Lillbask ex rel. Mauclaire v. Conn. Dept. of Educ.

Citation397 F.3d 77
Decision Date02 February 2005
Docket NumberNo. 03-7274.,03-7274.
PartiesIngabritt LILLBASK, as legal guardian on behalf of Lindsey MAUCLAIRE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE OF CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Theodore S. Sergi, Commissioner, Connecticut State Board of Education, Mary Gelfman, Hearing Officer, Kenneth Freeston, Superintendent of Redding Schools, and Redding Board of Education, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit)

Winona W. Zimberlin, Hartford, Connecticut, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Nyle K. Davey, Assistant Attorney General, for Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General for the State of Connecticut, Hartford, Connecticut, for Defendants-Appellees State of Connecticut Department of Education, Theodore Sergi, Connecticut State Board of Education, and Mary Gelfman.

Richard J. Buturla, Bercham, Moses & Devlin, P.C., Milford, Connecticut, for Defendants-Appellees Kenneth Freeston and Redding Board of Education.

Kelly D. Balser, Senior Staff Attorney (Patrice A. McCarthy, General Counsel, on the brief), Connecticut Association of Boards of Education, Wethersfield, Connecticut; Julie Underwood, General Counsel, and Naomi Gittins, Senior Staff Attorney, National School Boards Association, Alexandria, Virginia, for amici curiae Connecticut Association of Boards of Education and National School Boards Association.

Ralph F. Boyd, Jr., Assistant Attorney General (Mark L. Gross and Karl N. Gellert, Attorneys, on the brief), Civil Rights Division, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; Brian Jones, General Counsel, and Kala Shah Surprenant, Attorney, Office of General Counsel, United States Department of Education, Washington, D.C., for amici curiae United States and United States Department of Education.

Before: FEINBERG, KEARSE, and RAGGI, Circuit Judges.

RAGGI, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-appellant, Ingabritt Lillbask, the legal guardian of Lindsey Mauclaire, a disabled child, sued defendants-appellees, the Connecticut Department of Education, Commissioner Theodore S. Sergi, the Connecticut Board of Education, Hearing Officer Mary Gelfman, the Redding Board of Education, and Redding School Superintendent Kenneth Freeston (hereinafter "defendants"), for violations of both the United States and Connecticut Constitutions as well as various federal and state statutes, notably the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1490 (2000)1; the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-7961 (2000); and Connecticut's special education law, Conn. Gen.Stat. §§ 10-76a-10-76gg (2003). Lillbask now appeals from a final judgment entered in defendants' favor on February 13, 2003, in the District of Connecticut (Peter C. Dorsey, Judge). The judgment followed a bench trial, after which the district court issued a detailed unpublished Memorandum of Decision concluding that plaintiff had failed to carry her burden on the claim of retaliation in violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. The district court had previously issued two published decisions resolving cross-motions for summary judgment on all other claims in favor of defendants. See Lillbask v. Sergi, 193 F.Supp.2d 503 (D.Conn.2002); Lillbask v. Sergi, 117 F.Supp.2d 182 (D.Conn.2000).

On this appeal, Lillbask challenges certain rulings made by the district court on summary judgment. Specifically, she faults the court for (1) rejecting as a matter of law her IDEA challenge to defendants' proposal to place Lindsey in a private special education facility for the 1997-1998 school year,2 (2) holding that Conn Gen.Stat. § 10-76h(a)(1) was neither inconsistent with nor preempted by IDEA, and (3) rejecting as a matter of law her procedural challenges to administrative proceedings relating to Lindsey's placement. Defendants counter that Lillbask's first and second points are moot and that her third lacks merit. We agree with defendants that Lillbask's challenges to (1) the proposed 1997-1998 placement for Lindsey and (2) the application of Conn. Gen.Stat. § 10-76h(a)(1) no longer present live controversies. With respect to her challenges to administrative proceedings before individual hearing officers, we affirm the district court's judgment with respect to the proceedings before the third hearing officer, but we reverse with respect to the proceedings before the second hearing officer, defendant Gelfman.

