Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Roger Miller Music, Inc.

Decision Date28 January 2005
Docket NumberNo. 02-5766.,02-5766.
Citation396 F.3d 762
PartiesBROADCAST MUSIC, INC., Plaintiff, v. ROGER MILLER MUSIC, INC., Defendant-Appellant, Shannon Miller Turner, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

ARGUED: Walter Robert Thompson, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant. Jay S. Bowen, Bowen, Riley, Warnock & Jacobson, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Walter Robert Thompson, Nashville, Tennessee, John J. Griffin, Jr., Kay, Griffin, Enkema & Brothers, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant. Jay S. Bowen, Amy C. Martin, Bowen, Riley, Warnock & Jacobson, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellee. John C. Beiter, Robert L. Sullivan, Loeb & Loeb, Nashville, Tennessee, for Amici Curiae.

Before: SILER, DAUGHTREY, and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges.

GIBBONS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which SILER, J., joined. DAUGHTREY, J. (pp. 783-84), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.

OPINION

GIBBONS, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff Broadcast Music Inc. ("BMI") filed this interpleader action to determine what portion of the interpleaded funds it is required to pay to defendant-appellee Shannon Miller Turner and defendant-appellant Roger Miller Music, Inc. ("RMMI"). The interpleaded funds consist of royalties generated from BMI's licensing of certain songs written by country music legend Roger Miller. Turner, a daughter of Miller, is entitled to some of these royalties under the Copyright Act because the copyrights to the songs at issue were renewed after Miller died, vesting Turner with an interest in these copyrights pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 304(a). The extent of Turner's interest in these copyrights depends on the magnitude of the interest formerly held by Mary Arnold Miller, Roger Miller's widow, who also obtained an interest in the renewal copyrights pursuant to § 304(a), and by Roger Miller's other surviving children, who likewise obtained interests in the renewal copyrights. Turner argued before the district court that Mary Arnold Miller and Roger Miller's seven children, herself included, all held equal shares in the renewed copyrights and that, therefore, she is entitled to 1/8 (12.5%) of the renewal copyright royalties. RMMI, to which Mary Arnold Miller and all of Roger Miller's children except Turner have assigned their renewal copyright interests, argued that Mary Arnold Miller obtained a fifty-percent interest in the renewal copyrights as Miller's surviving spouse and that Roger Miller's children held equal shares in the remaining fifty-percent of the renewal copyrights, or 7.14% each. The district court found that § 304(a) provides that the surviving spouse and children of an author who originally copyrighted a work share equally in that work's renewal copyright when that copyright is renewed after the author's death. RMMI appeals the judgment of the district court. For the following reasons, we reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment for Turner, grant summary judgment for RMMI, and remand the case for distribution of the interpleaded funds.

I.

The facts in this case are undisputed. Roger Miller is a Grammy Award-winning legend of country music. Although Miller penned and performed many hit songs, he is most famous for the still-loved "King of the Road." Miller died on October 25, 1992. He is survived by his widow, Mary Arnold Miller, and seven children, including Turner.

This case concerns interests in the renewal copyrights of certain of Miller's works. A preliminary understanding of the renewal copyright scheme is necessary to appreciate the facts of the case. The Copyright Act provides that the copyright to any work copyrighted prior to January 1, 1978, endures for twenty-eight years from the date it was originally secured. 17 U.S.C. § 304(a)(1)(A). Once the twenty-eight year copyright period has expired, the copyright will be renewed for a term of sixty-seven years either by registration or, in the absence of registration, automatically. Id. § 304(a)(2)(B). If the copyright is renewed during the author's lifetime, the renewal copyright vests in the author. Id. § 304(a)(2)(B); 3 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 9.04 (2003) (hereinafter "Nimmer on Copyright"). If the author is deceased at the time of renewal but is survived by a spouse and/or children, the renewal copyright vests in the surviving spouse and/or children. 17 U.S.C. § 304(a)(2)(B); see also Nimmer on Copyright § 9.04[A]. The Copyright Act is silent, however, as to how the renewal copyright interest will be shared between an author's surviving spouse and children, which is the issue before us in this appeal.

