employed Aydin or about whether Aydin's employer was a common carrier. Instead, as to the strict liability claim, the defendants chose to litigate only whether Doe consented to the sexual intercourse and the amount of damages.
The case proceeded to trial, and at the close of the plaintiff's evidence, the defendants filed three separate written motions for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, defendants' Rule 50(a) motions argued: (1) that as to Doe's intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, Doe failed to show an independent tort (other than the alleged rape) rising to the level of "outrageousness" required under Florida law; (2) that as to the assault and battery claims, Doe failed to provide sufficient evidence from which a jury could find that Aydin intended to batter or assault Doe; and (3) that as to the strict liability claims, "notwithstanding [the pre-trial] ruling ... that strict liability applies," the "Defendants renew the arguments put forth in their Motion(s) to Dismiss." In other words, the third Rule 50(a) motion renewed their objections to the strict liability standard insofar as it applied to common carriers at all. Again, no defendant ever raised any issue relating to the status of Aydin's employer as a common carrier. The district court granted the defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law on Doe's emotional distress claims, but denied the other two motions.
At the close of all evidence, the defendants orally "renewed all of [their] previously denied directed verdict motions." The district court denied the defendants' Rule 50(a) motions again and submitted Doe's sexual assault and sexual battery claims to the jury.
As to the sexual battery, the district court instructed the jury that the defendants were strictly liable if Doe proved actual sexual penetration and that "that act" was done without her consent, as follows:
Sexual Battery
On Plaintiff's claim for sexual battery, Defendants, CELEBRITY CRUISES, ZENITH SHIPPING CORPORATION, APOLLO SHIP CHANDLERS, INC., and CELEBRITY CATERING SERVICES PARTNERSHIP are strictly liable to Plaintiff for sexual battery if Plaintiff shows, by the greater weight of the evidence, the following:
That Baris Aydin, with his sexual organ, penetrated or had union with the vagina of Plaintiff; and
That act was done without the consent of Plaintiff.
(emphasis added). In contrast, as to the sexual assault, the district court instructed the jury that the defendants were strictly liable if Doe proved Aydin (1) "intended to commit a sexual battery" and that "the attempted act" was done without Doe's consent, or (2) "intended to cause the plaintiff to fear a sexual battery" and that "the attempted act" was done without her consent, as follows:
Sexual Assault
On Plaintiff's claim for sexual assault, Defendants ... are strictly liable for sexual assault if Plaintiff shows, by the greater weight of the evidence, either:
a) That Baris Aydin intended to commit a sexual battery on the person of Plaintiff; and that the attempted act was done...
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