Maine Cent. R. Co. v. Bangor & Aroostook R. Co.

• Decision Date: 04 December 1978
• Citation: 395 A.2d 1107
• Parties: MAINE CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY v. BANGOR & AROOSTOOK RAILROAD COMPANY and Whittaker Corporation.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 1107

395 A.2d 1107

MAINE CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY v. BANGOR & AROOSTOOK RAILROAD COMPANY and Whittaker Corporation.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Dec. 4, 1978.

Pierce, Atwood, Scribner, Allen, Smith & Lancaster by Jotham D. Pierce, Jr. (orally), Ralph I. Lancaster, Jr., George J. Marcus, Portland, for plaintiff.

Verrill & Dana by John A. Mitchell (orally), John R. McKernan, Jr., Portland, for Bangor & Aroostook R.

Hewes, Culley & Feehan by George W. Beals (orally), Peter W. Culley, Portland, for Whittaker Corp.

Before POMEROY, WERNICK, ARCHIBALD, GODFREY and NICHOLS, JJ.

POMEROY, Justice.

This controversy results from a railroad derailment that occurred at Clinton, Maine, on October 20, 1971. The derailment took place after some twenty freight cars belonging to the Bangor & Aroostook Railroad (BAR) had been interchanged to a train belonging to Maine Central Railroad (MEC) and operated by MEC on its tracks. Maine Central alleges that the derailment occurred because BAR had modified several of its cars on an experimental basis. The modification, it is alleged, caused the center sills running lengthwise on BAR # 3121 to break and drop into the roadbed, derailing BAR # 3121 and the following thirty cars in the Maine Central train.

The matter is before us as a result of an appeal from the Superior Court's denial of an application for confirmation of an arbitration award pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. § 5937. We sustain the appeal.

Maine Central, after making good the damages sustained in the derailment to cars owned by other railroads, instituted an action against BAR and Whittaker Corporation, the successor in interest to the manufacturer of the allegedly defective car.

Both BAR and MEC are members of the Association of American Railroads (AAR), and each had become a signatory in 1920 to an Interchange Agreement promulgated by the forerunner of the AAR. This Agreement stated, Inter alia, that the signatories agreed to abide by "Each and all decisions and interpretations of the Arbitration Committee."

Prior to the commencement of the action by MEC, BAR sought to institute arbitration proceedings in accordance, BAR alleges, with AAR rules. MEC refused to submit to arbitration. Accordingly, an Ex parte arbitration award was granted on March 29, 1972, stating that MEC was initially responsible, under the Association's Interchange Rules, for the damage sustained by BAR's cars in the derailment. MEC refused to abide by this award, and BAR sought confirmation of it under 9 U.S.C. § 9 ¹ in the District Court of the District of Columbia in December of 1972. The award was made by the AAR Arbitration Committee sitting in Washington, D.C. The Court found, however, that § 9 did not vest independent jurisdiction in a federal district court, and that no other basis for asserting jurisdiction existed. The action was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Bangor & Aroostook Railroad Company v. Maine Central Railroad Company, 359 F.Supp. 261, 264 (D.C.D.C.1973).

This action was commenced by the filing of a complaint by Maine Central in the Superior Court, Cumberland County on January 26, 1973. On May 31, 1973, BAR filed an application for confirmation of its award pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. § 5937 ² and 9 U.S.C. § 9. That application was heard on November 12, 1976 and denied by Order dated December 15, 1976. This appeal, premised on 14 M.R.S.A. § 5945, ³ followed.

This appeal presents two major issues for our consideration. Initially we are presented with a motion to dismiss the appeal by appellee Maine Central, premised on its contention that the order appealed from is non-appealable under Rule 54(b), M.R.Civ.P., ⁴ and that, wholly apart from Rule

54(b), the appeal is premature because it leaves many issues yet unresolved. The second issue, broadly stated, is whether the arbitration award should have been confirmed, or whether grounds existed for refusing such confirmation. We will consider each of these in turn.

MOTION TO DISMISS

I.

As a general rule, an appeal to this Court properly lies only after a final judgment, decree, or order. Hazzard v. Westview Golf Club, Inc., Me., 217 A.2d 217, 222 (1966); Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Bodwell Granite Co., 102 Me. 148, 152, 66 A. 314, 316 (1906). ⁵

Beyond those exceptions enumerated by our Rules, our statutes create

"numerous exceptions to the final judgment rule, which our Court has long recognized in those instances in which the peculiar character of the question involved hardly admits of postponement, if any benefit is to be derived from it by the aggrieved party." Northeast Investment Co., Inc. v. Leisure Living Communities, Inc., Me., 351 A.2d 845, 848 (1976).

