Roberts v. City of Shreveport

• Decision Date: 13 January 2005
• Docket Number: No. 03-30824.,03-30824.
• Citation: 397 F.3d 287
• Parties: Joyce C. ROBERTS, etc.; et al., Plaintiffs, Latasha Mills, on behalf of La'Quarshay Mills; Nicole Moton, on behalf of Kearra S. Moton, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. CITY OF SHREVEPORT, etc., et al., Defendants, City of Shreveport, on behalf of Police Department of Shreveport; Steve Prator, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

397 F.3d 287

Joyce C. ROBERTS, etc.; et al., Plaintiffs, Latasha Mills, on behalf of La'Quarshay Mills; Nicole Moton, on behalf of Kearra S. Moton, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. CITY OF SHREVEPORT, etc., et al., Defendants, City of Shreveport, on behalf of Police Department of Shreveport; Steve Prator, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 03-30824.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

January 13, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Hersy Jones, Jr. (argued), Law Office of Hersy Jones, Jr., Shreveport, LA, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

James Richard Sterritt (argued), Gregg A. Wilkes, Cook, Yancey, King & Galloway, Shreveport, LA, for Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana.

Before JONES, SMITH and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge:

Defendant-Appellants City of Shreveport and Police Chief Steve Prator appeal the district court's denial of summary judgment, arguing that each is entitled to qualified immunity from this § 1983 lawsuit. As to Defendant-Appellant City of Shreveport and Defendant-Appellant Steve Prator in his official capacity, we DISMISS the appeals for lack of jurisdiction. As to Defendant-Appellant Steve Prator in his individual capacity, we REVERSE the district court and RENDER judgment, dismissing him from the instant action on the basis of qualified immunity.

I. Background

On Sunday morning, March 14, 1999, Officer Robert Rivet ("Officer Rivet") of the Shreveport, Louisiana Police Department was working as a crossing guard for the Springs of Grace Baptist Church. Although Officer Rivet was working off-duty, he was wearing a distinctive police baseball cap and jacket. With traffic stopped in both directions, Officer Rivet escorted a woman and her child across the street using the crosswalk. As the group reached the middle of the street, a car approached.¹

While attempting to get the pedestrians out of the way, Officer River signaled to the driver, Undray Carter ("Carter"), to slow down and stop. Although the parties give widely divergent accounts of the ensuing moments, they agree that Officer Rivet ended up on the hood of Carter's vehicle.² Officer Rivet struck Carter's windshield twice with his service revolver and ordered him to stop the car. Carter, cursing, applied the brakes, then the gas, sequentially, apparently trying to throw Officer Rivet off the car. This jerking motion threw Officer Rivet to the driver's side of the car. As he was falling, Officer Rivet fired a single, fatal shot at Carter. Officer Rivet gave no warning before discharging his weapon as he was thrown from the moving vehicle.

Plaintiffs, LaTasha Mills (on behalf of her minor child, La'Quarshay Mills) and Nicole Moton (on behalf of her minor child, Kearra Moton), brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Louisiana state tort law against Officer Rivet, former Chief of Police Steve Prator (in both his official and individual capacities), the City of Shreveport, Springs of Grace Baptist Church, and emergency medical personnel Greg Jackson, Chuck Justice, and Jeff Dixon, alleging that the defendants violated Carter's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures. The district court severed the claims against Officer Rivet and held a jury trial. The jury returned a special verdict, finding (1) that Officer Rivet used excessive force in this incident, but also (2) that Officer Rivet's conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law. Based on these findings, the district court dismissed the § 1983 claims against Officer Rivet on qualified immunity grounds.

Following the dismissal of the § 1983 claims against Officer Rivet, the remaining defendants moved for summary judgment, invoking qualified immunity as a shield to further proceedings. On July 24, 2003, the district court, in a one-page order without accompanying decision, denied the motion with respect to defendants Chief Prator and the City of Shreveport. That decision is the subject of the instant appeal.

II. Jurisdiction

As an exception to the principle that interlocutory review of district court decisions is not permitted, this court has jurisdiction to review denials of qualified immunity with respect to government officers sued in their individual capacities, so long as that determination turns on a matter of law. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2815- 16, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985); Feagley v. Waddill, 868 F.2d 1437, 1439 (5th Cir.1989).³ Our authority to review a judgment on an interlocutory basis does not, however, extend to all entities or all § 1983 claims. As relevant here, "[m]unicipal governments may not raise immunity defenses on interlocutory appeal." Jacobs v. West Feliciana Sheriff's Dep't, 228 F.3d 388, 392 (5th Cir.2000) (citing Nicoletti v. City of Waco, 947 F.2d 190, 191 (5th Cir.1991) (determining that a suit against a municipal officer in his official capacity is a suit against the municipality itself such that interlocutory appeal is barred)).

