Hart v. Heffernan, 32502
| Citation | 397 A.2d 910,35 Conn.Supp. 101 |
| Decision Date | 15 June 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 32502,32502 |
| Court | Court of Common Pleas of Connecticut |
| Parties | Helen D. HART v. Gerald J. HEFFERNAN, Tax Commissioner of the State of Connecticut. |
Mark Kostecki, for plaintiff.
Carl R. Ajello, Atty. Gen. and Ralph G. Murphy, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant.
In this action the plaintiff appeals from the ruling of the state tax commissioner that she was not entitled to the benefits of General Statutes § 12-170a et seq., the so-called "Circuit Breaker." The facts are not in dispute. The plaintiff was the owner of and resided in a home on MacArthur Drive, Waterbury. By deed dated January 8, 1975, recorded January 31, 1975, the plaintiff conveyed the home to her daughter, who does not qualify for the tax relief, and in the conveyance she reserved "the use, occupancy, possession and enjoyment of the conveyed premises for the term of my natural life." "Circuit Breaker" benefits had been accorded to her for the real property tax bills payable through 1976. By letter dated April 27, 1977, the Waterbury assessor notified the plaintiff that by reason of the conveyance she was no longer entitled to that tax relief, and the tax bill on the list of October 1, 1976, payable July 1, 1977, was not computed in accordance with the "Circuit Breaker." The plaintiff requested a hearing which was held by an officer designated by the defendant, who affirmed that the form of ownership deprived her of those benefits.
Section 12-170a extends the relief to "(a)n owner of real property or any tenant for life or tenant for a term of years liable for real property taxes under section 12-48" who meets all other qualifications, the last not being in dispute. Therefore, if the plaintiff is liable under § 12-48 she is entitled to the relief; if she is not liable, the relief is not available.
Section 12-48 provides: "When one is entitled to the ultimate enjoyment of real or personal estate liable to taxation, and another is entitled to the use of the same as an estate for life or for a term of years by a gift or devise and not by contract, such estate shall be set in the list of the party in the immediate possession or use thereof . . . ." It goes on to provide that if the person in immediate possession or use fails to pay the tax, the remainderman may pay it and shall be subrogated to the rights and remedies of the tax collector.
The defendant contends that the words "by gift or devise and not by contract" modify not only "a term of years" but also "estate for life." Clearly the life estate with which we are concerned came about because of a reservation and not by "gift or devise."
There are very few cases concerning § 12-48. One of the few is White v. Portland, 67 Conn. 272, 34 A. 1022, in which the Supreme Court held the tax to be the responsibility of a widower who was a tenant by curtesy. Clearly such a life estate does not arise from "gift or devise." The court said (p. 275, 34 A. 1022 p. 1023):
At the time of White, what is now § 12-48 was § 3845 of the Revision of 1887. It read: "When one is entitled to the ultimate enjoyment of money at interest, land, or personal estate, and another is entitled to the use of the same as an estate for life, or for a term of years by gift or devise and not by contract, such estate shall be set in the list of the party in the immediate possession or use thereof. . . ."
The presence of the comma after "life," an item now omitted in § 12-48, completely changes the thrust of the statute. With the comma in, "by gift or devise and not by contract" clearly limits only "a term of years." Without it, it can be argued that it also applies to an "estate for life."
The comma was present in the earlier Revision of 1875, page 158, § 27; the later Revision of 1902, § 2341; and when the statute...
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