394 U.S. 147 (1969), 42, Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham
|Docket Nº:||No. 42|
|Citation:||394 U.S. 147, 89 S.Ct. 935, 22 L.Ed.2d 162|
|Party Name:||Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham|
|Case Date:||March 10, 1969|
|Court:||United States Supreme Court|
Argued November 18, 1968
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
Petitioner, a Negro minister who helped lead 52 Negroes in an orderly civil rights march in Birmingham, Ala. in 1963, was arrested and convicted for violating § 1159 of the city's General Code, an ordinance which proscribes participating in any parade or procession on city streets or public ways without first obtaining a permit from the City Commission. Section 1159 permits the Commission to refuse a parade permit if its members believe "the public welfare, peace, safety, health, decency, good order, morals or convenience require that it be refused." Petitioner had previously been given to understand by a member of the Commission that under no circumstances would petitioner and his group be allowed to demonstrate in Birmingham. The Alabama Court of Appeals reversed the conviction on the grounds, inter alia, that § 1159, as written, unconstitutionally imposed an "invidious prior restraint" without ascertainable standards for the granting of permits, and that the ordinance had been discriminatorily enforced. However, the Alabama Supreme Court in 1967 narrowly construed § 1159 as an objective, even-handed traffic regulation which did not allow the Commission unlimited discretion in granting or withholding permits, and upheld petitioner's conviction.
1. A law subjecting the right of free expression in publicly owned places to the prior restraint of a license, without narrow, objective, and definite standards is unconstitutional, and a person faced with such a law may ignore it and exercise his First Amendment rights. Pp. 150-151.
2. Picketing and parading may constitute methods of expression entitled to First Amendment protection, and use of the streets for that purpose, though subject to regulation, may not be wholly denied. P. 152.
3. Since the terms of § 1159 gave the Commission unbridled authority to issue or withhold parade permits without reference to legitimate regulation of public streets and sidewalks, the ordinance would be, absent a limiting construction, unconstitutional on its face. Pp. 150-151, 153.
4. The narrow construction that the State Supreme Court placed upon § 1159 in 1967 doe not necessarily validate petitioner's 1963 conviction; the test is whether the ordinance was actually administered
so a not to deny or unwarrantedly abridge the right of assembly and the opportunities for the communication of thought and the discussion of public questions immemorially associated with resort to public places.
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574. Pp. 153-155.
5. Since, in this case, § 1159 was administered in accordance with its impermissibly broad language, so as to "deny or unwarrantedly abridge" the First Amendment right of the petitioner and his organization, the petitioner's conviction may not stand. Cox v. New Hampshire, supra, distinguished. Pp. 155-159.
STEWART, J., lead opinion
MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioner stands convicted for violating an ordinance of Birmingham, Alabama, making it an offense to participate in any "parade or procession or other public demonstration" without first obtaining a permit from the City Commission. The question before us is whether that conviction can be squared with the Constitution of the United States.
On the afternoon of April 12, Good Friday, 1963, 52 people, all Negroes, were led out of a Birmingham church by three Negro ministers, one of whom was the petitioner, Fred L. Shuttlesworth. They walked in orderly fashion, two abreast for the most part, for four
blocks. The purpose of their march was to protest the alleged denial of civil rights to Negroes in the city of Birmingham. The marchers stayed on the sidewalks except at street intersections, and they did not interfere with other pedestrians. No automobiles were obstructed, nor were traffic signals disobeyed. The petitioner was with the group for at least part of this time, walking alongside the others, and once moving from the front to the rear. As the marchers moved along, a crowd of spectators fell in behind them at a distance. The spectators at some points spilled out into the street, but the street was not blocked and vehicles were not obstructed.
At the end of four blocks, the marchers were stopped by the Birmingham police, and were arrested for violating § 1159 of the General Code of Birmingham. That ordinance reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful to organize or hold, or to assist in organizing or holding, or to take part or participate in, any parade or procession or other public [89 S.Ct. 938] demonstration on the streets or other public ways of the city, unless a permit therefor has been secured from the commission.
To secure such permit, written application shall be made to the commission, setting forth the probable number of persons, vehicles and animals which will be engaged in such parade, procession or other public demonstration, the purpose for which it is to be held or had, and the streets or other public ways over, along or in which it is desired to have or hold such parade, procession or other public demonstration. The commission shall grant a written permit for such parade, procession or other public demonstration, prescribing the streets or other public ways which may be used therefor, unless in its judgment the public welfare, peace, safety, health, decency, good order, morals or convenience require that it be
refused. It shall be unlawful to use for such purposes any other streets or public ways than those set out in said permit.
The two preceding paragraphs, however, shall not apply to funeral processions.
The petitioner was convicted for violation of § 1159 and was sentenced to 90 days' imprisonment at hard labor and an additional 48 days at hard labor in default of payment of a $75 fine and $24 costs. The Alabama Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of conviction, holding the evidence was insufficient "to show a procession which would require, under the terms of § 1159, the getting of a permit," that the ordinance had been applied in a discriminatory fashion, and that it was unconstitutional in imposing an "invidious prior restraint" without ascertainable standards for the granting of permits. 43 Ala.App. 68, 180 So.2d 114, 139, 127. The Supreme Court of Alabama, however, giving the language of § 1159 an extraordinarily narrow construction, reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the conviction. 281 Ala. 542, 206 So.2d 348. We granted certiorari to consider the petitioner's constitutional claims. 390 U.S. 1023.
There can be no doubt that the Birmingham ordinance, as it was written, conferred upon the City Commission virtually unbridled and absolute power to prohibit any "parade," "procession,"1 or "demonstration" on the city's streets or public ways. For in deciding whether or not to withhold a permit, the members of the Commission were to be guided only by their own ideas of "public welfare, peace, safety, health, decency, good order, morals or convenience." This ordinance as it was written, therefore, fell squarely within the ambit of the many decisions of this Court over the last 30 years, holding that a law subjecting the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to
the prior restraint of a license, without narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing authority, is unconstitutional.2
It is settled by a long line of recent [89 S.Ct. 939] decisions of this Court that an ordinance which, like this one, makes the peaceful enjoyment of freedoms which the Constitution guarantees contingent upon the uncontrolled will of an official -- as by requiring a permit or license which may be granted or withheld in the discretion of such official -- is an unconstitutional censorship or prior restraint upon the enjoyment of those freedoms.
Staub v. Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 322. And our decisions have made clear that a person faced with such an unconstitutional licensing law may ignore it and engage with impunity in the exercise of the right of free expression for which the law purports to require a license.3
The Constitution can hardly be thought to deny to one subjected to the restraints of such an ordinance the right to attack its constitutionality because he has not yielded to its demands.
It is argued, however, that what was involved here was not "pure speech," but the use of public streets and sidewalks, over which a municipality must rightfully exercise a great deal of control in the interest of traffic regulation and public safety. That, of course, is true. We have emphasized before this that
the First and Fourteenth Amendments [do not] afford the same kind of freedom to those who would communicate ideas by conduct such as patrolling, marching, and picketing on streets and highways, as these amendments afford to those who communicate ideas by pure speech.
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 655. "Governmental authorities have the duty and responsibility to keep their streets open and available for movement." Id. at 554-555.
But our decisions have also made clear that picketing and parading may nonetheless constitute methods of expression, entitled to First Amendment protection. Cox v. Louisiana, supra; Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88.
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they...
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