Detroit City Council v. Stecher

• Citation: 396 N.W.2d 444,153 Mich.App. 601
• Decision Date: 10 December 1986
• Docket Number: Docket Nos. 81675,81729
• Parties: DETROIT CITY COUNCIL, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Walter I. STECHER, Individually and as Budget Director for the City of Detroit, Defendant-Appellee. DETROIT CITY COUNCIL et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Walter I. STECHER, Individually and as Budget Director for the City of Detroit, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan (US)

Page 444

396 N.W.2d 444

153 Mich.App. 601

DETROIT CITY COUNCIL, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Walter I. STECHER, Individually and as Budget Director for

the City of Detroit, Defendant-Appellee.

DETROIT CITY COUNCIL et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Walter I. STECHER, Individually and as Budget Director for

the City of Detroit, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket Nos. 81675, 81729.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Jan. 8, 1986.

Decided June 4, 1986.

Released for Publication Dec. 10, 1986.

Colista & Urso by Philip Colista and Robert W. Palmer, Detroit, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Donald Pailen, Corp. Counsel, and Honigman, Miller, Schwartz & Cohn by James K. Robinson, Jay E. Brant and Lawrence A. Nathanson, Detroit, for defendant-appellee.

Before T.M. BURNS, P.J., and BEASLEY and PAJTAS, ^* JJ.

PER CURIAM.

These consolidated cases involve two disputes between the Detroit City Council (hereinafter referred to as "plaintiff") and the Detroit Budget Director. In Docket No. 81675, the circuit court denied plaintiff's request for a mandamus order which would require defendant to implement certain budget amendments enacted by the city council for the 1983-1984 fiscal year. The trial court held that the council was not empowered to enact budget amendments unless such amendments were requested by the mayor and conformed precisely to his proposals. In Docket No. 81729, the circuit court issued an order of mandamus directing the budget director to provide plaintiff with financial reports. The court held that the Uniform Budgeting and Accounting Act (UBAA), M.C.L. Sec. 141.421 et seq.; M.S.A. Sec. 5.3228(21) et seq., entitled the council to periodic financial reports prepared by the budget director. The city council appeals in Docket No. 81675 and the budget director appeals in Docket No. 81729.

We first address whether the trial court properly declined to issue a writ of mandamus regarding the council's budget amendments. A review of the parties' arguments reveals that the underlying issue is whether the budget amendments were valid. We hold that they were.

Section 17 of the UBAA authorized the city council to amend the budget. The relevant portion of that section stated:

"Except as otherwise provided in section 19, a deviation from the original general appropriations act shall not be made without amending the general appropriations act. The legislative body of the local unit shall amend the general appropriations act as soon as it becomes apparent that a deviation from the original general appropriations act is necessary and the amount of the deviation can be determined." M.C.L. Sec. 141.437; M.S.A. Sec. 5.3228(37).

Contrary to the trial court's conclusions, the council is not limited to making only those amendments which are requested by the mayor. Under Sec. 17, it is the mayor's duty to present "recommendations" to the council. The council remains the ultimate legislative decision-making body and retains the authority to exercise that function.

Moreover, we find that the city charter cannot validly restrict the council's ability to amend the budget. To the extent that the city charter imposes a greater burden on the city council than that required by statute, it is void. The home-rule statute provides that no charter provision shall conflict with or contravene the provisions of any general law of the state. M.C.L. Sec. 117.36; M.S.A. Sec. 5.2116. See also Marks v. Battle Creek, 358 Mich. 114, 117, 99 N.W.2d 587 (1959).

We further note that, because the city council adopted a budget amendment, the transfer provisions of the city charter and the UBAA are inapplicable.

Defendant argues that the method of amendment was inappropriate. This argument is meritless. Defendant ignores the distinction between resolutions and ordinances. See Detroit v. Detroit United Railway, 215 Mich. 401, 410-411, 184 N.W. 516 (1921). Because a budget amendment is adopted by resolution, the amendments were properly adopted under the city charter. See Home Rule Charter, City of Detroit, Sec. 4-113 (stating that acts other than those listed may be done by resolution). Thus, Sec. 6-114, which defendant relies upon, is not applicable. Section 8-208 of the city charter specifies the general procedures for budgetary amendment and adoption. In this case, the amending resolution was adopted by plaintiff on November 23, 1983. The mayor did not respond until December 5, 1983. Two days later, on December 7, 1983, the city council unanimously affirmed its November 23, 1983, resolution. Thus, plaintiff complied with the charter provisions and duly enacted the budget amendment. Defendant's failure to implement the budget amendments was a breach of his accepted duty as a member of the executive branch to carry out duly enacted laws of the legislature and a breach of his duty under Chapters 1 and 3 of the city charter.

Defendant also contends that plaintiff lacks standing in this case. We disagree. The requirement that a party bringing a suit have standing is used to ensure that only those who have a substantial interest in a dispute will be allowed to come into court to complain. Saginaw Public Libraries Bd. of Library Commr's. v. Judges of the 70th District Court, 118 Mich.App. 379, 385, 325 N.W.2d 777 (1982), lv. den. 417 Mich. 974 (1983). The standing doctrine recognizes that litigation should be conducted only by a party having an interest that will assure sincere and vigorous advocacy. Id. The threshold question is whether plaintiff has an interest in the outcome of the litigation sufficient to invoke the controversy resolving powers of the judiciary. Id. The UBAA specifically requires plaintiff to take action when necessary and authorizes the city council to require financial reports from the executive branch. The city council is one of only two parties who are directly involved in the budget process. As a legislative body, it obviously has an interest in making sure that the executive officers recognize the validity of its enactments. We conclude that plaintiff has a sufficient interest in the outcome of the litigation to assure a vigorous and sincere advocacy of the merits. Such an interest establishes the requisite standing.

However, even though plaintiff has the requisite standing, on the basis of the record before us we are not convinced that plaintiff is entitled to the requested relief. While the case is technically not moot because it presents issues which are capable of repetition and which would evade review, because the 1983-1984 fiscal year has long passed, there is some question as to whether the budget amendments may any longer be implemented. We can only assume that the appropriated funds have been spent and that the writ of mandamus requested by plaintiff would be of no practical effect. Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy. Clarke v. Hill, 132 Mich. 434, 93 N.W. 1044 (1903); Khan v. Jackson Prison Warden, 128 Mich.App. 224, 226, 340 N.W.2d 77 (1983). When there is a plain, direct and adequate alternative remedy, courts will not permit the use of a writ of mandamus. Coffin v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 114 Mich. 342, 72 N.W. 156 (1897). Mandamus is inappropriate where there is another adequate remedy in law or in equity. Clarke v. Hill, supra; Coates v. Attorney General, 120 Mich.App. 816, 820-821, 328 N.W.2d 113 (1982), lv. den. 418 Mich. 856 (1983). Mandamus will not issue to compel the doing of a vain and useless thing. Quandt v. Schwass, 286 Mich. 433, 438, 282 N.W. 206 (1938). If a question is moot and the granting of a writ of mandamus would serve no purpose, then mandamus should be denied. State Highway Comm'r. v. Ottawa Circuit Judge, 339 Mich. 390, 395; 63 N.W.2d 677 (1954). We therefore remand to the trial court for a determination of whether any action is now necessary.

We note that the UBAA does not provide an adequate alternative remedy in this case. Section 20 of the act, M.C.L. Sec. 141.440; ...