Scofield v. National Labor Relations Board

• Decision Date: 01 April 1969
• Docket Number: No. 273,273
• Citation: 22 L.Ed.2d 385,394 U.S. 423,89 S.Ct. 1154
• Parties: Russell SCOFIELD et al., Petitioners, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD et al
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

394 U.S. 423

89 S.Ct. 1154

22 L.Ed.2d 385

Russell SCOFIELD et al., Petitioners,

v NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD et al.

No. 273.

Argued Jan. 14, 1969.

Decided April 1, 1969.

James Urdan, Milwaukee, Wis., for petitioners.

Norton J. Come and John Silard, Washington, D.C., for respondents.

Mr. Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

Half the production employees of the Wisconsin Motor Corporation are paid on a piecework or incentive basis. They and the other employees are represented by respondent union, which has had contractual relations with the company since 1937.¹ In 1938 the union initiated a ceiling on the production for which its members would accept immediate piecework pay. This was done at first by gentlemen's agreement among the members, but since 1944 by union rule enforceable by fines and expulsion. As the rule functions now, members may produce as much as they like each day, but may only draw pay up to the ceiling rate. The additional production is 'banked' y the company; that is, wages due for it are retained by the company and paid out to the employee for days on which the production ceiling has not been reached because of machine breakdown or for some other reason. If the member demands to be paid in full each pay period over the ceiling rate the company will comply, but the union assesses a fine of $1 for each violation, and in cases of repeated violation may fine the member up to $100 for 'conduct unbecoming a union member.' Failure to pay the fine may lead to expulsion. As the trial examiner found, the company's complaint is not and cannot be that 'the employee, for the pay he receives, has not given the requisite quid pro quo in production.' 145 N.L.R.B. 1097, 1120. Rather, the question is the extent to which the group will forgo for pay the rest periods it has bargained for, and the discipline which the union may invoke to achieve unity toward this end which, the trial examiner found, was 'manifestly a matter affecting the interest of the group and in which its collective bargaining strength hinges upon the cooperation of its individual components.' Ibid.

The collective bargaining contract between employer and union defines a 'machine rate' of hourly pay guaranteed to the employees. The piecework rate, as defined by the contract, is set at such a level that 'the average competent operator working at a reasonable pace (as determined by a time study) shall earn not less than the machine rate of his assigned task.'² Allowances are made in the time study for setting up machinery, cleaning tools, fatigue, and personal needs. By ignoring these allowances or by speed and efficiency it is possible for an industrious employee to produce faster than the machine rate. If he does so, he is entitled to additional pay. Union members, however, are subject to the banking procedures imposed by the union rule.

The margin between the 'machine' rate set by the contract and the ceiling rate set by the union was 10¢ per hour in 1944. As a result of collective bargaining between company and union over both the machine and ceiling rates, the margin has been increased to between 45¢ and 50¢, depending on the skill level of the job. The company has regularly urged the union to abandon the ceiling and has never agreed to refuse employees immediate pay for work done over the ceiling. However, the parties have bargained over the ceiling rate and the company has extracted from the union promises to increase the ceiling rate. The company opens its work records to the union to permit it to check compliance with the ceiling; pays union stewards for time spent in this checking activity as legitimate union business; and banks money for union members complying with the rule. The ceiling rate is also used in computing piece rate increases and in settling grievances.

This case arose in 1961 when a random card check by the union showed that petitioners, among other union members, had exceeded the ceiling. The union membership imposed fines of $50 to $100, and a year's suspension from the union. Petitioners refused to pay the fines, and the union brought suit in state court to collect the fines as a matter of local contract law.³ Petitioners then initiated charges before the National Labor Relations Board, arguing that union enforcement of its rule through the collection of fines was an unfair labor practice. Petitioners asserted that their right to refrain from 'concerted activities,' National Labor Relations ct, § 7, 49 Stat. 452, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157, was impaired by the union's effort to 'restrain or coerce' them, in violation of NLRA, § 8(b)(1)(A). The trial examiner, after extensive findings, concluded that there was no violation of the Act, and his findings and recommendations were adopted by the Board, 145 N.L.R.B. 1097 (1964), whose order was enforced by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 393 F.2d 49 (1968). We affirm.