Familiarity with some basics of the music industry is also crucial to understanding the nature of the dispute before the court. A person who writes a song often copyrights that song. The songwriter at that point owns 100% of that copyright. Generally, a songwriter assigns all of his interest in a copyrighted song to a music publisher. In return, the publisher agrees by contract to exploit the song on the market and to pay the writer royalties generated by such exploitation. Although arrangements vary by contract, the standard practice is that a publisher retains fifty-percent of the revenue generated by a song's exploitation (known as the publisher's share) and pays the other fifty-percent to the writer of the song (known as the writer's share).

Publishers, in turn, affiliate with performing rights organizations, which license the public performance rights of copyrighted musical compositions on behalf of their affiliates.1 By affiliating with such an organization, the publisher grants the organization the ability to license the public performance of the songs to which the publisher holds the copyright. BMI and the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers ("ASCAP") are the two principal performing rights organizations operating in the United States. These organizations pay to their affiliates in the form of royalties a portion of the revenues generated from licensing the public performance of songs. When a publisher affiliates with one of these organizations, it agrees to adhere to the articles and bylaws of the organization, which generally provide that public performance royalties will be divided between the publisher and the writer irrespective of other financial arrangements made between the those two parties. Commonly, writers and publishers agree to be paid their respective shares of performing rights royalties directly by the performing rights organization.

After Roger Miller's death, the copyrights to numerous songs penned and copyrighted by him prior to 1978 were renewed on separate occasions pursuant to § 304(a).2 These compositions are the subject of this dispute. Under § 304(a)(2)(B), these renewed copyrights vested in Mary Arnold Miller and Roger Miller's seven children. Mary Arnold Miller conveyed all of her renewal copyright interests3 to RMMI.4 Excepting Turner all of Roger Miller's children also assigned their present and future renewal copyright interests to RMMI.

BMI collected royalties by licensing the songs at issue after the original copyright on each song expired and was subsequently renewed. BMI initially distributed these royalties to RMMI, a BMI affiliate. On February 2, 2001, Turner's attorney wrote BMI a letter requesting that the company pay Turner all royalties collected for the licensing of Miller's songs in which she held a renewal copyright interest commensurate with her interest in those songs. Turner claimed that she held a 12.5%, or 1/8, share in renewal copyrights and that she was thereby entitled to 12.5% of all royalties generated by the songs in which she held such an interest. RMMI disputed Turner's assertion that she owned a 12.5% share in any of the songs at issue. Thereafter, BMI withheld disputed royalties. In a letter to Turner's attorney written Match 6, 2001, BMI suggested that the parties resolve the dispute amicably. The parties failed to do so.

In an effort to determine its obligations under federal law, BMI filed this interpleader action on May 18, 2001, in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1335, seeking a declaratory judgment as to the entitlement of RMMI and Turner to royalties generated from the licensing of Miller's songs. At the time of the complaint, the funds at issue amounted to $30,425.60. This sum represented 12.5% of the publisher's share of the royalties generated, or 6.25% of total royalties. On May 24, 2001, the district court ordered BMI to place those funds in an interest-bearing account. BMI complied with the order. RMMI filed a cross-claim against Turner on June 19, 2001. RMMI argued that Turner's claim for royalties was barred by laches and the three-year statute of limitations set forth in the Copyright Act at 17 U.S.C. § 507(b). Because its position was that Turner was entitled to 7.14% of the total royalties, RMMI did not dispute that Turner was entitled to the interpleaded funds; however, it asserted that she was not entitled to a full 12.5% of all royalties. In response, Turner filed a motion to dismiss the interpleader complaint on June 29, 2001. Turner asserted that the case should be dismissed since RMMI conceded that she was entitled to the interpleaded amount. However, after filing the interpleader complaint, BMI began withholding 12.5% of all royalties — both the writer's and publisher's share — generated from the public licensing of the songs at issue and notified the court that it intended to interplead these royalties in addition to the prior interpleaded funds, which consisted only of the publisher's share. The court ordered BMI to interplead these additional total royalties on August 1, 2001, and BMI again complied. As a result, the district court denied Turner's motion to dismiss, noting that — while the parties did not...

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