Utah v. United States
| Citation | 394 U.S. 89,22 L.Ed.2d 99,89 S.Ct. 761 |
| Decision Date | 03 March 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. 31,O,31 |
| Parties | UTAH v. UNITED STATES. rig |
| Court | United States Supreme Court |
Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen. of Utah, Robert B. Hansen, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Dallin W. Jensen, Asst. Atty. Gen., for plaintiff.
Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Martz, Louis F. Claiborne, David R. Warner and Martin Green, for the United States.
L. M. McBride, Frank A. Wollaeger, Myer Feldman and Martin Jacobs, for Morton International, Inc.
George E. Boss, Raymond T. Senior, Claron C. Spencer and Robert D. Larsen, for Great Salt Lake Minerals & Chemicals Corp.
We are called upon to deal with exceptions filed by Morton International, Inc., which protests the decision by our Special Master, Senior Circuit Judge J. Cullen Ganey, denying it leave to intervene as a party defendant in this original action. While we affirm the Master's decision, we do so for reasons which are somewhat different from those advanced in the Master's Report. Consequently, it will be necessary to describe the nature of the underlying controversy before the basis for our disposition of this matter will become clear.
This case arises out of a long-standing dispute between the United States and Utah over the ownership of the Great Salt Lake. The importance and difficulty of the controversy is magnified by the fact that, over the course of years, the lake has proceeded to shrink in size, laying bare some 600,000 acres of land which had formerly been a part of the lakebed (the so-called 'relicted' lands). In 1966, Congress moved to resolve the controversy by passing a special Act, 80 Stat. 192, as amended, 80 Stat. 349, which both authorized the Secretary of the Interior to issue a quitclaim deed to the State for the entire federal interest in the lake properties and provided a mechanism by which the fair value of the federal interest could be ascertained. In consideration of the Secretary's deed, Utah was obliged either to pay the Federal Government an amount fixed by the Secretary or bring a lawsuit in this Court so that the extent of the federal claim could be judicially determined.
Utah and the United States, however, are not alone in advancing claims to the still submerged and non-relicted portions of the lake. Morton also claims part of the property, and seeks to intervene to quiet its title. Our Special Master's Report carefully sets out the nature of the competing claims of the two sovereigns and the private landlord:
'1. The State of Utah claims that on January 4, 1896, the date it was admitted to the Union, the Great Salt Lake was a navigable body of water. On the basis of this fact and the 'equal footing doctrine,' it asserts that it is the owner of the Lake's bed as delineated and determined by the official surveyed meander line and that the land (some 600,000 acres) left exposed by the recession of the Lake between the water's edge and the meander line, known as 'public domain reliction,' is part of that bed. * * *
'2. The United States claims, excluding those exposed lands lakeward from the upland1 transferred to patentees, title to a substantial portion (some 325,574 acres) of the exposed lands (known as 'public domain reliction' lands) claimed by Utah as part of the Lake's bed. The basis for this claim is that it was the original owner of the uplands and for that reason it is entitled to the exposed lands under the common-law doctrine of reliction.2
'3. Private vendees or paten ees of the Lake's uplands whose interest can be traced to the United States claim all the land lakeward fronting such uplands. Their claims do not stop at the water's edge but continue to the thread of the Lake. They contend that the patents impliedly passed title to the relicted land to the owner of the adjoining uplands. The combined area of the exposed land claimed by this group amounts to approximately 275,000 acres. Morton is a good example of one of this group.
Master's Report 6—8.
The Special Master found that the claim raised by Morton and the claims raised in the 'main action have a question of law or fact in common' and that, consequently, 'a district judge would exercise his discretion and permit (Morton) to intervene in the action.' Report 39. The Special Master, however, refused to take this step only because he found that the State of Utah had not waived its sovereign immunity as to Morton's suit.
Upon careful consideration, we do not find it necessary to reach the ground adopted in the Report. For we have concluded that a Stipulation entered into between the United States and Utah, which was presented to the Master, has so limited the issues before this Court that the presence of Morton and similar property owners is neither necessary nor appropriate. Hence, in the exercise of our discretion, we find that the interests of justice and sound judicial administration will best be served if Morton's motion is denied.
The entry of the Stipulation significantly changes the nature of the problem before us. If the Stipulation had never been filed, it is clear that Utah could have attempted to defeat the federal claim to the Basart lands by proving that private landlords like Morton had the best title to them. In such a situation, Morton's right to intervene would have had a substantial basis. For if Utah sought to invoke Morton's title to avoid payment to the United States, it would seem fairest to permit Morton to speak for itself. The Stipulation makes it clear, however, that Utah will not attempt to defeat the United States' claim to the Basart lands by proving that the private landowners have the best title to this acreage. In other words, if Utah does not prove that it owns the lake properties, it has agreed to pay the United States regardless of the other clouds on the federal claim.
On its side, the United States has also taken steps to remove the Basart question from this lawsuit by means of the Stipulation. It has agreed that it will not demand payment for its Basart claims, if the Court finds that its claims to the other disputed acreage have no merit. Consequently, it will be unnecessary to consider whether the United States or the private landowners have title to the Basart lands in order to determine whether the State must pay fair value to the United States in consideration for the Secretary's quitclaim deed. Thus, if the Stipulation is...
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