Background
I. Statutory Framework

Because the facts relevant to this appeal involve decisions made pursuant to IDEA, we begin with a brief overview of that statute. We have previously characterized the IDEA as part of "`an ambitious federal effort to promote the education of handicapped children.'" Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir.1998) (quoting Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 179, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982) (discussing predecessor statutes, the Education of the Handicapped Act ("EHA"), 91 Pub.L. No. 230, 84 Stat. 175 (1970), and the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub.L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975), which were subsequently amended and renamed IDEA, Pub.L. No. 102-119, § 1, 105 Stat. 587, 587 (1991))). Pursuant to IDEA, Congress "offers federal funds to states that demonstrate, inter alia, that they have developed plans to assure `all children with disabilities residing in the state' a `free appropriate public education.'" Mackey v. Board of Educ., 386 F.3d 158, 159-60 (2d Cir.2004) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A)). The statute is not neutral in its view of what generally constitutes an appropriate public education for children with disabilities. Rather, IDEA "expresses a strong preference" for disabled children "to be educated, `to the maximum extent appropriate,' together with their non-disabled peers" and, accordingly, requires "special education and related services [to] be provided in the least restrictive setting consistent with a child's needs." Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d at 122 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A)).

"The `centerpiece' of the IDEA's education delivery system is the `individualized education program,' or `IEP.'" Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Board of Educ., 297 F.3d 195, 197 (2d Cir.2002) (quoting Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988)); see 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (defining and describing the development, review, and revision of an IEP). "The IEP, the result of collaborations between parents, educators, and representatives of the school district, `sets out the child's present educational performance, establishes annual and short-term objectives for improvements in that performance, and describes the specially designed instruction and services that will enable the child to meet those objectives.'" Id. (quoting Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. at 311, 108 S.Ct. 592).

"IDEA also provides a variety of `procedural safeguards with respect to the provision of free appropriate public education' by school districts." Mackey v. Board of Educ., 386 F.3d at 160 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a)); see also Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d at 122-23 (describing procedural safeguards). Most relevant for our purposes, IDEA requires states to provide a disabled child's parent or guardian with "an opportunity to present complaints with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6). In response to such a complaint, a state or local hearing officer must conduct an "impartial due process hearing" and render a decision. Id. § 1415(f). A parent or guardian dissatisfied with that decision may appeal to the "State educational agency," which in turn must conduct "an impartial review." Id. § 1415(g).

Although "[t]he responsibility for determining whether a challenged IEP will provide a child with an appropriate public education rests in the first instance with administrative hearing and review officers," Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d at 129, "[t]heir rulings are ... subject to `independent' judicial review," id. (quoting Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205, 102 S.Ct. 3034); see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) (providing that "any party aggrieved by the findings and decision" of the administrative review officers "shall have the right to bring a civil action" in state or federal court). In conducting judicial review, federal courts are "expected to give `due weight' to [the administrative] proceedings, mindful that the judiciary generally `lack[s] the "specialized knowledge and experience" necessary to resolve "persistent and difficult questions of educational policy."'" Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d at 129 (quoting Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206, 208, 102 S.Ct. 3034 (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973))). But, "the `due weight' we ordinarily must give to the state administrative proceedings is not implicated with respect to ... issue[s] of law," such as "the proper interpretation of the federal statute and its requirements." Mrs. B. v. Milford Board of Educ., 103 F.3d 1114, 1122 (2d Cir.1997). As the district court properly observed in this case, "[s]tate hearing officers are not more experienced or expert than courts in interpreting federal statutes or the federal constitution," and, therefore, "deference is not warranted." Lillbask v. Sergi, 117 F.Supp.2d at 187.

Significantly, IDEA contains a "stay put" provision requiring that, "during the pendency of any proceedings [regarding a parent's or guardian's complaints about an IEP], unless the State or local educational agency and the parents otherwise agree, the child shall remain in the then-current educational placement of such child." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j); see also Mackey v. Board of Educ., 386 F.3d at 163...

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