Jones v. United States

Decision Date28 November 1978
Docket NumberNo. 11918.,11918.
Citation396 A.2d 183
PartiesMichael A. JONES, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
CourtD.C. Court of Appeals

Silas J. Wasserstrom, Public Defender Service, Washington, D. C., with whom Alan F. Greenwald, Public Defender Service, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellant.

Joel S. Perwin, Asst. U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., with whom Earl J. Silbert, U. S. Atty., and John A. Terry, Asst. U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellee.

Before KELLY, MACK and FERREN, Associate Judges.

FERREN, Associate Judge:

The trial court found appellant Michael Jones not guilty of petit larceny by reason of insanity. After a "release hearing," D.C.Code 1973, § 24-301(d), the court committed Mr. Jones indefinitely to St. Elizabeths Hospital. This case presents one question: whether Michael Jones is constitutionally entitled to release from St. Elizabeths upon expiration of the maximum period for which he could have been imprisoned (in this case one year), unless the government carries the burden of proving, at a civil commitment hearing, D.C.Code 1973, § 21-545(b), that Mr. Jones is still mentally ill and dangerous to self or others.

Appellant does not challenge the validity of his initial commitment to St. Elizabeths after the "release hearing." On the assumption, therefore, that this commitment was lawful, we can perceive no constitutional requirement that appellant be released or civilly committed at the end of the maximum imprisonment period, for that period bears no relationship to the unchallenged basis for appellant's hospital confinement: that he is mentally ill, is dangerous to self or others, and should receive treatment until he is well enough for release. We therefore affirm the denial of appellant's motion for civil commitment or release.

I.

On September 19, 1975, the police arrested Michael Jones for attempting to steal a coat from a department store. The next day the government charged him with attempted petit larceny; and, following a competency examination yielding a finding of mental illness, he was arraigned and ordered to St. Elizabeths for mental observation pursuant to D.C.Code 1973, § 24-301(a). He remained in the District of Columbia jail for four and one-half months until bed space became available at St. Elizabeths on February 4, 1976.

Following the observation period, appellant went to trial on stipulated facts. In an uncontested proceeding, the trial judge entered a judgment of not guilty by reason of insanity. Thereafter, he recommitted appellant to St. Elizabeths temporarily, pursuant to D.C.Code 1973, § 24-301(d)(1). On May 25, 1976, appellant was afforded his § 24-301(d)(2) "release hearing," at which the court determined that he was mentally ill and likely to be dangerous to himself or others in the reasonable future. The court accordingly continued his commitment to St. Elizabeths — indefinitely.

At this juncture the procedural history of the case becomes murky. Apparently, upon conclusion of the May 25 proceeding, the court ordered a further hearing for November 29, 1976. When that date arrived appellant's counsel appeared before Judge Hamilton and orally requested that appellant be released — or civilly committed — since his cumulative hospital confinement had exceeded the one-year maximum period of incarceration for attempted petit larceny. No attorney appeared for the government. The judge responded with an order that the government either pursue civil commitment or show cause why the "criminal commitment" should not be vacated by January 18, 1977.

During the seven-week period which followed, it appears that the government initiated the civil commitment process — resulting in a recommendation of such commitment by the staff of St. Elizabeths — and then changed course, deciding to contest the court's order. The government persuaded the court to modify its order by requiring appellant to file a written motion for civil commitment or release, and by allowing the government time to respond.

The matter came on for hearing on February 22, 1977. After extended argument, the court denied appellant's motion and reaffirmed the findings of May 25, i. e., that appellant was mentally ill and likely to be dangerous. Appellant noted an appeal and, on June 14, 1977, filed a motion in this court for summary reversal. The government responded with a motion for summary affirmance. The motions division of this court rejected both requests for summary disposition. Instead, we ordered expedited oral argument on the appeal. After argument before this division of the court, we called for post-argument briefs.

In his final brief, appellant confirms the narrow scope of the question presented in this appeal. "[A]ppellant's position has been, and remains, . . that even if an automatic commitment following an insanity acquittal is permissible, continued confinement beyond a certain point of time — at the latest when the prison sentence which could have been imposed had the defendant been convicted has run — is constitutionally impermissible unless the government can prove the necessity of such continued confinement just as it would have to prove the necessity where it seeks civil commitment" (emphasis in original). Thus we are not confronted with a challenge to the process for initial commitment which ordinarily follows an insanity acquittal. We are faced only with the constitutional propriety of hospitalization beyond the period of a maximum prison term, absent invocation of the protections of the civil commitment process.

