U.S. v. Charley
| Decision Date | 03 February 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 03-10579.,03-10579. |
| Citation | 396 F.3d 1074 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Elvira CHARLEY, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Patrick E. McGillicuddy, Phoenix, AZ, for the defendant-appellant.
Paul K. Charlton, United States Attorney, District of Arizona, Michael T. Morrissey, Chief, Appellate Section, and Joan G. Ruffennach, Assistant United States Attorney, Phoenix, AZ, for the plaintiff-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona; Earl H. Carroll, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CR-02-00081-1-EHC.
Before: D.W. NELSON, KLEINFELD, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.
A federal jury convicted Elvira Charley of three counts of first degree murder in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111, 1153(a), and three counts of using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c), (j). Charley appeals her conviction alleging that the district court erred in denying motions to suppress her statements to law enforcement officers because the statements were obtained in violation of her rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.1 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
On the tragic morning of January 1, 2002, Elvira Charley shot three of her six children to death with a .22 caliber semi-automatic rifle, as they slept in the Charley family home located on the Navajo Indian Reservation in Klagetoh, Arizona. When the children were dead, Charley covered their bodies with blankets and went to the home of her aunt, Minnie Begay. After visiting with the Begays for more than an hour, Charley left, telling those present that she was going home to "check on her kids."
Charley later returned to the Begay residence with one of her remaining children, and then left again to make phone calls. She first called her estranged husband and told him that she had shot their three older children. After hanging up with her husband, Charley called the police dispatcher and asked for police assistance because, as she said, she had "done something bad." She gave the dispatcher directions to the Begay residence and asked the dispatcher to send someone quickly.
Charley then went back to the Begay residence and gave her children's birth certificates to one of her cousins saying, "take care of my kids, here [is] all the information you need." Charley did not explain why she needed someone to care for her children. When the police arrived, Charley began hugging her relatives, saying, "I'm sorry ... I wasn't strong enough."
Sergeant Wallace Billie and Peter Lincoln, an Emergency Medical Technician ("EMT") from the local fire department, were among the government officers dispatched to the Begay residence. Upon his arrival at the Begay home, Sergeant Billie observed Charley crying and hugging another female. Charley then handed Sergeant Billie the keys to her house, stating "that she'd done something very bad, and that she needed [Sergeant Billie] to check on her children." Charley also told Sergeant Billie that he was "going to have to put [her] away for a long time."
Several of Charley's relatives who were present at the Begay residence began asking Sergeant Billie what was going on. Sergeant Billie asked EMT Lincoln to escort Charley from the house so that Sergeant Billie could talk to Charley's relatives and explain what was happening.
While waiting for Sergeant Billie outside the Begay residence, Charley initiated a conversation with EMT Lincoln, whom she had known in a personal capacity for about twenty years. Charley addressed EMT Lincoln as "Peter" and volunteered that she had done "something very bad." Charley further told EMT Lincoln that she had killed her children and that the bodies were still at her house.
When Sergeant Billie came out to his patrol car, he told Charley, She replied, "You're going to have to take me away for a long time." Sergeant Billie placed Charley in the patrol car and she gave him directions to her house. When Sergeant Billie asked for permission to enter Charley's house, Charley responded, "Yes," urging him to hurry because the children were inside.
After finding the lifeless bodies of three of Charley's children inside the house, Sergeant Billie secured the scene, and proceeded to question Charley as she sat in his patrol car. The district court found that Charley received Miranda warnings before the interrogation began and that Charley "knowingly and voluntarily waived her rights and made statements" to Sergeant Billie. According to Sergeant Billie, Charley was coherent and did not appear to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol at this time. Moreover, there was no language barrier, and Charley was not handcuffed, threatened, or abused in any way. During the interview by Sergeant Billie in his car, Charley admitted to killing her children as they slept, and described the manner and order in which she had shot them. When the questioning ended, Sergeant Billie arrested Charley and escorted her to the tribal jail.
Charley made several unsolicited statements regarding her children to the booking personnel at the tribal jail as they were taking down her medical information. For example, she said, When asked if she had ever considered killing herself, Charley responded, "no," but further remarked, "[b]ut now I killed my own kids."
Charley was interviewed on the evening of January 1, 2002, by Special Agent Bradley Purscell of the FBI. Agent Purscell prefaced the interview by reading Charley the standard FBI advice of rights form. Charley reviewed and signed the form, telling Agent Purscell that she understood her rights and wished to waive them. The interview was conducted in English, with no language problems. Agent Purscell reported that Charley seemed coherent and did not appear to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Agent Purscell did not abuse or threaten Charley to make her talk.
During the session with Agent Purscell, Charley again admitted to shooting her three oldest children while they slept. She described the manner and order in which she had shot them, and told Purscell how she had covered the children's bodies with their blankets because she could not stand the sight of their blood. She also said, "you know what, I brought them into this world, and I took them from it, but they will always be with me."
Charley was arraigned in tribal court on January 2, 2002, for endangering the welfare of minors and for criminal homicide. Charley then told the tribal court that she wanted to consult with a lawyer before pleading to the tribal court charges against her.2 The tribal court entered a default plea of not guilty and scheduled a pretrial conference for Charley to attend at a later date after she had secured an attorney.
On January 3, 2002, Agent Purscell escorted Charley to her initial appearance in federal district court. During this trip, Agent Purscell again interviewed Charley. Before commencing this second interview, Agent Purscell again read Charley the Miranda warnings, and Charley again waived her rights by executing a written waiver. The responsive information that Charley gave in this second interview was substantially the same as the information she had given Agent Purscell on January 1, 2002.
Charley was subsequently indicted on three counts of first degree murder in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111, 1153(a), and three counts of use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c), (j). After her indictment, Charley filed motions to suppress the statements that she had made to law enforcement personnel on January 1, 2002, and on January 3, 2002. The district court conducted hearings on the motions to suppress, took the motions under advisement, and then denied them both.
In a seven-day trial, the government presented evidence including Charley's statements to Sergeant Billie and Agent Purscell which had not been suppressed.3 The jury found Charley guilty on all counts, three of first degree murder and three for firearm use in the murders. The district court then provisionally sentenced Charley to six consecutive life terms under 18 U.S.C. § 4244, and we consider in this opinion whether the district court committed reversible error in denying Charley's motions to suppress.
We review Charley's motions to suppress de novo. United States v. Crawford, 372 F.3d 1048, 1053 (9th Cir.2004) (en banc). The determination of whether a seizure exceeds the bounds of an investigatory Terry stop and becomes an arrest is also reviewed de novo. United States v. Miles, 247 F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir.2001). Charley's briefing on these issues is unclear. But her principal argument appears to be that the district court erred in declining to suppress the statements she made to Sergeant Billie on January 1, 2002, because, she argues that those statements were the fruits of an illegal arrest made without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Charley also contends that she was entitled to suppression of the incriminating statements she made to FBI Agent Purscell on January 3, 2002, because, she argues, those statements were obtained in violation of her Fifth Amendment right to counsel.
Charley maintains that the district court should have suppressed all the statements she made to Sergeant Billie on January 1, 2002, because those statements were the fruits of her allegedly illegal arrest and because the taint of this alleged illegal arrest was not purged by the Miranda warnings she received. Charley argues that the district court erred in finding that she was not in custody when Sergeant Billie took her from...
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