Under the present state of our law, therefore, the Court will decline to review a case before it "Unless the appeal is from a 'final judgment,' Except when otherwise specifically authorized." Id. (emphasis supplied).

This Court has found such specifically authorized exceptions in many contexts. See cases cited in Northeast Investment Co., Inc., supra at 848-49. See also, Boyle v. Share, Me., 377 A.2d 458 (1977); Milstar Mfg. Corp. v. Waterville Urb. Renewal Authority, Me., 351 A.2d 538 (1976); Cf. Summit Realty, Inc. v. Gipe, Me., 315 A.2d 428 (1974).

Title 4, § 54 of our statutes expressly allows review of interlocutory orders or rulings by reporting the same to the Law Court when, in the opinion of the presiding Justice, they present questions of law so important as to require review before any further proceedings are had in the action. As we noted in Northeast Investment, however, the statute was not designed to provide an exclusive avenue for such appeals, but merely to add to existing exceptions. 351 A.2d at 848.

In 1967, our Legislature adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act, 14 M.R.S.A. § 5927, Et seq. (hereinafter U.A.A.). The Act provides for application to the Superior Court by a party to a valid arbitration agreement to confirm, deny, modify or vacate an arbitration award. 14 M.R.S.A. § 5937. Section 5945 of the Act provides further that:

1. An appeal may be taken from:

C. An order confirming or denying confirmation of an award;

2. The appeal shall be taken in the manner and to the same extent as from orders or judgments in a civil action.

Appellee MEC ⁶ argues that subsection 2 of this provision implicitly incorporates We do not accept that conclusion.

the "final judgment" policies of this Court, and precludes our consideration of this appeal inasmuch as the denial of confirmation does not constitute a final judgment under Hazzard, supra, and similar precedents.

Section 5945(2), as we interpret it, warrants application of constitutional, statutory and prudential rules and policies relative to the appealability of orders or judgments. Among those, as noted above, is our willingness, absent countervailing considerations, to entertain appeals from orders otherwise not sufficiently final where the Legislature has enacted a specific statutory authorization for such an appeal. ⁷

The highest courts of Maryland, Nevada, Arizona and Massachusetts, for example, have by Obiter dictum interpreted the U.A.A. appeals section to create an immediate appeal right, irrespective of the interlocutory nature of the decree. See Maietta v. Greenfield, 267 Md. 287, 297 A.2d 244 (1972); United Association of Journeymen & Apprentices of Plumbing v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 82 Nev. 103, 412 P.2d 352 (1966); Roeder v. Huish, 105 Ariz. 508, 467 P.2d 902 (1970); School Committee of Agawam v. Agawam Education Association, Mass., 359 N.E.2d 956, Mass.Adv.Sh. (1977) 227, and cases cited therein at notes 5 and 6.

In State v. Pearson, Fla., 154 So.2d 833 (1963), the Court held a confirmation order immediately appealable under the U.A.A., though not a final judgment, despite a Florida statute purporting to restrict appeals to final judgments, subject to only three inapplicable exceptions.

A similar result obtains in this state. The existence of recognized exceptions to the final judgment rule does not preclude the recognition of additional ones, particularly where, unlike Florida, we have no single statute purporting to encompass all such exceptions and where our final judgment rule is judicially rather than legislatively created.

The clarity of language of § 5945(1)(c) cannot be gainsaid. In our view, it evidences a legislative intention to create an exception to the final judgment rule allowing immediate appeal of such interlocutory orders. As discussed Infra, we find no procedural rule or other impediment which might preclude us from giving full effect to this intention. See M.R.Civ.P., Rule 54(b).

II. COHEN ISSUE

As stated earlier, one of the exceptions to the final judgment rule which we have recognized was announced by this Court in Northeast Investment Company, Inc. v. Leisure Living Communities, Inc., Me., 351 A.2d 845 (1976), in which we heard an appeal from an order confirming an attachment of real estate.

In Northeast Investment we adopted the test of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation, 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949) providing for immediate appeal of interlocutory orders within that

Small class which finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated. 351 A.2d at 851.

In Northeast Investment, however, we were considering the test for review of interlocutory orders in the absence of a statutory grant of appeal. Orders granting or denying attachments were not specifically made appealable by statute, and it was necessary to consider under what circumstances such appeals would be heard. The circumstances here are quite different; the explicit grant of § 5945(1)(c) makes unnecessary

a consideration of whether the instant order would otherwise be appealable by virtue...