I.

We are met at the outset with the contention that the petition for certiorari was untimely filed. In civil suits certiorari must be applied for 'within ninety days after the entry of (the) judgment or decree' of which review is sought. 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c). In this case an opinion of March 5, 1968, concluded that 'upon presentation, an appropriate decree will be entered.' A decree was in fact entered on April 16, 1968. The petition for certiorari was docketed here on July 6, 1968, within 90 days of the decree but not of the opinion.

In our view, the petition for certiorari was timely filed. Petitioners here received a copy of the March 5 opinion, but were given no notice of any entry of judgment on that date, as would be required by Rule 36 of the new Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, effective July 1, 1968. Since no notice was given and it could not have been clear to petitioners whether there was a March 5 judgment or not we hold, without abandoning the standard that a 'judgment for our purposes is final when the issues are adjudged' and settled with finality, Market Street R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 324 U.S. 548, 551—552, 65 S.Ct. 770, 773, 89 L.Ed. 1171 (1945); FTC v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 344 U.S. 206, 212, 73 S.Ct. 245, 249, 97 L.Ed. 245 (1952), that in this case the relevant date is that of the entry of the decree. Cf. Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 6 Wall. 153, 156, 18 L.Ed. 762 (1868).

II.

Section 8(b)(1) makes it an unfair labor practice to 'restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in (§ 7): Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein * * *.'

Based on the legislative history of the section, including its proviso, the Court in NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 195, 87 S.Ct. 2001, 2014, 18 L.Ed.2d 1123 (1967), distinguished between internal and external enforcement of union rules and held that 'Congress did not propose any limitations with respect to the internal affairs of unions, aside from barring enforcement of a union's internal regulations to affect a member's employment status.' A union rule, duly adopted and not the arbitrary fiat of a union officer, forbidding the crossing of a picket line during a strike was therefore enforceable against voluntary union members by expulsion or a reasonable fine. The Court thus essentially accepted the position of the National Labor Relations Board dating from Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 727 (1954) where the Board also distinguished internal from external enforcement ⁴ in holding that a union could fine a member for his failure to take part in picketing during a strike but that the same rule could not be enforced by causing the employer to exclude him from the work force or by affecting his seniority without triggering violations of §§ 8(b)(1), 8(b)(2), 8(a)(1), 8(a) (2), and 8(a)(3). These sec- tions form web, of which § 8(b)(1)(A) is only a strand, preventing the union from inducing the employer to use the emoluments of the job to enforce the union's rules.⁵

This interpretation of § 8(b)(1), as the Court explained in Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S., at 193—195, 87 S.Ct. at 2013—2014, was reinforced by the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959 which, although it dealt with the internal affairs of unions, including the procedures for imposing fines or expulsion, did not purport to overturn or modify the Board's interpretation of § 8(b)(1).⁶ And it was this interpretation which the Board followed in Allis-Chalmers and in the case now before us.

Although the Board's construction of the section emphasizes the sanction imposed, rather than the rule itself, and does not involve the Board in judging the fairness or wisdom of particular union rules, it has become clear that if the rule invades or frustrates an overriding policy of the labor laws the rule may not be enforced, even by fine or expulsion, without violating § 8(b)(1). In both Skura⁷ and Marine Workers,⁸ the Board was concerned with union rules requiring a member to exhaust union remedies before filing an unfair labor practice charge with the Board. That rule, in the Board's view, frustrated the enforcement scheme established by the statute and the union would commit an unfair labor practice by fining or expelling members who violated the rule.

The Marine Workers case came here⁹ and the result reached by the Board was sustained, the Court agreeing that the rule in question was contrary to the plain policy of the Act to keep employees completely free from coercion against making complaints to the Board. Frustrating this policy was beyond the legitimate interest of the labor organization, at least where the member's complaint concerned conduct of the employer as well as the union.

Under this dual approach, § 8(b)(1) leaves a union free to enforce a properly adopted rule which reflects a legitimate union interest, impairs no policy Congress has imbedded in the...