II.

According to appellant, the principles of Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 86 S.Ct. 760, 15 L.Ed.2d 620 (1966), Bolton v. Harris, 130 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 395 F.2d 642 (1968), and, more directly, Waite v. Jacobs, 154 U.S.App.D.C. 281, 475 F.2d 392 (1973), mandate a conclusion that the equal protection clause is transgressed when insanity acquitees are held beyond their maximum potential terms of imprisonment without the intervention of civil commitment procedures.1 To comprehend his argument fully, a brief history is in order.

Prior to the circuit court's 1968 Bolton decision, a successful insanity plea resulted in automatic, indeterminate confinement to a mental hospital. Because there was no required judicial review of such confinements, the "statutory scheme would [have] conceivably allow[ed] a patient committed under [D.C.Code 1967, § 24-301(d)] to remain in the hospital for the rest of his life without a judicial determination that he [was] mentally ill or that he [was] still likely to commit dangerous acts." Bolton, supra, 130 U.S.App.D.C. at 7, 395 F.2d at 648. At that time, however, as today, the 1964 Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Act, D.C.Code 1973, §§ 21-541 to -545, provided numerous protections for civilly committed persons — including, significantly, the right to a jury trial with the burden on the government to prove mental illness and dangerousness beyond a reasonable doubt.

In Bolton, therefore, the circuit court explored the "sharp contrast" between the two commitment schemes in light of the Supreme Court's Baxstrom principle "that the commission of criminal acts does not give rise to a presumption of dangerousness which, standing alone, justifies substantial difference in commitment procedures and confinement conditions for the mentally ill." Bolton, supra at 6, 395 F.2d at 647. Concluding that the differences between the two groups, insanity acquitees and civil commitees, could not constitutionally support most of the differences in procedure, the court read most of the 1964 Act's civil commitment safeguards into the "insane criminal" commitment scheme.2 Thereafter, acquitees were entitled to a "Bolton hearing" after trial: "a judicial hearing with procedures substantially similar to those in civil commitment proceedings." Id. at 10, 395 F.2d at 651 (footnote omitted).

In 1970, however, Congress responded to the Bolton decision by amending § 24-301 of the D.C.Code. Dissatisfied with the anticipated consequences of Bolton, Congress attempted to accommodate the acquitee's constitutional rights and provide rehabilitative opportunities while protecting the public against anticipated danger. United States v. Jackson, 179 U.S.App.D.C. 375, 381, 553 F.2d 109, 115 (1976). By the terms of the amended, and currently applicable, § 24-301, an insanity acquitee once again faces automatic commitment:

If any person tried upon an indictment or information for an offense raises the defense of insanity and is acquitted solely on the ground that he was insane at the time of its commission, he shall be committed to a hospital for the mentally ill until such time as he is eligible for release pursuant to this subsection or subsection (e). [D.C.Code 1973, § 24-301(d)(1).] The next paragraph of the statute, however, eliminates the pre-Bolton possibility of indeterminate commitment without judicial review. Congress provided for an automatic, legislatively tailored "release hearing" within 50 days of the § 24-301(d)(1) commitment:

A person confined pursuant to paragraph (1) shall have a hearing unless waived, within 50 days of his confinement to determine whether he is entitled to release from custody . . . If the hearing is not waived, the court shall cause notice of the hearing to be served upon the person, his counsel, and the prosecuting attorney and hold the hearing. Within ten days from the date the hearing was begun, the court shall determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto. [D.C.Code 1973, § 24-301(d)(2), in relevant part.]

Additionally, the 1970 amendments provided for habeas corpus relief, § 24-301(g), as well as for a more specific motion mechanism for seeking release (no more often than every six months), § 24-301(k).

As we have noted, however, the major impetus for legislative action was anxiety about the Bolton...

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  • Benham v. Edwards, Civ. A. No. C80-78R.
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    ...supra, the Court pointed to the prior judicial hearing (the criminal trial) as the relevant distinction. Similarly, in Jones v. United States, 396 A.2d 183 (D.C. 1978) vac. on rehearing en banc on other grounds, D.C.App., 411 A.2d 624 (1980), the Court compared an M.H.C. committee's hearing......
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