Here, we have jurisdiction to review the district court's denial of summary judgment to Chief Prator in his individual capacity. The Chief's motion challenged plaintiffs' evidence of failure to train or supervise, causation, pattern of unconstitutional conduct, and deliberate indifference, as well as whether the Chief's conduct was objectively unreasonable. Because, on this record, the district court's determinations can be reviewed as a matter of law, we have appellate jurisdiction over Chief Prator's individual claim of qualified immunity. However, as the right to interlocutory review does not extend to municipalities or municipal officers sued in their official capacities, we must DISMISS the claims of both the City of Shreveport and of Chief Prator in his official capacity.

III. Standard of Review

We review the district court's summary judgment decision de novo, using the same standard as the district court. Keenan v. Tejeda, 290 F.3d 252, 258 (5th Cir.2002); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. More specifically, "[w]hether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on a question of law, is a question that we review de novo ...." Keenan, 290 F.3d at 261 (citing Kennedy v. Tangipahoa Parish Library Bd. of Control, 224 F.3d 359, 376-77 (5th Cir.2000)). In making this determination, we review the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. In re Millette, 186 F.3d 638, 641 (5th Cir.1999). Thus, in this case we review the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.

IV. Qualified Immunity

The plaintiffs allege that Chief Prator violated Carter's Fourth Amendment rights because he acted in an objectively unreasonable manner by failing to train Officer Rivet properly. Before this court—or any court—can adjudicate the merits of this claim, the plaintiffs must overcome the bar of qualified immunity. Chief Prator argues that the district court should have granted him qualified immunity because (1) his actions were objectively reasonable; (2) the plaintiffs cannot meet their burden on the failure to train claim; and (3) this case does not meet this circuit's standards for the "single incident exception" for supervisory liability.

When applicable, qualified immunity protects public officials from both recovery of damages and trial.⁴ As a prerequisite, a plaintiff "must identify defendants who were either personally involved in the constitutional violation or whose acts are causally connected to the constitutional violation alleged." Woods v. Edwards, 51 F.3d 577, 583 (5th Cir.1995) (citing Lozano v. Smith, 718 F.2d 756, 768 (5th Cir.1983)). "Under section 1983, supervisory officials are not liable for the actions of subordinates on any theory of vicarious liability." Thompson v. Upshur County, 245 F.3d 447, 459 (5th Cir.2001) (quoting Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir.1987)). To establish § 1983 liability against supervisors, the plaintiff must show that: (1) the police chief failed to supervise or train the officer; (2) a causal connection existed between the failure to supervise or train and the violation of the plaintiff's rights; and (3) the failure to supervise or train amounted to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional rights. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989); Burge v. St. Tammany Parish, 336 F.3d 363, 370 (5th Cir.2003).

Plaintiffs allege that Chief Prator failed to train Officer Rivet sufficiently. Chief Prator responds that this issue is foreclosed in his favor because the jury verdict in Officer Rivet's trial found Rivet's conduct objectively reasonable. Chief Prator is incorrect. The jury, after all, found that Officer Rivet violated Carter's constitutional rights, even though it also accepted Officer Rivet's defense that his conduct was objectively reasonable. Under such circumstances, Chief Prator remains vulnerable to a failure to train claim because the plaintiffs may be able to demonstrate that by his failure to train or supervise adequately, he both caused Carter's injuries and acted deliberately indifferent to violations of Fourth Amendment rights by Shreveport police officers, including Officer Rivet. See, e.g., Snyder v. Trepagnier, 142 F.3d 791, 800 (5th Cir.1998) (quoting Melear v. Spears, 862 F.2d 1177, 1187-88 (5th Cir.1989) (Higginbotham, J., concurring) ("It is possible for the jury to find that, although the actual circumstances of the search did not justify the officer's behavior, the circumstances that appeared to the officer would have justified a search.... It might be possible for the jury to resolve factual ambiguities so as to conclude that a constitutional violation took place, even though it is not possible for the jury to resolve factual ambiguities so as to conclude that the violation was the product of an objectively unreasonable mistake.") (internal citations and alterations omitted)). The jury's...